


STUDIES IN VEDANTISM



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Comparative Studies
in

VEDĀNTISM

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BY

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR, M.A., Ph.D.

*Professor of Philosophy, Sanskrit College; Author of 'System of
Vedāntic thought and culture.'*



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
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‘विद्ययामृतमश्नुते’

‘Knowledge gives immortality’



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TO
MY MOTHER



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PREFACE

MY apology for publishing and presenting this volume to the world is the dignified position that Vedāntism occupies in the history of thought and in the field of Indian Culture.

Vedāntism has a long history, and thinker after thinker in the long race of commentators has had his say upon the Brahmasūtras, which represent in condensed form the wisdom of the Upaniṣads. The orthodox Vedic teachers claim, and not without reason, that truth is revealed in our loftiest intuitions. What passes down from the seer requires a logical thinking before it can be understood by the less illuminated souls. Vedāntism is thus in its initiation a body of intuitions and in its growth a collective system of philosophy. Though the later teachers render allegiance to the infallibility of the śruti, still, the free growth of philosophic thinking and construction has not been checked. And in the history of development, the more we make our advance, the more are we impressed by the diversity of thought, the complexity of concepts and the subtlety of reasoning. Vedāntism in its later development has become a pyramid of conceptual construction, so to speak. A vast philosophic literature has developed and is being developed on Vedāntism, which still is the only living system in Indian Philosophy.

The perusal of these pages, I expect, will acquaint the reader with the growth of thought in Vedāntism and exhibit to him the fact that Vedāntic teachers have thought in concepts similar to those of Western

thinkers, have shown the highest logical acumen and have not been lacking in philosophic boldness in pressing, as they do, their conclusions to a logical end. Though their works may sometimes be thought deficient in the scientific analogies, employed in the philosophy of the day, yet their acuteness in logic, their depth of metaphysical reflection and their keenness of intuitive penetration, and above all their deep conviction in, and whole-hearted call to the life of transcendent bliss do not leave the least trace of doubt that they have established a sufficient claim to be heard. Philosophy knows no barrier of land, time and civilization, and in all humility I suggest that Vedāntism as a system of thought has not outgrown its importance and usefulness. As speculative thinking it is deeply instructive, as a promise of life it is highly inspiring, as a solace in affliction it is unfailingly consoling. In the Valhalla of the world's creative geniuses and seers the Vedāntic teachers occupy undoubtedly a high place.

It is not possible to do justice in this little volume to all the teachers—and their number is a legion—of Vedāntism. This book is no history of Vedāntism, nor a complete presentation of thought of all its teachers and commentators. I have only attempted to indicate the fundamental concepts of Vedāntism, a comparative study in the different lines of thinking of these problems. I have, therefore, before me the two types of thought—Transcendentalism of the Advaitins and Theism of the Vaiṣṇavas. Among Vaiṣṇava teachers I have attempted to throw light on the systems of Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva, Nimvārka and the Bengal School. Though the main profession of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta has been theistic, yet the Vaiṣṇava teachers have minor differences amongst themselves, and the cast of Vaiṣṇavic thought

has different moulds to suit the minor differences in logic.

The one difficulty that a reader may find in following these pages is the introduction in the chapter on the creative order of some forms of theological mysticism which make a demand upon our credence. The evolution of the world process is still involved in mystery, and philosophy until this day, except for setting forth some general theories of cosmogony, has not shown in detail the successive phases of creative evolution. But in Vedāntism we have schemes of evolution which mark out the details and show the successive stages, and in this respect they have a value. In working upon Indian philosophy I feel the irresistible impulse to introduce some elements which may appear to scientific minds as not strictly philosophic, but without which the statements of systems appear incomplete and partial. And on these elements mysticism will throw a flood of light, which is not possible for reason, as such, completely to divine and fully to digest.

The complete presentation of the Vedāntic system demands a treatment of Vedāntism as a discipline in life; for Vedāntism, rightly understood, is as much an art of life as a science of thinking, and life ultimately in its fullness of growth embraces Truth and finds its meaning and purpose therein. And it will not be wrong to say that Vedāntic systems are ultimately attitudes of life and consciousness, which subsequently find out a logical support and basis. Though the later teachers are found engrossed in working at the concepts, yet these concepts are formed and woven out of a demand to meet the requirement of the particular attitude of consciousness. And in the history of Vedāntism two attitudes of knowledge and

love have almost become fixed, and the psychological demands have given two types of philosophical concepts and thinking. I do not minimize the importance of logical and conceptual thinking in Vedāntism, but what I feel is that Vedāntic teachers, led by an unfailing instinct of some demands in consciousness, have freely created concepts, and in doing this they have recognized the superior claim of life and its intuition.

I may conveniently indicate the fundamental features of the systems.

9 Vedāntism is the philosophy of the self-conscious. It is pre-eminently the search for the self. This is undoubtedly true of Advaitism. No less true is it of Vaiṣṇavism. Though Vaiṣṇavism has in it the supreme stress upon God-consciousness, still it cannot ignore that God-consciousness is metaphysically an implication of self-consciousness and psychologically involved in it. The religious consciousness buds with the Kaiṅkarya-consciousness, the clear realization of the self as intimately related to God and ultimately dependent upon it. The sense of dependence is a natural consequence of the Kaiṅkarya-consciousness and follows it. The Kaiṅkarya-consciousness is akin to what Dr. Otto calls Creature-consciousness, but it has this difference that it connotes a nearness to God and spiritual relationship with Him. In Creature-consciousness the sense of utter helplessness is evident, in the Kaiṅkarya-consciousness the sense of helplessness is substituted by the feeling of security of a fellowship with the Infinite with touches of the delight of such a consummation. The love-consciousness is the blossom of self-consciousness and is based and grounded upon it.

Śaṅkara's Philosophy in the realistic aspect does accept the relativistic consciousness which reveals the

duality of subject and object. The aesthetic intuitions of sweetness and beauty, the religious sense of devotion and surrender are to Śaṅkara empiric and float in immanent consciousness. Śaṅkara cannot deny the basic foundation of experience, for this is so clear an implication in life and consciousness that none can deny it unless the divided consciousness be passed over. Śaṅkara soars beyond the psychological duality in transcendence. The transcendent revelation is called vidyā or knowledge. The divided consciousness is ignorance or avidyā. Avidyā gives us imperfect or partial knowledge and in passing from avidyā to vidyā we pass over half and incomplete truths and attain the fuller vision of truth and knowledge. The budding of self-consciousness is an effect of avidyā; self-consciousness, which is the datum of theistic conception, is, according to Śaṅkara, the datum of empiric intuitions. Śaṅkara distinguishes between consciousness and the self, and thinks that the self, though a native accompaniment of consciousness, is not in it. To mean the one for the other is avidyā. The term 'avidyā' has a different sense in Śaṅkara and in Rāmānuja. Avidyā in Śaṅkara's system lies at the root of cosmic experience, including self-consciousness. In theistic system it can produce ignorance, but cannot create experience. Avidyā, in Śaṅkara, creates the cosmic subject and originates the cosmic experience; in theistic teachers the cosmic consciousness is never subject to avidyā and has no touch with it. Māyā spins out a universe out of herself under the control of Īśvara, the cosmic subject. In theistic philosophy the world history might have occasional lapses, but transcendent revelations in spirit cannot for a moment be stopped. Such is not the case with Śaṅkara. The transcendent here is still and has no necessity of self-

revelation. Saṃkara feels that self-revelation may be true of a personal God, but it cannot be true of the Absolute. The demand of a god-head is the demand of the practical reason, but such a vision and such a satisfaction are an ascent in māyā and a move in divided consciousness. Avidyā is still operative and has a spiritual drama in it. The intuition is still empiric, however lofty and inspiring it may be. Such experiences are experiences in self-consciousness and cannot compare with the freedom, ease and joy of the transcendence. This is the meaning of Saṃkara's philosophy.

I take this opportunity of expressing my obligations to Pandit Gourasundar Bhāgavatācārya for his illuminating exposition of the philosophy of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism, and to Professor Rādhākṛṣṇan of the Calcutta University for his readiness to read the book in manuscript and for his valuable suggestions. I must express my gratitude to my esteemed colleague Professor Shyamacharan Mukherjee for his kindness in reading large portions of proofs and offering valuable corrections. Finally, I have to express my thanks to my pupils Messrs. Shyamacharan Bhattacharjya, B.A., Nepalchandra Mukherji, B.A., Sudhir Kumar Sircar, B.A., Payaskanti Sircar, and Nalini Kumar Dutt, for their kind assistance in proof-reading and transliteration.

Apart from the original sources mentioned in the footnotes I have had to refer to Sir B. N. Seal's admirable work, *Comparative Studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity*.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR.

SARADA-SAPTAMI,

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CHAPTER I

EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH

Being, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja—Epistemological basis of Vedānta—The controversy of indeterminate and determinate cognition—The static and dynamic character of knowledge—Jīva Gosvāmī's attempt at a synthesis—Immediate intuition or simple apprehension, the psychological minimum but the metaphysical Absolute—Śaṅkara accepts the minimum and denies relational development and synthesis—Rāmānuja denies the minimum and makes knowledge synthetic—Jīva Gosvāmī accepts both—An apparent homogeneity passing into heterization—Citsukācārya and Nigamānta Mahādeśika on Bheda-consciousness—Nyāyāmṛta's charge—Madhusūdan's reply—Intuition, its character—Madhusūdan, Rāmānuja, Valadeva and Madhva—Rāmānuja accepts the mutuality of subject and object—Padmapāda denies it and affirms the absolute independence of percipi—Sākṣī consciousness—Its different connotation in Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Valadeva and Nyāyāmṛta—Dialectic on Sākṣī—Sākṣī in deep sleep—Suṣupti and Turīya—Consciousness as intuition and notion—position and projection—Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara—Absolute Sat, Cit, Ānanda—Brahman, personal and impersonal—Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja accept the logic of Identity—Being is the fundamental conception—No reference to non-Being—Śaṅkara on relation concept—Rāmānuja on relational synthesis—Rāmānuja rejects the relation of co-inherence and accepts the relation of non-difference—Criticism of the relation of non-difference—Jīva Gosvāmī's assertion of Svarūpa relation—Criticism—Bliss identified with Consciousness—Bliss is expression—Rāmānuja accepts and Śaṅkara denies a distinctive trait of bliss in the Absolute—Dialectic on Bliss—Nyāyāmṛta—Advaita Siddhi—Madhva follows Rāmānuja—Viśeṣa—Līlā—Self-expression—An expressive and receiving current—The absolute life in theistic Vedāntism, in Nityabībhūti and in Līlābībhūti.

The outstanding feature that marks thought in Vedāntism is that it begins with the ontological problem. And this is mainly because Vedāntism is systematic thinking based upon and partially determined by the Upaniṣads, which begin with a categorical affirmation of the substance. And this Reality in the common terminology of the Upaniṣads is Brahman. Though the different schools of Vedāntism have solid differences among them regarding the conception of Brahman as the basic reality of the cosmic order, and, though, besides this, other categories of existence have been advanced as equally real, none have denied the truth of existence to be Brahman, which is substance *per se*.

Brahman is Saccidānandam. It is Being, it is Consciousness, it is Bliss. Vedāntists agree thus far. As soon as they come to the clear definition of Being, they differ among themselves. And this difference becomes evident in the two widely divergent types of thought, Transcendentalism and Theism.

Śaṅkara's conception of Being as homogeneity of consciousness and blissfulness of Existence exclusive of determination offers a bold contrast to the theistic conception of the Absolute as inclusive of infinite determination and endless qualification. To Śaṅkara determination is negation of Being, to determine it is to deny its absoluteness.

To Rāmānuja the Absolute is the synthesis which does not deny qualifications, but, on the other hand, expresses its fullness through the richness of existences. It is the Being of infinite attributes, the supreme Being of sweetness, goodness, and wisdom.

But all teachers of Vedāntism make consciousness the supreme fact and ground of all knowledge and experience. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka has it that even after

the light of the Sun, the Moon and the Fire has been put out, the light of consciousness shines in silent splendour and serene delight. The most intimate fact in experience is this consciousness, and the philosophic search must, therefore, begin with a thorough logical determination of knowledge as revealed in our introspective insight and psychical analysis.

Both Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's ontological conceptions are, therefore, based upon the psychological nature of knowledge.

Epistemological Basis.

Śaṅkara makes a distinction between the changing character of thought and the immutable character of pure cognition and opines that thought by reason of its involving relations cannot be adequate to the Absolute which is non-relational in character. Śaṅkara has, therefore, to assert the pure static character of the Absolute, for this is in consistence with a changeless indeterminate existence. Thought, on the other hand, has its origin in the world of relation and use in the world of determination—a sphere where it is confronted by the multiplicity of existences to be synthesized in an integral conception. It is consequently out of touch with the native homogeneity of absolute existence which transcends the operation of thought. Moreover, thought is fully aware that in understanding relations or in establishing them it cannot appropriate the original task of absolute cognition to illuminate facts and their relations. Thought, therefore, by necessity presupposes the existence of something which reveals its own existence and its objects. This revelation is not innate in thought. It is acquired. This perception is the absolute cognition. It is processless accomplished perception. The Naiyāyika distinction of

indeterminate and determinate cognition, denying or implying relations in knowledge, has been accepted by Śaṅkara, though he attributes determinate cognition to thought and indeterminate cognition to pure consciousness (dr̥śī) transcending the operation of the thinking process.

Rāmānuja¹ denies the indeterminate character of cognition in the sense of transcendent apperception. He defines the term in another way. To him all knowledge connotes relation. It is the unit of judgment. Absolute cognition without any determination is not knowledge. Knowledge, in order to be knowledge, must unfold and develop the system of relations through which it asserts its own existence. It is the accomplishing process which understands its nature better, the more it recognizes the relation of things and existences. Knowledge is not cognition, to be knowledge it should be recognition as well. There is an immanent necessity in the very nature of knowledge to establish the determinate relation involved in recognition. This makes knowledge a dynamic stress which goads it to transcend its indeterminate existence and to develop fully its determinate character. The difference between determinate and indeterminate cognition in Rāmānuja's system ultimately resolves itself into one of degree and not of

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya* (Jāvaji's Edition), p. 73, ll. 1-9.

Pratyakṣasya nirvikalpakasavikalpakabhedabhinnasya na nirviśeṣavastuni pramāṇābhāvaḥ | Savikalpakam jatyadyanekapadārthaviśiṣṭa-viśayatvadeva saviśeṣaviśayam | Nirvikalpakam pi saviśeṣaviśayameva ; savikalpake svaminnanubhūtapadārthaviśiṣṭapratisaṁdhānahelutvāt | Nirvikalpakam nāma kenacitviśeṣeṇa vijuktasya grahaṇam, na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya ; tathābhūtasya kadācidapi grahaṇādarśanāt, anupapatteśca | Kenacidviśeṣeṇedamitthamiti hi sarvā pratītirūpa-jāyate ; trikoṇasāśnādisamsthānaviśeṣeṇavinā kasyachidapi padārthasya grahaṇāyogāt. | Ato nirvikalpakameka jātīyadravyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇam, dvitīyādiṇḍagrahaṇam savikalpakamityucyate | Tatra prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe gotvāderanuvṛtilākāratā na pratīyate, dvitīyādiṇḍagrahaṇeṣvevānuvṛtipratītiḥ.

kind. With the increase of clearness and distinctness of knowledge implying the active exercise of memory an indeterminate cognition acquires a determinate character. This distinction has a value as marking the potentiality and the actuality of relations involved in knowledge, the potentio and the actuo of thought in its undeveloped form and apparent homogeneity and its fully developed and clearly borne out synthetic unity. In other words all cognition is recognition, all knowledge qualified and differentiated. When knowledge is not developed in full synthesis, it remains to us as partially determinate. Such a cognition is called indeterminate in the sense that it cannot be seen in its complete connotation and fullness of relation. The fundamental difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja thus begins with the static and the dynamic character of knowledge. Śaṅkara's absolute transcends the operation of thought, Rāmānuja's is essentially self-conscious principle which reveals its true nature in the synthetic unity of apperception. The one denies all determination and is the absolute consciousness, the other includes all determination and is the identity that expresses itself through infinite qualifications.

The charge that thought as a dynamic existence requires the illumination of consciousness would create a division in the integrity of spiritual existence. It would perforce make thought a blind activity and destroy its teleological character. The very nature of thought as a synthetic activity propounds at once its relational character. In this teleological purposiveness thought unfolds its own nature at first in a differentiating activity of understanding an antithesis between self and its objects and subsequently apprehending its synthetic character potentially involved in the analytic process.

Rāmānuja recognizes an effort in (the very nature of) consciousness to relate itself to object in order to be explicitly conscious of its character as self-cognizer. This effort does not end in cognizing the subject and the object, but directs itself to understand the illumination of object as an integral part of its own being. It soon discovers a unity, which keeps its existence through the triple activity of positing itself, projecting itself and finally understanding the projection and the revelation of object as elements of its own being.¹

Jīva Gosvāmī, the exponent of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism, differs from Rāmānuja and finds a place for indeterminate cognition in transcendent apperception. The distinction of indeterminate and determinate cognition is accepted. The determinate character is involved potentially in the indeterminate form, not as an accidental qualification, but as a predicate. It does not reveal itself in the first act of perception. The first act of cognition is strictly indeterminate: it is simple apprehension without any cognizance of relation. To Rāmānuja this relation is clear before view, though not fully cognized in its entire bearing. But the acceptance of nirvikalpa prajñā—indeterminate cognition—does not commit Jīva to the position of a Saṃkarite, for he, unlike Saṃkara, denies the abstract universal to be a negation of all differences or modifications.² He accepts two stages in

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, pp. 83 and 84.

Yattvanubhateḥ svayamprakāśtvamuktam, tadviśaya-prakāśanavelāyām jñāturātmanasīthaiva. . . . anubhūitvam nāma vartāmānadaśāyam śvasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam, śvastayaiva svaviśaya-sādhanaṭvam vā.

² Vide *Śat-sandarbhā*, p. 55.

Nirvikalpatayā sāksātkṛteḥ prāthamikatvāt, brahmanasca bhagavata eva nirvikalpasattārūpatvāt; vicitrarūpādivikalpaviśeṣa viśiṣṭasya bhagavatastu sāksātkṛtestadanantarajatvāt, tadīyasvarūpabhūtam tadbrahma tatsāksāt-

apperception: (1) the cognition of the universal itself without any differentiation, the generic concept of being as consciousness, and (2) the cognition of the universal with specific qualifications—a state where the knowledge is quite determinate. Jīva appears to have attempted a synthesis between the theories of knowledge as held by Saṃkara and Rāmānuja. Saṃkara denies all qualifications, Rāmānuja denies homogeneity of cognition; Jīva accepts both of them as stages involved in the development of synthetic unity of apperception. The indeterminate form is involved in the determinate as its basis: though a clear definition and a consistent conception require a relational synthesis which comes in subsequently as the demand of thought, yet in the immediacy of perception this synthesis is not in direct cognition.

To be more explicit, we need enter into a thorough discussion of the immediate fact in perception. Rāmānuja holds the immediate intuition to be not merely presentative, a mere simple apprehension, it is not free from all definition and not independent of all relation. Any act of perception is determinate inasmuch as it receives the fact not in its entire nakedness, but as a fact in a synthetic whole, though the relation is not clearly presented in the first act of perception. Jīva Gosvāmī seems to have seen through this hazy conception of Rāmānuja and insists upon the simple apprehension as the absolute psychological fact in perception, which any subsequent development through judgment must presuppose as the basic reality in cognition. A system of qualifying relations must have an operative basis which itself is not a term of relation. The relation cannot

*kārūspadam bhavātītyarthaḥ. Nirvikalpabrahmaṇastasya svarūpalakṣa-
ṇaṇāha, pratibodhamātramiti.*

create it but it finds it ready made before its own inception. Thought-relations can never constitute a content of immediate intuition. This immediate content may stand in a system of relation unfolded by judgments but the immediate apprehension is not the judgment, nor does it depend for its existence upon the relation. The truth of immediate apprehension as the basic reality of all thought-determinants in systems has been clearly cognized, though Jīva has not gone to the extent of the Śaṅkara Vedāntists in characterizing all determinate thought universes as illusory.

Śaṅkara accepts immediate intuition as the fundamental psychological reality in knowledge and sets aside the perceptual synthesis as not admitting of logical determination though in empiric consideration it comes in on the exercise of memory. The demand of a synthesis may be a necessity of thought to make knowledge determinate, but is no factor in the immediate apprehension of perception, for this is indicative of existence as such, apart from all determination. Citsukācārya¹ refutes the assertion that perception in its immediacy conveys knowledge of a fact as well as the difference. The activity of attention to understand difference and to build up a cognitive and recognitive *continuum* is a demand of thought, however implicit. To hold that perception gives knowledge of existence as well as difference, and that both of them are equally necessary for their own mutual existence and knowledge is to commit a simple *petitio principii*.

Nigamanta Mahādeśika asserts that the consciousness of bheda or difference in itself is in no way relative to

¹ Vide *Citsukī*, ch. ii, p. 168.

*Yugapadgrahanaṇayogādanavasthāprasaṅgataḥ,
parasparāśrayatvācca dharmabhede'pi nākṣadhīḥ.*

the fact which it distinguishes. Bheda may imply a reference but in itself it is an independent existence, and, therefore, perception can give us knowledge of a fact as well as its difference. They do not determine each other and are not dependent upon one another. They determine them when they are sought to be united.¹

Even if it is accepted that perception informs the existence of both simultaneously, it cannot be asserted for a moment that their unity and mutual determination are a fact of or in perception. We can go further and assert that the bheda connotes a difference which is not clear apart from its application. A difference without differentiating anything is an inconceivable concept. The difference by itself cannot be an absolute concept.

Dialectic-being as intelligence.

The author of the Nyāyāmṛta thinks that to posit the Absolute as an indeterminate existence and to attribute to it intelligence and bliss is surely to make a predication of what denies all predicates and to destroy its impersonal character.² The predicate intelligence may either signify, (1) a generic attribute of consciousness, (2) a quality opposed to inertness or a quality differentiating it from inert existence, (3) a quality opposed to nescience, (4) a quality determining experience and activity, (5) a quality expressive of objects. In none of these senses we can attribute 'intelligence' to Brahman. An undifferentiated intelligence cannot be a generic concept. Again, any differential quality, *ex hypothesi*, is impossible, for its absoluteness would deny a separatist cons-

¹ Vide *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, p. 46, ll. 4-7 (Madras Edition).

² Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, vol. iii, p. 498 (Jāvaḥi's Edition).

*Tatratāvat jñānatvaṃ kiṃ jātiviśeṣo vā . . .
jaganyatvaṃvā ajñānavirodhitvaṃ vā.*

ciousness and existence. Being transcends all forms of relational or differential concepts. It cannot be thought of as opposed to nescience, for, by the affirmation of Advaita Vedānta, nescience, though empirically felt and perceived, is eternally non-existent in Brahman. Consciousness, though it appears as determining empirical experience and activity, generates none in dreamless sleep, samādhi and emancipation. It is not expressive consciousness. Expressiveness requires either the self or the not-self as objects of expression. The former makes it self-conscious and takes away its character of impersonality. Brahman is not an object to its own self. The latter makes liberation impossible by the constant demand of mutuality of subject and object.

Madhusūdan Sarasvatī meets the charge by accepting the absolute to be intelligence. To speak of being and to think of it as intelligence is an identical proposition. Being is intelligence. It is illumination but not self-illuminating. It is consciousness, but not self-conscious. The contention of the Nyāyāmṛta that this definition is partial inasmuch as it does not characterize conscious being in liberation, where nothing remains to be revealed is not sound, for, as the author of the Laghuchandrikā points out, when Brahman as Intelligence is characterized as revealing objects, this character is not to be taken as *predicate*. It is merely an *accident*, so that it may or may not reveal an object. But in any case it does not lose its character of illumination. It is a *conscious expression*, rather than an *expressive consciousness*. It is necessarily a witness, a *sākṣī*, a *percipi*.¹

¹ Vide *Advaita Siddhi*, p. 750.

Arthaprakāśatvameva jñānatvaṃ. Muktvāvarthābhāvepi tatsaṃsṛṣṭa-prakāśatvasya kadācidarthasambandhenāpyanapāyāt.

Dialectic on 'Svaprakāśatva.'

The author of the Nyāyāmṛta examines the Advaita conception of self-illumination and holds that a logical determination of Svaprakāśatva (self-illumination) is not possible. Positively Svaprakāśatva may mean :¹

(1) Vṛtti-vyāpyatva, the object indicated by the indeterminate conscious process, I am Brahman.

(2) Falavyāpyatva—the object is not indicated by the determinate consciousness.

(3) An object of direct use, but never known.

The first meaning is not tenable. The indeterminate conscious process is destructive of the nescience immediately before final illumination. It does not define the self-illuminating character of Brahman.

Falavyāpyatva is a negative mark which does not exactly indicate Brahman. It may also indicate past and future events and other existences which are beyond immediate cognition.

The third is a partial definition, for in dreamless sleep, consciousness is, but is not an object of use. It has then no functioning.

The definition of Brahman as conscious expression

Ibid., p. 757.

Arthaprākāśatvaṃ cārthopalakṣitaprakāśatvarūpaṃ

Kadācidarthasambandhamātreṇamuktou arthāsambandhe'

—pyupāpadyata eva. Nahyasmāviḥ kadācidarthaviśiṣṭatvena sarvadāpi tattvamabhyupagamyate. Yena muktāvāpi Brahmaṇa āvṛtatvamāpādyeteti nirviśeṣamāpi jñānarūpameva.

¹ These are technical terms in Vedāntism. *Vṛtti* is a psychosis—a *Vṛtti* may be definite inasmuch as it reveals a concrete object, e.g. a pot, or it may be indefinite inasmuch as it reveals an abstract object which has no particular form or character, e.g., *Brahman*. In the former case the *vṛtti* or the psychosis has a definite functioning, in the latter an abstract functioning. The mental consciousness in the perception of concrete objects has the definite modification in the form of the object, in the perception of Brahman it has an indeterminate modification, because Brahman has no form. Technically a concrete object is called *Falavyāpya*, Brahman is called *Vṛttivyāpya*.

does away with all difficulties of the definition. It is present in all states of mental consciousness, be it waking or dream, and also it does not indicate a determinate consciousness.

Saṃkara's system draws a clear line between intuition and facts. An intuition cannot be intuited. Anything that is intuited is a fact, not an intuition. Citsukhācārya affirms that an intuition is never an object, though it can intuit all objects.

Rāmānuja fights this out. No law can be established that as soon as an intuition is intuited, its character and significance as an intuition is lost, and it is divorced to the category of facts. Introspection gives us conclusive evidence that moments of intuition are as much real as intuition itself. An intuition has two poles of existence, a subject, its locus, and an object, it reveals. By any stretch of imagination we cannot divorce this character of intuition as synthetic unity of apperception. The moments of intuition may appear and disappear, but intuition itself with its two-fold relation to a subject and an object does not change its character as a synthetic unity. It has no transcendent character in the sense of refusing all predicates.

Valadeva also upholds the dynamic nature of intuition, which is revealed in the process of illuminating facts to the self, or in the effort of self-consciousness. He thinks that the acceptance of cognition as transcendent does not rid itself of its character as self-illuminating, a character which has no possible meaning or import if it is not a self-conscious active process.¹ Madhvācārya also brings

¹ Vide *Siddhāntaratnam*, p. 289 (Calcutta Edition).

Jñānaguṇāśrayatvameva jñātyam. jñānam tu nityasyāpyautpattika-dharmatvānnityam. . . . Tasmājjñānadiśaktimadeva Brahma na tvanūbhūti-samvitparyāyam jñānamātram.

out the synthetic and dynamic character of knowledge which reveals itself as a reality subsisting through differences. He accepts intuition as a dynamic stress inherent in itself. It is an attribute, a *guṇa*.¹ Jīva Gosvāmī in his *Sarvasambādinī* has entered an elaborate defence of the dynamic character of intuition and asserts that self-expression of cognition does not yield any clear sense unless it is expressive of something—positively it connotes expressiveness, negatively it denotes an apparent independence. It does not require anything new to illuminate itself. He evidently differs from Citsukhācārya in his affirmation that an intuition, besides being itself an expression, is an expressive consciousness.

The Śāṅkarites contend that the subject-object theory is not tenable. The object is intuited in knowledge but this relation does not necessarily prove the object to be an integral part of cognition, for, an object is object, and cognition a cognition. That facts are intuited in cognition is not denied but to say that it is the necessary character of intuition to be related to facts is more than one can logically demand. Intuition is expression, there is no inherent necessity of it to be related to facts to be conscious of its character as intuition. The duality of naïve realism is the statement of a fact, but offers no explanation. It is no theory and proves nothing. It indicates the attitude of the mind to reality and accepts the deliverance of experience. The correlativity of subject-object may characterize experience in its mediate and concrete stages, but in its basic foundation in simple apprehension such correlativity is not only non-obtaining but completely absent.

¹ Vide *Madhvabhāṣya*, 3. 2. 29, p. 50.

*Om Prakāśāśrayavadvātejastvāt. Yathādityasya prakāśatvaṃ prakāśit-
evam ca evaṃ vā dṛṣṭāntaḥ. Tejorūpatvādbrahmaṇaḥ.*

The immediately intuitive character of simple apprehension or cognition does not suffer if it does not stand in relation to any object. Prakāśātma Yati points out that the consciousness of an object presupposes its *esse*, but the truth of consciousness or percipii itself is not dependent upon the truth of object, the supposed character of percipii to relate itself to object would destroy its character of immediate intuition and lend to it the character of a notion.¹

The contention of the Nyāyāmṛta that the absolute monistic Vedāntism also accepts the subject-object theory of knowledge is not to the point and is not a fact. Even if it is conceded that a relation is accepted it is true only in empiric sense apart from any substantial setting. The epistemological dualism does not necessarily prove the reality of the object. There is no fact really in the sense ordinarily accepted. A fact is an idea to the subject, it has no independent existence. The perception of the supposed real fact objectively in space and time is a false projection and a creation of inter-subjective intercourse. But this does not prove the fact to be a trans-subjective reality. (The Ekajīvavādīs do not accept any extramental reality; the Vahujīvavādīs create different thought-universes.)²

Now the subject-object theory of knowledge may have either a psychological or an epistemological implication. The former accepts a psychosis as the object in perception, the latter demands an objective reference.

¹ *Pañcapādīkavivaraṇam*, p. 21.

Arthābhāve kathamāparokṣā samvidīti cet na. Yathāsamvidavabhāsādhīnatvādarthasattānīścayasya. Nahīarthasattānīścayadhīnaḥ samvitsattānīścayaḥ arthasattānīścayasyāpi nīścayantaradhīnatvaprasaṅgāt.

² We make here a general statement. There are differences of opinion amongst the Śaṅkarites on this point.

Vide *The System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture* (Calcutta University Publication).

Śaṅkara Vedāntism would accept the former and naturally deny the latter, as the objective reference in perception is illusory; the limitation put upon by the senses apparently set up a division of subject-object, but if one can transcend the habitual mode of thinking and observe the spontaneity of creative effort in dream one would feel truly that knowledge does not necessarily suppose the objectivity of the subject-object relation.

Dialectic on 'Sākṣī' consciousness —: Witness-intelligence.

The distinction of the static and dynamic character of consciousness is also borne out in the conception of sākṣī or witness intelligence. Theistic Vedāntists hold that the concept sākṣī is indissolubly identified with knowing activity. Śaṅkara Vedāntists accept a transcendence in cognition and assert that the cognitive-recognitive continuum sometimes breaks off as a continuity revealing cognition in transcendent isolation. This is witness intelligence. To be more explicit Śaṅkara accepts witnessing as an accident, Rāmānuja, as a predicate, to consciousness. The dynamic element in conscious life, according to Śaṅkara, is creation of nescience. The transcendence of consciousness is apparent even in conscious activity, and when this transcendent isolation is felt, we have the knowledge of sākṣī, i.e., that a differentiating knowledge of the self as constant and fixed entity from the psychoses or vṛttis, psycho-physical functions of antaḥkaraṇa, apparently identified with consciousness, is a necessary implicate of witness-intelligence. The author of the Nyāyamṛta denies such an existence.

The witness-intelligence is conceived in different ways:—¹

- (i) It is a state in the limited consciousness of Jīva.

¹ Vide *Advaitasiddhi*—Notes on *Nyāyamṛta*—p. 756.

(ii) It is a state in the expansive consciousness of Īśvara.

(iii) It is transcendent cognition itself.

(i) Jīva is a conscious unit either reflected in buddhi or in avidyā. In the former case, because of the limitation of the buddhi, jīva-consciousness is atomic. The jīva-sākṣī is, therefore, consciousness possessed of the functioning of buddhi or of avidyā as its accidents. It is limited in its operation by buddhi, and cannot transcend the limitation. The second, though it removes the limitation inasmuch as avidyā is an integral existence, and jīva, an all-pervasive existence, commits a circle. Sākṣī reveals avidyā, and avidyā creates sākṣī, i.e., sākṣī is formed in association with avidyā or is dependent upon it. A circle is also manifest in the first case. Buddhi, in association with consciousness creates sākṣī, sākṣī reveals avidyā, avidyā, again, evolves buddhi.

(ii) The Īśvara-consciousness cannot be accepted as sākṣī. It makes a confusion of all distinctions of jīva and Īśvara. The concept of jīva becomes useless. Our personal affections would be attributed to Īśvara, or the supreme knowledge and bliss of Īśvara will be the possession of

Evamadviṭṭyanirviṣesacaitanyasya sākṣītvānupapattirāpi saviṣeṣatvaṃ gamayati—Tatra ca sākṣī na jīvaḥ ; tasya buddhyupādhiakatvenanupapakṣe idamaṃśavacchinnacidvedyasya rūpyādeḥ sākṣīvedyatvānupapatteḥ. Ajñānopādhiakatvapaksastu na sambhavati ; ajñānasyāpi sākṣyādhīnasiddhikat-venanyonyāśrayāt. Nāpi Brahma ; tasyaiva sākṣīvedyaduḥkḥhādīdhirna jīva-syetyūpatteḥ. Anyathānavacchinnānandadhīrāpi Jīvasyetyūpatteḥ.

jīva. The same difficulty originates with the third alternative; besides, it throws away all differences in individual perceptions. Moreover, it makes liberation impossible. The continuity of sākṣī involves the continuity of avidyā.

The confusion arises from ignorance of the sense in which the term is employed. The word, sākṣī, has a transcendent and an empiric meaning. In the former case it is the percipii accomplished. It has no relation with avidyā. It is completely transcendent. It is *Suddha cit*. It is not sākṣī in its usual implication.

In its empiric application, it is consciousness not purely transcendent, but felt in isolation from its timeless but accidental qualification, either of *buddhi* or of *avidyā*. The charge of a circle is not true. The circle may be conceived

- (1) in origination,
- (2) in knowledge, and
- (3) in continuity of existence.

(1) In the first case, both *avidyā* and *sākṣī* are co-eternal, the one depends not on the other for its existence.

(2) In the second case, *avidyā* is revealed in *sākṣī*, and *sākṣī* originates in association of consciousness with *avidyā*; still its percipency, as *Vācaspati* points out, is not dependent upon *avidyā*. The very knowledge of *avidyā* proves its existence.

(3) Though *avidyā* is located in consciousness and continues to exist therein, yet consciousness is not supported in *avidyā* and consequently not dependent upon it.

The identity of sākṣī does not mar individual distinctions in perceptions, for, the sākṣī-consciousness, because of its intimate association with jīva-consciousness, has its distinction imposed upon itself and no confusion in perception is possible in that way. The perceptions of jīvas and Īśvara as sākṣī-witness are distinct, limited as they are in their own provinces, either of mental-consciousness or of avidyā. Rāmānuja's and Valadeva's definition of sākṣī as ¹ cognizer has been thrown aside as not inherent in self-cognition. The evidence of self-consciousness has been accepted, but on a searching analysis the sense of a synthetic unity has been referred to mental consciousness and explained as a limitation imposed upon transcendent cognition.

Rāmānuja and the theistic Vedāntists accept the dynamic and synthetic character of Intuition which has an uninterrupted continuity in self-expression and self-subsistence. Śaṅkara refers the dynamic grouping, implying a cumulative process, to the mental-consciousness which admits a history of development by retaining past experiences and assimilating the new ones with them. The dynamic character of experience has been accepted, though the static character of intuition has been equally insisted upon. Śaṅkara's philosophy accepts this dual character in knowledge—consciousness transcendent, and experience immanent. No doubt, in the formation of experience, the being of synthetic unity of consciousness is in the field of direct vision and immediate apprehension, and its importance is clearly felt, but this unity has a value in immanent experience ; its presence there does not necessarily establish its

¹ Vide Śrībhāṣya, p. 108.

Sākṣītvam ca sākṣātjñātytvameva, nahyajānataḥ sākṣītvam. Jñātaiva lokavedayoḥ sākṣīti vyāpadiṣyate ; na jñānāmātram,

transcendent truth. The logical ego interpreting and building up the experience-whole is accepted by the Sāṃkarites, and this ego holds itself to be true, so long as knowledge dwells upon empiric basis. So long as the continuity of experience is a fact, the logical ego establishing a unity and an integration of the past experiences with the present and the future possible experiences obtains, and its truth cannot be denied ; but as soon as experience cuts itself, the continuity, nay the existence of a logical ego, completely vanishes. Such an experience is partially felt in deep sleep, and fully in *turiya*: in the former the active grouping of the waking experience, the spontaneous grouping of the dream-consciousness, both the forms of functioning, volitional or spontaneous, in mental consciousness cease, and the apprehension of consciousness in its indifferent isolation, though still in association with native ignorance is within the range of direct vision and immediate understanding ; and on a stage higher in the depth of *turiya* consciousness in its transcendent integrity manifests itself without the dynamic accompaniment of mental consciousness with its history and continuity.

Rāmānuja insists upon the continuity of active ego in its concrete simplicity in the silence of deep sleep, and he claims it to be a matter of direct experience which alone explains the remembrance on waking—‘ I was sleeping sweetly. I did not know anything.’ Puruṣottamacārya has the same conclusion.¹

Both Sāṃkara and Rāmānuja accept the existence of the self in *suṣupti*. Rāmānuja accepts the continuity

¹ Vide *Vedāntaratna Mañjuṣā*, p. 8.

Evamahamarthasya sarvāvasthanugatatvāt . . . anubhavasmrityoreka dhikarāṇya niyamācca . . . uktahetvasiddhestādavasthyameva.

of the concrete consciousness with its synthetic unity dimmed by the influence of sleep and consequently appearing in comparatively bare and naked form, though it does not on that account lose its inherent nature as energizing consciousness. Saṃkara maintains the existence of a rarified consciousness in *suṣupti*, the consciousness in transcendence, in isolation from the active element of *antaḥkaraṇa* but in association with the native ignorance or *avidyā*. If there is an activity in *suṣupti*, we can no longer identify it with the underlying and immanent consciousness, it is vibration in *avidyā* expressed by the transcendent *sākṣī*. This is the view accepted by *Vivaraṇācārya*.¹ Sureśvara goes further and holds that there is no vibrative activity in *suṣupti*, which is an existence in pure ignorance revealed by *sākṣī*.

Ultimately the claim to truth in both systems of Vedāntism is to be decided by the psychological revelation of *suṣupti*, a state which is within the native bounds of every being. The difference between the systems of thought resolves itself into one of direct experience in *suṣupti* and *turiya*, states whose descriptions differ in Saṃkara and Rāmānuja; the one denies the continuity of the dynamic consciousness in them, the other accepts it and opines that the *turiya* reveals the true nature of conscious life in dissociation from its sensuous and mental accompaniments, which sometimes bar from view

¹ Vide *Vivaraṇa*, pp. 55-56 (Benares Edition).

Vide *Prameya Saṃgraha*.

Suṣuptāvanubhūta ānandāt mabhavarūpaṃjñāṃceti trayamaḥpyutthitena parāmrśyaṭe.

Vide *Ratnāvalī*, p. 16, 1. 4. *Sukhasvarūpa sākṣīsvārūpaḥ ajñānasvarūpākāraḥ nirvikalpatisro'vidyāvṛttayaḥ suṣuptou jāyante.*

Vide *Advaitasiddhi and Brahmānandī* (pp. 558-559, Jāvaji's Edition) *Ekaiṣa avidyāvṛttiḥ suṣuptyādikalāsthayinī, na tu suṣupti kalamātravṛttiḥ, kācanavṛttiḥ, yannāśat smaraṇam.*

the true nature of consciousness. The basic difference between Saṃkara and Rāmānuja originates in the acceptance of intuition and notion respectively as the ultimate character of consciousness. The former attributes to it a static stability, the latter, a dynamic integrity.

The Saṃkarites, of course, cannot accept the immediately intuitive nature of a notion, for a notion asserts its existence through a relation, which would make it concrete, definite, and necessarily mediate. The relation though not imposed from without but inherent in the dynamic integrity cannot on that account be accepted as immediate, since it subsists through a reference, implying an outwardness, a mediateness. The dynamic concreteness is, therefore, a necessity of thought and will be lacking in the immediacy of intuition which is the *fait accompli* and does not imply the necessity of self-projection to understand a division to be consequently fully aware of a synthesis. The fusion implies a self-analysis, a self-denial, which the Advaita Vedāntin would point out is inconsistent with the immediate intuition, whose immediate character does suffer if it requires a mediate reference.

Rāmānuja would, of course, maintain that the mediateness or outwardness of this reference is not the last or ultimate fact in the process of self-integration, the mediacy of self-analysis necessitates a deeper and a higher determination in self-consciousness which is immediate. The supposed outwardness or mediacy is a necessary element to make the inwardness or immediacy of consciousness clear, definite or self-conscious. But for this, the immediacy of consciousness would not even be fully immediate; immediacy does not exclude but

rather supposes and includes mediacy in its expression and development.

But still the Śaṅkarites would say that the absolute is position. Absolute position is intelligible, but its projection or mediateness escapes logical determination. The nature and purpose of the projection can be understood in two ways. It may mean a going out either to reveal objects or to reveal itself. The former accepts things outside of or beside it, which cancels its absoluteness, the latter gives rise to insurmountable difficulties. This separation through projection is either identical with or different from position: the former cancels projection, the latter denies its conscious character.

Empirically Śaṅkara himself has emphasized the identity of position and projection,¹ but philosophically the relation eludes logical grasp and categorical determination. Jīva Gosvāmī also feels this and describes the relation and the projection as mysterious, though he with Rāmānuja has sought to resolve the position and the projection in a unitary conception. Śaṅkara characterizes this as mysterious and indefinable and has ultimately to reject the conception of projection from the absolute. Moreover, the conception of projection involves temporal and spatial conception, which by necessity must find a place simultaneously with or even before projection in the absolute. These ideas are interdependent and cannot be separate. They should find a fit place in the order of empirical relation, but not in the absolute.

¹ Vide *Brahma Sūtra*, 2. 1. . . . 14, 18 *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*.

*Śaktisca kārāṇasya kāryaniyamārthā kalpyamānā nānyā nānya, satī va kāryaṇṇiyacchet asāttvāviśeṣadanyatvāviśeṣa. Tasmāt kārāṇasyātma-
bhūtāśaktiḥ, śaktiescātmabhūtaṃ kāryam*

But it may be argued that the Absolute does not deny the phenomenal groupings and their categories, but, on the other hand, contains them in its own being as moments of its own existence through which it transcends its initial abstract character, realizing its qualitative integrity and quantitative definiteness. It is a whole that does not deny the parts, a substance that does not deny attributes, a ground that does not deny the consequent, an integrity that does not deny fullness. In other words, to Rāmānuja the true Being is concrete being, it is not a tendency or growth to fullness, but complete concrete fullness itself with all its wealth of attributes. Such a being excludes or denies non-being completely (and it should be noted that non-being is not accepted as a category in Rāmānuja) and is not relative to it. Being, to Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara alike, is the absolute category which is complete in itself and independent of any reference. But Rāmānuja, unlike Śaṅkara, lays emphasis upon its concrete nature implying a synthesis of attributes—Sat, Cit, Ananda—which lends to it a personality and a character. These attributes—Sat, Cit, Ānanda—although they imply specifically distinctive merits, still they do not exclude one another and by a common reference find room in the absolute being. An inner outwardness or difference of attributes ultimately resolves into an inner inwardness or unity in the integral conception of Being. A quality (e.g., cit) by itself is different from another as a quality, but by a common reference they would indicate the identity in which they inhere as attributes. They cannot make any division or difference in the integrity of being.¹

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, Introduction, i. 1. 1.

'*Satyaṁ jñānamantaṁ brahma*' *ityatrāpi sāmānadhikaraṇyas-*

Saṁkara, on the other hand, denies a personality or a character to the Absolute which, according to him, is the highest abstraction of impersonal consciousness. It denies and transcends the relation of substance and attributes, ground and consequent. Being is identity, but not a unity. There is no outwardness or inwardness, a going out or coming in, in the self-revelation of Being, for it is stillness and sameness everywhere, in every point of its existence. It is immediate expression: the determination of Saccidānanda does not make it concrete existence, for, it does not indicate any attribute but, by a common reference, points to the identity of being, consciousness and Bliss, and not a unity or synthesis of attributes. The specific nature of an attribute, if emphasized, would indicate perforce a division in the indivisible being; it should be interpreted as only indicating by an indirect, though common reference, the identity or sameness of Being and Consciousness. Naturally, Saṁkara would find no place for attribute in Being, and he, by the logic of identity and contradiction, refutes the difference of attributes from Being. He cannot accept their unity, for, such a unity to him is an impossible, rather, an adventurous attitude of thought.

It should be marked here that both Saṁkara and Rāmānuja have laid emphasis upon the Identity of Being and the logic of Identity. None refer to the contrary opposition or contradiction, the necessity of thought to pass into opposite of being to come to the definite conception. Saṁkara's is absolute identity, even the possibility of a mediate reference does not rise. Rāmānuja's is concrete identity, here also the possibility

*yānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaikaṛthabhidhānavyutpattyaḥ na nirviśeṣavastusiddhiḥ.
Pravṛtti—nimittavedenaikārtha vṛttitvaṁ sāmānādhikaranyam.*

of a reference or a projection to anything besides it does not rise. Both argue with force that Being can never require a reference to non-Being. Saṃkara¹ definitely says that the same thing cannot be the substratum of a quality being and its opposite non-Being. Rāmānuja² has it that a thing qualified as 'is' cannot be at the same moment a thing qualified as 'is not'. A difference implies opposites. The absence of opposites is identity, how can then an Identity of Being hold within it the opposites of Being and non-Being.

But then there is a difference. While Saṃkara denies all the attributes to Being, Rāmānuja affirms them of Being. Śaṃkara points out that a system of relation leads to an infinite regress. Relation implies duality of existence which with the relation itself make the number three, and if we add to it the mutual relations of these to one another, of these again to one another, we are forced to an infinite regress. He, therefore, holds that the concept of relation can find a place in empiric consciousness, but it escapes a clear logical determination. It is something mysterious, it has an appearance, but no reality. Even the relation of tādātmya, according to Saṃkara, has, transcendently or truly speaking an appearance; it is also a superimposition due to avidyā. A relation must pre-suppose an amount of difference, which cannot be reconciled in the conception of the Absolute, for the Absolute is positive sameness in every point of existence. Determination,

¹ Vide *Saṃkara-Bhāṣya*, 2. 2. 33.

Nahyekasmindharmīni yugapat sadasattvādiviruddhadharmasamāveśaḥ sambhavati śītoṣṇvat.

² Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, 2. 2. 31.

Ekasminvastāni astitvanāstitvadervirudhasya cchāyātpavadyugapadasumbhavāt.

qualitative, quantitative or relational has no place in Śaṅkara's transcendence of Being.

In the dynamic character of Being Rāmānuja finds the possibility of inner self-revelation and unfoldment and this basic conception naturally leads us to expect the processes of self-projection and self-integration—a going out and a coming in—as building up the endless synthesis in the totality of *synthesis*. Being is concrete. A thesis at once by the demand of thought supposes an antithesis. The thesis of Being by the relativity of thought requires the position of attributes, which, again, finds the synthesis in the concrete Being of substance and attributes. The demand of thought is satisfied in the constructive effort of building up a synthesis of Being and attributes, thus presenting the concrete picture of Being, or uniting the extremes of abstraction, either of substance without attributes or of attributes without substance.

Rāmānuja, like Śaṅkara, fights shy of the Naiyāyika conception of co-inherence which implicitly denotes an inherent separateness, but, unlike Śaṅkara, institutes a relation of non-difference¹ between substance and attributes. This negative way of indicating the relation emphasizes the identity of Being and its attributes and at the same time retains the conception of relation in the integrity of Being by rejecting the absolute oneness and identity of the Śaṅkarites. Rāmānuja clearly perceives the impossibility of a synthesis of identity and difference, hence he conceives a relation which can present the identity in its concreteness.

But still it may be pointed out that non-difference is not a relation, it indicates the Identity; if it is a relation,

¹ *Aprthaka-Siddhi-Samvandha*.

it must posit some amount of exclusiveness and outwardness, otherwise the conception of relation is not logically clear. If we speak of non-difference, it cannot be a relation; if we insist upon relation, it cannot be non-difference. If all difference between substance and attributes be withdrawn, we cannot speak of any relation between them. Non-difference and relation are mutually exclusive concepts. Either all relation should be ignored and differences resolved into Identity or difference must find a place in the integrity of the Absolute. An attribute, to preserve its individuality and to be characterized as such, requires an isolation from substance and it cannot, therefore, be reduced to the integrity of Being.

The position of theistic Vedāntism is not much improved by the assertion of a svarūpa relation, the relation of identity between substance and attributes. Jīva Gosvāmī positively asserts that the attributes express and are inherent in the very essence of Brahman. Logically there is no great difference between Rāmānuja and Jīva Gosvāmī. He puts from a positive standpoint what Rāmānuja does from a negative one. But still it may be asked: does svarūpa constitute a relation? Surely not. Svarūpa is essence which cannot be conceived to be related to itself. Relation and essence cannot be synchronized.

The attempt to establish a relation between Being and attributes ends in a logical confusion. Either we must say that there is no relation between substance and attributes, or we must accept an outwardness or mediateness in relational concept. Either the attributes resolve themselves into substance or they are illusory. Anything, besides this, forces us to a dualistic position.

This basic difference of static and dynamic theories

runs out into the conception of Bliss. To Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and all other Vedāntists Bliss is identical with Being and Consciousness. It is the absolute possession of undivided expansive and continuous existence. To the Śaṅkarite Bliss is expression, it is the delight of consciousness. It transcends the epistemological or psychological dualism of subject and object, Rāmānuja and theistic teachers also identify Bliss with Expression and Consciousness. Yet there is this difference that theistic teachers impress the conceptual distinction of Being, Consciousness and Bliss in the integrity of Absolute Being. Each of them has a character and a being of its own, though each in unity with other finds a place in the highest conceptual synthesis. In the words of Jīva Gosvāmī these are *vr̥ttis* of *svarūpa śakti*. Madhva maintains the integrity of the Absolute and its attributes, though to preserve the speciality of them and to denote their individuality, he accepts a *viśeṣa*. And the conception of Bliss does not necessarily exclude, but, on the other hand, includes the subject-object relation of the Dynamic theory. The ideality of Bliss becomes a concrete reality in fact when it is felt in experience. The Dynamic view makes the multiplication of Bliss a possibility and renders it more enjoyable in its integrative determinateness and definite fullness. The conception of *līlā* as holding a permanent place in the life of intelligence and sweetness implies that Bliss realizes its unity by the dynamic stresses of expression and adoration of love. And the immediacy of self-expression calls for a reflex current which apparently is a mediate or outward response in the life of love but on a deeper insight appears to be immanent in self-expression which acquires a self-conscious character in this process of sending

forth Bliss-currents and receiving responses the reaction.

The Absolute to the Saṃkarites has no history of its life and development. To the theists it is the perpetuity of an expression in Bliss and Consciousness : a history which is a self-revelation to itself of its own inner possibilities in a transcendent plane, a revelation to finite existences in experience, either through an inward revelation or through the world of Nature. The absolute life, therefore, has a transcendent history in Nitya Bibhūti (a life only accessible to the saints and liberated souls) and an immanent history through humanity and Nature which cannot because of its grossness receive the currents of love, life and bliss which keep up the saintly life in freshness, joy and delight.

Dialectic on Bliss.

The author of the Nyāyāmṛta makes a dialectic analysis of Bliss and shows that Bliss, as understood by Advaitins, has no clear sense. It may mean, as the author of the Nyāyāmṛta,¹ points out :—

(1) A generic concept, (2) an object of agreeable consciousness, (3) an agreeable consciousness, (4) agreeableness, (5) consciousness (identity with consciousness), and (6) consciousness indicated as the absence of pain.

Bliss is integral. It is no generic concept, it cannot be an object of agreeable consciousness, for, in emancipation Bliss, is, but is not an object. An agreeable affection or agreeableness directly or indirectly (but equally) implies a reference to an object besides self or consciousness otherwise, an agreeable feeling, is either different or non-different from consciousness. The

¹ Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 499.

former suggests a difference between agreeableness and consciousness and destroys the integrity, the latter makes them an identity which, again, may lead on to the identity of agreeable and disagreeable consciousness. As consciousness we can draw no line between the two. Absence of pain cannot be an object of active pursuit and as such an ideal. It is a negative state and cannot be indicative of liberation.

Madhusūdan Sarasvatī points out that ānandam is the *Summum Bonum*. It is the Being of self. It is non-different from Consciousness. The consciousness of pain as Consciousness is identical with the consciousness of pleasure as pleasure. To maintain the identity of Consciousness with Bliss does not commit the Vedāntin to the identity of the psychical states or processes. Advaitism in emphasizing the identity of consciousness does not identify the psychical states with the immanent consciousness. The two terms—cit and ānandam—do not denote two things, they have a common reference to an identity. The difficulty of thinking in this way arises from the limitation of thinking by differential concepts, though in the intuitive effort Consciousness appears as Blissfulness, Blissfulness as Consciousness. So long as the limitation of thinking in concepts lasts, we shall have an imaginary differentiation of Consciousness and Blissfulness.¹ If a definition of Bliss is the demand, we can characterize it as something with the attainment of which every other object loses their value and attractiveness. It is positive, though not an object.

Advaita Vedāntists have identified Bliss with fullness of Being. The conception of Bliss is then not psychological, but metaphysical. Bliss is complete expression

¹ Vide Advaita Siddhi, p. 751, ll. 16, 17.

of Being, when this expression is not complete, Bliss appears as divided and determined by extraneous causes. The psychological experience of the self as the source of unconditioned joy and of the not-self as the source of conditional delight has been the chief support of the Vedāntic theory, Self is Bliss. The not-self by itself is not delight. It acquires a delightful character inasmuch as it is associated with self. The delight here is accidental, the self-delight is original. 'Self is delight' is an identical proposition.

In the dynamic theory of the theists the jīva-consciousness has an experience of an expansive Being in the fellowship of the Delight-Self and the consequent blissful experience. This expansiveness is not its own, though it feels its being unceasingly in liberation. 'The expanse is bliss' is a constant experience, felt and enjoyed. Bliss is self, but here the Infinite self is fullness of Bliss and the finite experience can have it as an object of Delight when it has its inner revelation. In the Advaita Vedānta Bliss is Being, in the theistic Vedānta Bliss is the Infinite Being, and the finite being, itself a drop of bliss, must accept the infinite in life and consciousness to feel and to continue to feel the pulse of never-breaking joy and delight.

In the theistic Vedānta the promise of an expansive delight in the unitive consciousness remains unfulfilled. The notion of jīvātman as an atomic consciousness, by nature limited in vision, knowledge and delight cannot be conceived as perpetually enjoying the fullness of Delight in the Divine fellowship. Even if the Divine Life has an ingress into the finite consciousness, it can only understand its side-glances, but cannot grasp the fullness of Delight-Being. This fullness is Bliss. Of course the possibility of the reception of the Divine joy

and glory is there, but this possibility cannot be realized in its fullest degree. Something must be conceived as helping us to receive this inflow of Divine Life. Jīva Gosvāmī has this in svarūpa-śakti. But this, again, is to seek protection in a theological attitude and to leave Philosophy aside.

We should not ignore that Rāmānuja maintains that in liberation the finite consciousness acquires an expansion in Knowledge, Bliss and Being. It attains Sāmyāpatti, equality with Brahman, when it is freed from the restriction and limitation of a screened being and intelligence.¹ The expansiveness of being and intelligence is an ingress due to the evolution of a subtler being and truer self-consciousness consequent on philosophic knowledge and discipline. Though in the ideal of Brahma-Sāmyāpatti, Brahman—likeness, we have the promise of an expansive and unrestrained life in knowledge and delight, still the philosophic doubt about the possibility of such a life lingers. How can a being of atomic magnitude transcend the limitation of knowledge and bliss and acquire a likeness unto Brahman is a question that passes logical comprehension. The 'I-ness', which is the creation of māyā, may be removed, but how, with its removal, the finite being, by acceptance atomic in nature, can transcend its finitude and acquire an expansion in Being, Intelligence and Bliss is what requires an explanation. And this explanation is not logically possible so long as the least difference between the infinite and the finite is retained.

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, ch. iv, 4, 3.

CHAPTER II

CATEGORIES OF EXISTENCE

The double aspect of Śaṅkara's Philosophy—Esoteric and Exoteric—Being, the only category—Pañcadaśī's six categories—Jīva, Īśvara, undifferentiated consciousness, difference of Jīva and Īśvara, Avidyā—Relation of Avidyā and Brahman,—except undifferentiated consciousness the remaining five are empirical categories—Prakāśānanda resolves the categories into two—Ekajīva and Avidyā, besides Brahman.

Rāmānuja puts six categories : Prakṛti, Kāla, Śuddhasattva, Jñāna, Jīva and Īśvara—Vedānta Deśika on Śuddhasattva—Nimvārka accepts Cit, Acit and Īśvara—Acit is Prākṛta, Aprākṛta and Kāla, Aprākṛta is Śuddhasattva—Śuddhasattva of the Vaiṣṇavas and Śaṅkarītes—Jīva Gosvāmī and Valadeva accept five categories : Īśvara, Jīva, Māyā, Svarūpa Śakti and Kāla—Jñāna and Śuddhasattva are reduced to Svarūpa Śakti—Madhva divides the categories into Being and Non-being—Madhva's conception of negation—Three kinds of negation—Positive categories are substance, quality, action, community, viśeṣa, the specified, the whole and the parts, similarity, number, union—substance is absolute, limited, inert—Vallabha makes Brahman, Jīva, Kāla, Prakṛti and Māyā the categories—Abhāva is not a category.

Conception of relation—Madhva on difference—five kinds of differences—The difference in integrity—Viśeṣa—Madhva's refutation of Naiyāyika's conception of Samavāya—The author of the Nyāyāmṛta on Viśeṣa—Madhva's position—Nimvārka on the logic of difference in unity—Jīva Gosvāmī improves upon Nimvārka—The conception of Jīva and Prakṛti as dependent reals has been replaced by the conception of Śakti—Svarūpa-śakti, Tatasthāśakti and Vahiraṁgāśakti—Acintya-bhedābheda—Bhagavān as the highest dialectic unity embracing Brahman and Paramātman—The synthesis of the three concepts Brahman Paramātman and Bhagavān—Valadeva on Viśeṣa—Rāmānuja's modified monism—The identity of material and efficient causes—

The conception of the unity of Being—Refutation of Bheda and Bhedābheda—Vedānta Deśika on Bhedābheda—The adjectival theory—The relation of the finite and the infinite.

The double aspect of Saṁkara's philosophy presents us with a two-fold category—transcendental and empirical. Strictly speaking, Saṁkara's philosophy embraces a single identical category of existence, for, in the height of knowledge every other form of being is an illusory appearance. To the sophisticated mind attracted to the exoteric plane of Existence some modes of existence appear to be gaining a hold upon consciousness as determinants, either efficient or formal, of phenomenal groupings. The author of the Pañcadaśī has fixed the number to five :—

- (1) Jīva—the individual soul.
- (2) Īśa—the enveloping conscious reality.
- (3) The difference of these two, as limited and unlimited in knowledge, power, and goodness.
- (4) Avidyā—the eternal nescience which Brahman energizes.
- (5) The relation of locus, the support and the supported between Brahman and Avidyā.

Besides these, Brahman is the absolute category. Space, time and causality are not separate categories. Space is the first element in evolution, time is identified with nescience. Causality is brought under the creative aspect of māyā—causality as implying pariṇāma, transformation, and not vivartta, i.e., attribution or modification.

The number cannot be further reduced, for, each is what it is in relation to the other, though attempts have been made in the extremely subjective form of Vedāntism to reduce the number to two, eka-jīva and avidyā, besides Brahman.

These categories are not our ways of thinking and grouping in thought the empiric manifold. They exist all along as realities apparently more durable than evanescent phenomena. In fact they are objectively real, though transcendently they are as much illusory as phenomenal groupings. Hence they have been characterized as obtaining existence eternally, though they vanish with the dawn of knowledge. No beginning of them in time can be conceived, though an end has been conceived and actually sought.

Rāmānuja has drawn a distinction between immanent and transcendent existence, and this distinction has a value for finite individuals in reference to their outlook on experiences obtained either in association with or dissociation from prakṛti and its evolutes. In so far as the spiritual vision is swayed by the influence of prakṛti, the knowledge obtained by the senses and intellect may be termed empirical, and this empirical knowledge cannot claim the possession, validity and immediacy of the knowledge revealed in spiritual vision, when the soul in its purity and transcendence oversteps the bounds of immanent experience and intuitively realizes truth in its noumenal aspect. Experience immanent or transcendent has for its object Brahman as revealed to us either by its outer manifestation or by its revelation in our spiritual consciousness. The one reveals to us Brahman as expressing itself—a cosmological principle—through līlā-vibhūti, the other Brahman-in-itself through the transcendent revelation in nitya-vibhūti. The līlā-vibhūti is not inherent in Brahman; it is inherent in prakṛti. It is indirectly related to Brahman inasmuch as prakṛti forms an integral part of its nature. The nitya-vibhūti is in Brahman. Through supra-conscious mentality we

obtain glimpses of Brahman in its integral concreteness and qualitative completeness.¹

The transcendent apperception manifests to us the six categories of existence, which are prakṛti, kāla, śuddha sattva, jñāna, jīva and Īśvara. Of these prakṛti and kāla are two inert existences. They are the basic principles of the creative order. Everything in the immanent order is subject to the influence of time; hence the three kinds of pralaya (cosmic dissolution)—nitya, naimittika and prākṛta, are events in time. Both kāla and prākṛti are, therefore, *substantia causa* of līlā-vibhūti. Some think kāla has a place in nitya-vibhūti, others differ.

The other four categories are not inert. They are self-illuminating. Jñāna is consciousness; jīva and Īśvara are self-conscious existences. Jñāna is an attribute inherent in both jīva and Īśvara. Śuddha-sattva is different from sattva, rajas and tamas. It is sattva pure and unqualified. It is illuminating,

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣyam*.

Sūksmacidācidvastu śarīrasyaiva brahmaṇaḥ . . . sthūlacidācidvastuśarīratvena kāryatvāt.

Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, pp. 50 and 53.

Sā vibhūtirīśvarasya nityānāṃ muktānāṃ ceśvarasaṃkalpādbhogya bhogopakaraṇa bhogasthānarūpā ca bhavati.

Vaikunṭhātirikṭasṛstirīlā-vibhūtiḥ.

Vaikunṭhasṛstirnitya-vibhūtiḥ.

Vide *Nyāyasiddhāntjanam*, pp. 109, 110.

Nityavibhūtirucyate trigunadravyavyatirikṭatve sati sattvavattvam, tamorahitātve sati sattvavattvam, niḥśeṣāvidyānivrṭtidesavijātyānyatvamityādi . . . tallakṣaṇam, ādityavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastāt . . . yo asyādhyakṣaḥ parama vyoman, tadakṣare parama vyoman, . . . tadviṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ.

Tatrānandamayā bhogā lokāścānanda lakṣṇāḥ. Ānandam nāma tam lokam paramāṇḍalalakṣaṇam. Kimātmako bhagavāniti ca praśne jñānātmakaityādyuttaramuktam, sarvasyā nityavibhūterjñānātmakatvamucitam, jñānātmakatvam cātra svayaṃprakāśatvameva.

though not conscious.¹ Some regard it as inert. But in any case it is regarded as self-illuminating and does not require illumination of knowledge or consciousness. Vedānta Deśika (Rāmānujist) regards it as conscious. It differs from ātman. It cannot claim the conscious energizing of the soul. As an existence it escapes sensuous vision and manifests itself to the intuitive vision of Īśvara and the liberated souls. It forms the basic principle of nitya-vibhūti. It readily subjects itself to modification at the will of Īśvara and expresses itself in varieties in the supra-natural plane of existence.

Jñāna or dharmabhūta jñāna is an eternal self-illuminating existence. It is an attribute (dharma). It admits of expansion and contraction, it reveals or expresses objects, other than itself to ātman. In Īśvara it is always expansive and all embracing, in others it is limited, in others, again, sometimes expansive, sometimes limited. It is a continuous existence.

Jīva is the self-conscious atom different from its physical, vital and mental functionings. It is the immanent principle that asserts its existence through them though it transcends them in reality. As an entity it is real and self-subsisting, in number it is manifold.

Īśvara is expansive self-conscious being, supporting all others in existence, controlling them, distributing

¹ Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*.

Tānīca dravyāṇi śat—prāyīkālāsuddhasattvadharmabhūtajñāna jīveśvarabhedāt.

Atha nityamvibhūtinirūpyate—suddhasattvadharmabhūta jñānajīveśvarasādhārāṇaṃ. Ajādatvaṃ nāma svayamprakāśatvaṃ.

Tatra suddhasattvadharmabhūtajñānasādhārāṇa lakṣaṇaṃ parāktve satyajādatvaṃ. Tat tu svayamprakāśatve sati parasmā eva bhāsamādenatvaṃ. Suddhasattvaṃ nāma triguṇadravya vyatirīkītatve sati sattvavattvaṃ niḥśeṣavidyānivṛtti desavijātiyanyatvaṃ. Sā vibhūtirūdharpradeśe' nantā.

merits according to deeds. It is the ultimate reality in which everything is as its integral part. It is the centre of existence related to all, subsisting all.

Nimvārka accepts the categories of existence to be chiefly three, cit, acit and Īśvara. The acit, again, is prākṛta, aprākṛta and kāla. The aprākṛta is, like Rāmānuja's śuddhasattva, an expressive and expansive existence, though unconscious. It is not the śuddhasattva of the Śaṅkarites, the evolute of māyā or māyā itself. It transcends māyā and forms the *materia prima* of nitya-vibhūti of Īśvara. It is pervasive of the paramavyoma, the abode of Nārāyaṇa.¹

Nimvārka, like Rāmānuja, accepts time and prakṛti to be eternal objective existences. They are the *materia-dynamic* basic reality of the cosmic order. Īśvara and jīva are both self-conscious; the former has no limitation, the latter has limitation. These categories can be put under the two heads : substance and quality. Under substance, we have conscious and unconscious existences. The conscious existence is either absolute or limited. The unconscious matter is śuddhasattva, prakṛti and time. Under quality, we have dharma-bhūta jñāna, the *dynamic* consciousness inherent in jīva and Īśvara.

Jīva Gosvāmī and Valadeva accept five categories :— Īśvara, jīva, māyā, svarūpa śakti and kāla ; jñāna and śuddhasattva are reduced to svarūpa śakti, jñāna and svarūpa śakti are modifications of it. They are called vṛttis.

¹ Vide Nimvārka's *Vedānta Siddhānta or Daśaślokī*.

Jñānasvarūpaṅca Hareradhīnaṃ, Śarīrasaṃyogavīyogayogaṃ. Anuṃ hi jīvaṃ pratidehahhinnaṃ, Jñātyavantaṃ yadanantaṃāhuh.

Aprākṛtaṃ prākṛtarūpakam ca, Kālasvarūpaṃ tadacetanaṃ mataṃ. Māyāpradhānādīpadapravācyam, Śuklādi bhedāśca same api tatra.

Madhva classifies the tattvas as (1) Independent real, and (2) Dependent real. The latter, again, is classified as (1) Bhāva (being), and (2) Abhāva (non-being). Bhāva is either eternal or transitory, the eternal, again, is conscious and inert. This scheme indicates the complete independence of Viṣṇu, the independent real. Others are real, but dependent (asvātantra). Madhva defines bhāva as that which is cognized in the initial perception; he defines abhāva as that which is not so cognized—or that which is cognized as non-existing in the initial perception.¹

Negation has always a reference to a locus and an object. It is not intelligible in itself. What is negated is the object, and where the object is negated is the locus.

Two conceptions are possible regarding the relation of abhāva with its locus :—

(1) abhāva is identified with the locus.

(2) abhāva is bhāva (positive) different from the locus.

The supporters of the former conception argue thus :—Abhāva (non-being) can be possibly related to either a locus (āśraya) with a bhāva (being) (e.g. a pot), or a locus without a bhāva (e.g. a pot). The latter begs the question. The former is a self-contradiction. Abhāva, therefore, should be characterized as identical with the locus. It is negation in so far as it denies a particular reference, it is position because it has no existence of itself apart from the locus.

¹ Vide *Tatvasaṃkhyānam*, pp. 10, 12, 13.

*Svatantrāsatantrabhedāddividhamtatvamīti . . . Svatantrabhagavān-
Viṣṇuḥ . . . asvatantratratvatmandvidhā. Kathaṃ bhāvoabhavasceti . . .
Abhāvaprātītibhāvaprātītyadhīnā. Niyameneti prādhānyāt prathamam bhā-
vavyoddeśaḥ. Prathamaprātītāvastītyupalabhyate yaḥ sabhāvaḥ. Yaśca
prathamopalabdhou nūstīti prātīyate sobhāvaḥ.*

Madhva points out that if abhāva is identical with its locus, then a locus with a bhāva is the same without it. Evidently an absurd position. It is natural then to characterize abhāva as bhāva different from the locus. It is bhāvāntara (a position). Such a position leads on to contradiction and resolves all distinction of bhāva and abhāva, position and negation.¹

Abhāva is not being; had it been so, negation or non-being would have been the same in thought and existence as being, and the concept would have been illusory. The non-being must have then a reference to its locus, but it is not the locus. It is different from the locus, otherwise a locus with a position would be the same as one without it.

The author of the Yatīndramatadīpikā (Rāmānujist) thinks abhāva or non-being to be a relative concept which is intelligible not in itself but in reference to *its locus* (āśraya) and its object (pratiyogī). It indicates a changed condition of a thing or a being. It is nothing ultimate. The prior-non-existence (prāgābhāva) is the successive changes of previous conditions. It is to be conceived positively and should not be taken to mean a continuity in non-being. The destruction-non-existence (dhvaṃsābhāva) indicates impending changes of bodies in future. Transformation implies negation of a previous state but this does not make negation a category. The mutual negation (anyonyābhāva) appears to demand a *position* and a *negation* in thought, whereas in reality the demand is only a reference to *another position* and a differentiating

¹Vide *Tatvasaṃkhyānam*, p. 18.

*Abhāva eva nāstīतिकेचित्. Tadasat. Nāstītipratīterdurapahṇavatvāt. Ghato nāstītipratītirbhūtalāmātraviśayeticeṭ. Mātreṭikīm bhūtalamevocyatā-
ulātīrikīṭaṃ kimcī, ādyeghatavatyatiprasamgaḥ. Atīrikītopighataścedu-
ktodoṣaḥ bhābāntaram cedrūpavati ghaṭe gaṇḍhonāstīti prātītiprasamgaḥ.*

consciousness. The absolute negation (atyantābhāva) is nothing absolute, it indicates a reference to the *locus* and an object, it is the locus or a bhāvāntara or a dharmāntara.¹ Citsukhācārya, a Sāṃkarite, has also the same conclusion. In other words, all judgments are affirmative. A negative judgment is no judgment in reality, it is by implication an affirmative judgment. Madhva accepts both positive and negative judgments in accepting abhāva as a category by itself.

Madhva's position has an apparent clearness and simplicity, but it stands no logic, for, thought cannot accept and understand abhāva-in-itself. It cannot be completely unreal, if it is to be thought of; or, in other words, thought can think in affirmation but never in complete negation. In negative judgments thought really thinks in positives, though it fails to establish a connexion; but a denial of a relation is no negation, it is an indirect assertion of two irreconcilables or opposites.

Madhva's contention—that if abhāva is identical with its locus, then a locus with a bhāva is the same without it—does not stand, for the locus is completely positive and in accepting abhāva as identical with the locus, we really refuse to give it a character, and practically deny it altogether. The locus is not denied. The locus with a bhāva (being) has a character different from a locus with an abhāva (non-being). In the former case the locus is differentiated, in the latter the locus remains undifferentiated.

¹ Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, p. 36.

Etenābhāvaḥ saptaṃśadārthaityaṇi nirastaṃ. Abhāvasya bhāvāntara-rūpatvāt. Prāgābhāvo nāma pūrvāvasthāpāramparā. Pradhvānsābhāvo nāmottarāvasthāpāramparā. Atyantābhāvānyonyābhāvau tu dharmyantarasarūpāveva.

Madhva's second point does not arise. If abhāva (non-being) is another bhāva (being), it can have no existence apart from the locus. It only qualifies the locus not in itself, but in reference to a pratiyogi. A pot with form cannot be characterized as scentless, for the scent is inherent in it and is not denied in the pot. Abhāva has a reference to what is actually denied and by calling it a bhāvāntara, nobody can make a negation of a position.

Madhva accepts three kinds of non-being:—(1) Prior non-existence, (2) Posterior non-existence, and (3) Absolute non-existence.

Besides non-being the other categories of Existence are:—(1) Substance, (2) Quality, (3) Action, (4) Community, (5) *Viśeṣa* or speciality, (6) the Specified, (7) the whole and the parts, (8) Similarity, (9) Number, (10) Union.¹

The unconscious or inert Existence is, again, put into three categories:—(1) Eternal, (2) Eternal-non-eternal, (3) Non-eternal or transitory. The Vedas are eternal. Time, space (*ākāśa*), and *prakṛti* are eternal-non-eternal. The evolutes of *prakṛti* are non-eternal. Philosophically time, space and *prakṛti* are important. They are objective. Moments of time are transitory. Points in space, like space itself are eternal. Evolutes of *prakṛti* appear and disappear. These entities are real, and not subjective.

The inert *prakṛti* is a homogeneity. It passes into a heterogeneity in creation. It is modifiable and gives rise to *tattvas* which are not eternal. Madhva does not accept the atomic theory of matter.

The Absolute is intelligence and activity. Brahman

¹ Vide *Madhvasidhāntasāra*, p. 1, *Sūtras*, 2, 3 and 4.

is not limited by time and space. It is the absolute monad, the finite conscious monads are not limited by time, but limited in intelligence, power and activity. The conscious (finite) being bears a close resemblance to the Infinite in intelligence. They are wholly dependent upon supreme Intelligence, who in his wisdom best knows how to guide and help them in working out their destiny.

The other categories are either modes of relation or attributes of these three, e.g., whole and parts: this category is specially applicable to time and its moments, space and its portions, prakṛti and its evolutes, cause and its effect.

These categories resolve themselves into four broad divisions: (1) Category of Substance, (2) Category of Quality, (3) Categories of relation, and (4) Quantity. Substance is divided into: (1) absolute intelligence, (2) limited intelligence, and (3) inert existence. Under quality we can put guṇa, viśeṣa, similarity, action, community, under quantity number, under relation, the whole and the parts, union, the specified.

Vallabha has the dynamic conscious reality Brahman, as the only being. Though jīva, kāla and prakṛti or māyā are eternal existences, still they have been completely assimilated in the being of Brahman. They have no separate existence. Māyā has two functions: (1) Evolution, and (2) Withdrawal.

Abhāva (non-being) is not a category. Prior-negation (pragābhāva) is non-different from the cause. The effect-form has its prior negation in cause-form. Destruction-negation (dhvaṃśābhāva) is disappearance of effectual form in casual form. It is non-different from the withdrawal. Mutual negation (anyonyābhāva) is in a sense *affirmation*. It is negation only by an

indirect reference. It is strictly a position. Absolute negation is also the same functioning of withdrawal in its highest intensity which makes for the clear and complete absence.¹

Jīva is an emanation. Jīva is *atomic*. It has no separate existence. A desire of self-expression is innate in Brahman. Self-expression connotes a process of becoming in time, a becoming which implies emanation of finite centres of consciousness and the inert existence. An existence is inert in which consciousness and bliss are absent, an existence is jīva in which bliss is absent.²

In fact, these distinctions and characterization are only a concession to naïve or popular realistic consciousness. But this admission is denied a metaphysical import, for these distinctions dissolve in the unity of being, and this identity is dynamic. Vallabha differs from Rāmānuja in holding that all apparent differences in being and relation are dissolved in the identity, where jīva attains bliss, inert existence, consciousness and bliss.

We should note the remarkable coincidence among Vaiṣṇava philosophers in the enumeration of the categories and they can be put in three broad divisions of jīva, prakṛti, and Brahman, generally designated as cit, acit and Īśvara. The other categories are either attributes or relations subsisting in them.

¹ Vide *Suddhādvaitamārtanda*, p. 10.

Tatra prāgabhāvaḥ kāraṇāvasthāto nātirichyate . . . Evaṃ dhvaṃse api . . . tirobhāvāśakyatiriktasya dhvaṃsasya nirūpayitumaśakyatvāt . . . Tathā ca kāryapratikūla kāraṇāvasthaiva dhvaṃsa iti tadarthaḥ . . . Ghataḥ palo netyanyonyābhāvapratilāvaḥpi ghate mūlecchayā patādīnām tirobhāvaḥ. Evaṃ pate ghatādīnaṃ . . . Evamatyantābhāvo'pi tirobhāvenaiva. Abhāvasyādhikaraṇarūpatvamityanyatra vistāraḥ.

² Vide *Suddhādvaitamārtanda*, p. 6.

Jīvasya niḥsaraṇamevocyate, na tu utpattiḥ.

Save and except the identity-existence-consciousness, Saṅkara's philosophy practically accepts jīva, Īśvara and māyā. Rāmānuja's prakṛti is the basic principle of the creative order. Śuddha-sattva is different from prakṛti. We have a reference to śuddha-sattva in the Pañcadaśī (sattva predominating). But it is not an element independent of prakṛti. It is māyā, the upādhi of Īśvara. We confess we cannot understand what kind of substance Rāmānuja's śuddha-sattva is. Anything unconscious though illuminating forming the *materia* of spiritual manifestations is a paradox. Jīva Gosvāmī sees this difficulty and reduces śuddha-sattva to the conscious category. It is a modification of svarūpa śakti, the original spiritual force.

Relation: The most important topic from philosophic standpoint is the relation of these ultimate existences. Are these totally different, or related in some way?

The Vaiṣṇava teachers are here sharply divided among themselves. Rāmānuja denies difference. Madhva conceives difference in identity. Nimvārka reconciles difference with integrity. Jīva Gosvāmī emphasizes identity, though he admits differences in it as inconceivable and mysterious. Valadeva admits difference in identity. It should be made plainly clear here that none of the Vaiṣṇava philosophers admit any absolute difference between these categories.

Madhva emphasizes the element of difference and yet maintains the actuality of every element subjected to God's will. If an absolute and rigid difference exists, it requires a straining of thought to establish a relation between them. The relation is accepted, though absolute difference is maintained.

The elements of difference, according to Madhva,

are ineffaceable. These are differences, (1) between jīva and Īśvara, (2) between Īśvara and prakṛti, (3) between jīvas themselves, (4) between jīva and prakṛti, (5) between the separate evolutes of prakṛti.

Jīvas contain a certain perfection and a certain self-sufficiency in themselves. In spite of the essential identity of nature of these jīvas or monads, the difference between them has been made absolute.

Īśvara may be called the monad of all monads controlling and regulating the conscious jīvas and the unconscious prakṛti, though it is different from them as an existence. There must have been some harmony, otherwise this dependence and regulation cannot be accounted for.

The contention that Īśvara, because of his absoluteness and all powerfulness, can naturally exert influence upon the finite intelligence and the unconscious matter is not much helpful, for the very assertion of independent entelechies and matter makes the Absolute lose its character of absoluteness and reduces it to the category of finite existence. The assertion of independent realities does not make the distinction of absolute and limited entelechies logically clear. So long as an absolute division is maintained in the inwardness of being, every one of them is a separate entity regulating and fulfilling its own destiny freely. If difference is a positive fact, the absolute being is an impossibility. Naturally the system must be logically resolving itself into a pluralistic universe which might contain in it a central monad, reducing and binding all others in a system in some form of law yet unknown and inexplicable.

The Madhvites perceive this inherent difficulty of accepting absolute differences. They expressly lay

emphasis upon Being with its manifoldness as an *integral being*, exclusive of difference. That the difference is perceived in the integral being is due to *viśeṣa*. *Viśeṣa* can differentiate the whole from the parts, the *Aṃśī* from *Aṃśa*, being from its attributes but cannot create division in Being. The author of the *Tatvodyota* draws a distinction between an integrity exclusive of *viśeṣa* and an integrity exclusive of *bheda*. The former posits an identity exclusive of *viśeṣa*, the latter an identity inclusive of *viśeṣa*, but exclusive of *bheda*. The integral being is not necessarily unqualified or unmodified being (*nirviśeṣa*) but an undivided being. The undivided integrity admits of qualitative differences or modifications through *viśeṣa*.¹

Viśeṣa, according to the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*, is

¹ Vide *Tatvodyotatikā*, p. 26.

*Akhaṇḍārthanīṣṭhatvaṃ nāma nirvedārthanīṣṭhātvaṃ nirviśeṣārtha
niṣṭhatvaṃ vā. Ādye saguṇatvāvirodhaḥ bhedaḥ bhāvepi viśeṣavalenaivata-
dupapattēh.*

Vide *Sattatvaratnamālā*, p. 12.

*Yathāhi yāvaddravyabhāvīgūṇāṇḍravyātyantābhedeḥ na dravyaṃ
nirguṇaṃ kiṃtu dharmībhūtaṃ dravyaṃ taddharmabhūtāgūṇāścasanti
viśeṣavalāt.*

Ibid., p. 16. *Tatraikatvasaṃkhyā viśiṣṭeḥpyacintāśaktibalenaiva bahu
saṃkhyāgocaravasyavakṣyamāṇatvāt.*

Ibid., p. 18. *Abhedeḥpi viśeṣasya sarvatrāṅgīkṛtatvataḥ.*

*Na kaścidviśeṣostī sa svanirvāhakobhavet. Viśeṣasyabhedapratidinidhitvān-
noktadoṣa iti bhāvah, namu viśeṣasya viśeṣīnābhinnatve kiṃ dharmāṃtareṇa-
parāddham. Viśeṣa viśeṣīnorbhede āpasiddhāntasca. Abhedeḥpunarvya-
vahārādyanupapattīḥ. Viśeṣāntarasvīkāre' navasthetyata āha. Sa iti, sa
eva viśeṣoviśeṣāntaramāntareṇa viśeṣatadvadbhāvaṃ gamayati. Ekasya
nirvāhyatvaṃ nirvāhakatvaṃ catadbālādevasidhyati. 'Svanirvāhaka-
lāyuktāḥ samīvastusvāśeṣata' ityukteḥ. Viśeṣonāma nirbhedaatvena-
pramītesvapīṣvāraḥpavajadeṣu nānāvīdharūpajñānānaṃdādi guṇa kṛiyā
saṃyogasaṃkhyā jāti viśiṣṭāśakti sādṛśyādīnāmavāntara bahutvādi ghata-
kobhedapratidinidhiḥ śakti viśeṣaḥ. Taduḥktaṃbrhadbhāṣye. 'Ekasminneva-
śabdānāṃ yastunānāsvarūpīṇāṃ, prayojaktvāhetusyāt sa viśeṣaḥ prakīrtita'
iti. Nirbheda vastuni katham viśeṣasyāpyavasthānamilicedīśvarācīṃtya
śaktyetīdrumah.*

a necessity to avoid two extremes of absolute monism and absolute pluralism. The absolute is an existence which, though integral, admits of difference. Viśeṣa denotes bheda in integrity and not identity in difference. It establishes difference where there is none, but, it cannot set up identity in difference.

To avoid pluralism Madhva first establishes an integral whole of existence, in which he introduces viśeṣa. To establish a difference where there is none or to bring a harmonious adjustment among things of absolute and ineffaceable differences Madhva attributes a mysterious power to God. With this his system just lyavoids the appearance of a pluralistic system.

This is made clear in Madhva's refutation of the Naiyāyika conception of samavāya and Rāmānuja's conception of viśeṣaṇa. The Naiyāyikas conceive samavāya (co-inherence) to account for the relation between the whole and the parts. Rāmānujists favour adjectival predication. Though samavāya is represented as the unifying and the relational link between the whole and the parts, yet in insisting upon the individuality of the relational facts the Naiyāyikas accentuate the difference more than the unity ; the wished-for unity is not strictly unity in which differences are assimilated, but rather a complexity in which the elements and their differences are equally recognised.

The adjectival predication has not been favoured by the Madhvites. A predicate can be conceived either as different from or identical with the subject. The former posits absolute differences, the latter denies predication. To institute another predicate to establish a relation is to invite an infinite regress. To avoid these difficulties, Madhvites

conceive *viśeṣa* which causes a differentiating consciousness in an integral whole. The acceptance of *viśeṣa*, the differentiating element, accentuates the monistic aspect of the system; moreover it enables us to avoid the infinite regress necessarily implied in *samavāya* (co-inherence). *Viśeṣa* determines itself. It does not require the aid of anything else.¹

Philosophy is confronted with the problem of assimilating the one and the many. *Samkara* denies the many and asserts the one. *Rāmānuja* makes the many a predicate to the one. *Madhvites* cannot accept the former, for it denies the truth of the many, nor the latter, because a relational consciousness leads on to a regress.

Madhvites clearly recognize that the Absolute consciousness cannot be relational, nor can it deny differentiating consciousness. Here is the problem. Philosophy has either to negate relational consciousness or to posit it in the Absolute. *Bradley* supposes that in the Absolute the differences, if not completely annulled, are transmuted and fused, but how, he does not know. *Hegel* and *Rāmānuja* make a unitive synthesis of differences in the Absolute. *Bosanquet* is nearer to *Rāmānuja* in assimilating the differences in the Absolute as predicates or adjectives. *Bradley* does not solve the mystery. *Rāmānuja* and *Bosanquet* cannot give the unity they desire so much. *Madhvites* are anxious to retain the difference in the Absolute, but finding such a

¹ Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, vol. iii, pp. 562-564.

Vastutastvasmanmate bhedovastunāsa viśeṣabhinnāḥ. Tataścābhinnatvānnānavasthādi. Bheda pratinidheśca viśeṣasya sattvānnaparyāyatvādikam. Viśeṣaśca bhedahinepyekataraparīṣeṣābhāvādinirvāhakaḥ.

Ayameva viśeṣaḥ vastvabhinnāḥ svanirvāhakaścetinnānavasthā tasya tathātvaṃ ca dharmigrāhaka mānasiddham. Yatra bhedābhāvo bhedakāryaṃ ca pramīto tatraivaḥ viśeṣaḥ kalpyataiḥ.

position otherwise untenable institute *viśeṣa*, the doctrine of specific particulars. These specific particulars keep the differences in the Absolute without destroying its absoluteness and at the same time without being involved in the *infinite regress of relational* (*samavāya*) *consciousness*. A differentiating element (specific particular) which does not require any relational reference is a necessity, according to the author of the Nyāya *suddhā*, to keep up the difference in integrity. The Absolute is, for example, consciousness and bliss. To say "there is no difference between them is to deny their specific nature. To say "there is difference" is to deny the integrity of Being. To avoid these extremes the doctrine of *specific particulars* is necessary. The author of the Nyāya *suddhā* writes 'because such a synthesis is not otherwise possible, some such hypothesis is conceived by *arthāpatti* (reasoning by implication) to institute *bheda* in *abheda*, distinction in integrity.'

Madhvites claim their position to be monistic. Though they accept infinite differences, still they accentuate the integrity of Being. Their doctrine of specific particulars does not make the differences absolute, it seeks to assimilate differences in integrity. They deny differences. They accept distinctions. These distinctions are specific and cannot create division in integrity. The doctrine of specific particulars has enabled Madhvites to avoid the identity of efficient and material causes of the universe and at the same time to deny the absolute difference between them (as we have in *Sāṃkhya*). It enables them to leave aside the two impossible extremes, the hypothesis of Nature as a predicate to *Īśvara*, and the metaphysical dualism of *Sāṃkhya*. It retains *prakṛti* in the Absolute, though through specific parti-

culars it keeps a difference between them. This doctrine of specific particulars is extended to indicate differences of eternal and transient existences. In this way Madhvites reconcile ineffaceable differences in the Absolute.

Nimvārka makes a classification of existences as independently Real and dependently Real. The former is Puruṣottama, the latter is jīva and prakṛti. Prakṛti is subject to transformation. Jīva is not. Jīvas are spiritual monads, infinite in number. Prakṛti and jīvas, though real as separate entities, are not quite independent inasmuch as they are controlled by Puruṣottama.

Teachers of this school lay emphasis upon the logic of difference in unity and expressly maintain that the entire existence is an integrity of Being. As an integrity it does not admit of a separate independent existence. Jīvas and prakṛti are, therefore, accepted as dependent existences naturally forming parts in the unity. Puruṣottamacārya says that "the world-soul Paruṣottama because of its sustaining the world is non-different from it, and because of its transcending the cosmos, and of its being different from jīva and prakṛti in expansiveness, wisdom, goodness, it is different from them." It is immanent in prakṛti and jīvas. In this sense it is non-different from them. It is transcendent, in this sense it is different from them. But his insistence upon jīvas and prakṛti as forming realities though dependent would leave some room for a pluralistic interpretation which he without doubt seeks to avoid by laying stress upon the integrity and undividedness of the Absolute. His system is monism with a pluralistic countenance.

Jīva Gosvāmī has greatly improved upon

Nimvārka in holding the Reality as the one without a second.¹ The conception of jīvas and prakṛti as dependent reals has been replaced by the conception of śaktis related to svarūpa-śakti of Bhagavān. Bhagavān is the source of emanation within his ownself. It is personal reality possessing the attributes of intelligence, sweetness, power and bliss. These are the qualities expressive of his essence, and they are related to him in samvandha, (relation) called svarūpa. This svarūpa-śakti merely indicates the statico-dynamic nature of Bhagavān and differentiates it from the static character of the Absolute. But if this svarūpa-śakti indicates his inner nature, this supports jīva-śakti, which, again supports māyā-śakti. Māyā has no direct touch with Bhagavān. The jīva is called tatasthā-śakti. The tatasthā-śakti is the source of pure essence of souls (jīvas), the vāhiraṁgāśakti is the creative energy. It brings forth pradhān, ego and Incarnation.

Jīva Gosvāmī's reduction of jīva and prakṛti to the categories of śaktis in the integrity of Being has given a monistic appearance to his system. And when these śaktis cannot exist apart from the support of Īśvara their existence as independent forces can easily be ignored. The svarūpa-śakti of Īśvara gives a direct and an indirect support to jīva and māyā-śakti. It is technically called viśeṣa.

Īśvara is the Reality, the superior person. Īśvara, is, indeed, identical with his śakti. But the difficulty of the logic of identity to indicate the reality of śakti has been clearly felt, and at the same time the creation

¹ Vide *Tattvasandarvaḥ*, p. 37.

Jñānam—cidekarūpam. Advayatvañcāsya svayamsiddhatādyśātadriṣa tattvāntarabhāvat, Svasaktyekasahāyatvāt, paramāśrayaṁ tam vinātāsāmsiddhivācca.

of a difference in the integrity of Being in keeping up the individuality of śakti is no less difficult an experience.

To avoid these two extremes Jīva emphasises the logic of difference in unity. In his Sarba-sambādini he writes, ' Since it is difficult to think of śakti as identical with the Being of Īśvara, we conceive a difference, and, again, since it is difficult to think of it as distinguished from Īśvara we conceive an Identity.' Jīva Gosvāmī calls it the inconceivable relation of difference and identity. (Acintya-bhedābheda).

Jīva Gosvāmī¹ does not maintain any direct relation holding between Īśvara and māyā, though indirectly māyā has been conceived as its vahirangā or outward śakti. So long as māyā is regarded as a śakti, the identity of material and efficient cause is an evident conclusion. But Jīva Gosvāmī in laying stress upon indirect relation of māyā to Brahman, sees the difficulty of conceiving prākṛta evolution as a transformation of Īśvara. The material cause transforms, but since Īśvara transcends the *causa materia*, the Being of Īśvara is not at all affected in the course of natural evolution. The līlā-vibhūti is the history of Īśvara's will as manifested in the cosmic evolution. But Jīva's stress on transcendence of Īśvara and Īśvara's svarūpa-śakti at once makes it clear that the Being of Īśvara, is never transformed with creation. The transformation is in māyā, but not in Īśvara. The svarūpa-śakti is the efficient cause, māyā, the material cause. The synthetic unity is retained by complete subordination of bahirangā

¹ Vide *Sarbasamvādinī*, p. 61.

*Atrottarayoranantarangatvaṃ tāvyāṃ paramēśvarasyāliptatayā śakti-
vaṃca ; nityatadāśritatayā tadvyatirekeṇa svato 'siddhatayā tatkāryo-
payogitayāca.*

śakti, though a direct relation and intervention have been conceived impossible.

Bhagavān is the highest dialectic unity which embraces the concepts of Brahman and Paramātman. Bhagavān is the Person infinite in excellence and power. Paramātman is Bhagavān in relation to the creative order and infinite selves. It is the innerscient, the support of all beings including jīvas. Paramātman is Bhagavān in so far as it is imperfectly manifested. Brahman is Bhagvān in the immediacy of absolute intelligence, realised when the distinction of the subject and the object, the substance and the attributes, die out in absorption. Such a homogeneity of consciousness is felt when the bounds of prakṛti are crossed and the synthetic completeness of Bhagavān is not yet in sight. A distinctionless intuition in immediate awareness is first experience in spiritual consciousness. In this intuitive height the soul passes into the calm of the deep and is unable for the moment to get into the deeper self-conscious realisation of excellences, perfections of Bliss-Person. In the spiritual fulfilment, the seeker comprehends Brahman, the Absolute intelligence (notion) in its immediacy as the first moment, next he comprehends Paramātman,¹ the God-in-person in relation

¹ Vide *Ṣaṭ-Sandarbhah*, *Bhaktisandarbhah*, p. 542.

Nirviśeṣarūpasya tadīyabrahmākhyāvirbhāvasya jñānarūpaṃ saviśeṣarūpasya ca tadīyabhagavadādyākhyāvirbhāvasya bhaktirūpamiti dvayam.

Vide *Ṣaṭ-Sandarbhah*, *Paramātmāsandarbhah*, p. 214.

Sa ca vai sarva jivānāmāśrayaḥ paramēśvaraḥ. Antaryāmī sa teṣāṃ vai tārakāṇāmivāmvaram.

Anicchātāḥ prarayaṭi tadvadeva paraḥ prabhuḥ.

Paramātmāne sarvajīvanīyante iti.

Vide *Bhāgavatsandarbhah*, p. 50.

Tathācāvaṃ vaiśiṣṭye prāpte pūrṇāvirbhāvatvenākhaṇḍatattvarūpo'sou bhagavān, brahma tu sphuṭamaprakāṭitavaiśiṣṭyākāratvena tasyai-vāsamyagavirbhāva ityāgatam.

to nature and man as the second moment in realization. In the second stage the seeker still has not the complete vision of Bhagavān in its fuller being and expression in transcendence to nature and unliberated finite souls, Bhagavān as the supreme delight of existence. Such a vision completes the all-embracing dialectic unity and reveals in it an expression of the Infinite to itself. This self-expression is an expression in Intelligence, bliss and goodness.

The immediate sameness of absolute Intelligence is strictly not sameness, at least not in the sense in which the Śāṅkarites express the term. It is the immediacy of Absolute dynamic reality, which so far appears as an identity, though it possesses all the time infinite attributes. The homogeneity is only apparent, it is only a partial vision and is not the complete reality. The Śāṅkarites claim the Absolute to be eternally homogeneous. It denies dynamic completeness and dialectic expression of fullness. But to the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas (Jīva Goswāmī and others) Bhagavān is the dialectic fullness which includes in it Brahman and Paramātman as elements of the complete synthesis.

Valadeva closely follows Jīva Goswāmī, but he appears to have been influenced by Madhva in his doctrine of viśeṣa. Jīva Goswāmī attributes all differences to svarūpa-śakti and explains them as modifications of it. He does not accept viśeṣa, a differentiating category, like Madhva. But Valadeva thinks it necessary. In his Siddhāntaratna, he holds that viśeṣa must be accepted. Viśeṣa substitutes bheda. It institutes the dharma-dharmī (Substance-attribute) relation and indicate difference in meanings of the terms satya,

jñāna and ānandam.¹ But viśeṣa is not extended to absolute or categorical distinctions e.g. Īśvara, Jīva.

Valadeva confines this viśeṣa to svarūpa śakti and its modifications. He does not extend it or its application to jīva and prakṛti, for in his opinion their differences are established facts and do not require a viśeṣa to distinguish them. He follows here Jīva Gosvāmī. He holds prakṛti and kāla to be dependent existences. They are not to be regarded as self-caused and self-regulated reals. They are śaktis. Since they cannot exist without Īśvara, they must not be thought as separate and independent existences. But there is a passage in the Siddhāntaratna which points to a clear division of jīva and Īśvara, a division, which, according to the author, is indisputable and established. But the general tenure of his thought is not consistent with this affirmation. We can, therefore, reject it as a casual observation. No doubt, Valadeva accepts realities of jīva and prakṛti and their difference, but this acceptance does not support their independence as realities.

Rāmānuja has rejected all conception of division and has instituted modified monism. He maintains only one integral Being which has a concrete character. His system may be better styled as concrete monism, for the Reality to him is not an abstraction or homogeneity of Being, but a highly concrete synthesis, which gives support to innumerable finite conscious existences and

¹ Vide *Siddhāntaratnam*, p. 44.

Viśeṣastvaśyaṃ svākāryaḥ. Sa ca bhedaḥ pratinidhirbhedaḥ bhavedaḥ pi bhedaḥ karyasya dharmadharmivyabahasasya satyādisavdāparyāyatāyāsa nirvarttakāḥ. Itarathā Sattā Satī bhedo bhinnāḥ kālāḥ sarvadāstideśāḥ sarvatretyavādhitavyavahāranupapattiḥ . . . Itarathā vijñānamānandanāḥ brahma satyaṃ jñānamānandanāḥ brahmetyādisu svarūpamātravodhakānām. Vijñānadisavdānāḥ paryāyatāpattiḥ vide Ibid. commentary . . . Nirbhede vastuni gunagunivyavahārahetoḃviśeṣasyānāṅgikare satītyarthaḥ.

unconscious matter as parts of its own being (cidcidviśiṣ-teśvarah). There is one and one Existence only, the finite souls and inert prakṛti inhere as realities, in the terminology of Rāmānuja and his followers, as viśeṣaṇa or qualifications of the Absolute. The Absolute does not deny jīva and prakṛti, but embraces them as moments of its own being (svagatabheda).

The Absolute is the self-conscious effort of self-revelation either in the world of spirits or in the world of nature. This opening is, on the highest synthesis, an opening into itself. In the līlā-vibhūti, throughout the history of the evolution of cosmos, the expression of power and intention is clearly manifest. In the nitya-vibhūti the history of the life in sweetness, harmony, wisdom, displaying itself in varieties enriching itself every moment, revealing the infinite possibilities of such an existence is a never-ending process of self-expression of the Infinite. Līlā-vibhūti is the immanent expression of the Absolute through nature and finite selves. Nitya-vibhūti is the transcendent expression of the Infinite to self and liberated souls. Rāmānuja has a vision of the Infinite life in nature and above nature and to him the entire vision reveals one life—an undivided integrity, which has an expression transcendent and an expression immanent and unites them in itself as a self-expression of self. Rāmānuja naturally lends his support to the identity of material and efficient causes of the universe or simply he makes Īśvara the only Reality which brings out the cosmic evolution in self-expression in līlā.

With a consciousness of the impossibility of līlā in undivided oneness of Being, Rāmānuja is naturally alive to the importance of other existences, besides Brahman. Hence he accepts jīva, śakti, and prakṛti as elements

necessary to keep up the dynamic fullness in the integrity of Being.

But these elements though as realities they are different from and independent of one another, cannot create any division in the integrity of the Absolute, for, the Absolute Unity realizes its synthetic character through them; they (jīva and śakti) in turn recognize themselves as participating in the synthetic response and enjoying the harmony of Divine Life.

This synthetic vision makes it easy for Rāmānuja to deny bheda as an element in the conception of the Absolute. The Absolute is synthetic unity which may admit of entities as elements in its own being, but in the synthetic totality they lose their individuality keeping up the sense of isolated and independent units. The admission of Nimvārka that these are dependent reals is significant. The system has the appearance of insisting on bheda among the reals. Rāmānuja has not designated either prakṛti or jīvas as reals (dependent) like Nimvārka or as śakti like Jīva Gosvāmi. He calls them viśeṣana and accentuates the inwardness and directness of relation between jīva and Īśvara, between Īśvara and prakṛti. And this has been borne out in the identity of *causa materia* and *causa efficiens*.

Though Rāmānuja has insisted upon the identity of causes, material and efficient, he is careful to indicate that prakṛti as matter undergoes transformation, and jīvas as finite beings seek evolution in, and freedom of, spirit. Īśvara is not affected in the course either of transformation or evolution. It keeps its identity of Being. Transformation of prakṛti and self-realization in spiritual consciousness of jīvas are not to be thought of as distinct and totally different from Īśvara; it is His līlā and as such is inherent in Īśvara.

Rāmānuja and his followers lay emphasis upon the conception of unity of Being. They refute all conceptions of bheda (difference), bhedābheda (difference and identity). The former launches us into the difficulties of dualism and pluralism. The latter is impossible. They are contradictories and mutually exclusive.¹

Rāmānuja thinks that the conception is to be modified by more emphasis upon unity which admits of bheda and ultimately absorbs it into its own being. He throws away, therefore, the conception of bheda as indicating difference and in its place institutes the conception of viśeṣaṇa (predication). Predication introduces the adjectival theory and completely dispenses with contradictory extremes of identity and difference. The adjectival theory has the advantage of bringing out the Reality of one and one Existence only and of assimilating others to the being of the Absolute. It establishes a concrete synthesis. It makes the Absolute prominent in its concreteness.

Vedānta Deśika refutes the conception of bhedābheda. Identity is exclusive of, and denies difference. The acceptance of a bheda as genus (jāti) and bheda as vyakti is not very helpful, for the universal is not particular in its being. The community of nature of jīvas and paramātma does not dispense with inherent

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya—Śrutaprakāśikā* (Bombay Edition), p. 75.

Bhedābhedavādināpi pīṇānāmanyonyabhedābhedasamarthane—idamidam na bhavatiiti bhedah, idamidam bhavatiityabhedā ityekasyaiva jugapadbhāvābhāvarūpavyāhatiparihārārtha—jātyātmanā'bhedo, vyaktiyātmanā bheda ityākāradvayena bhedābhedā upapāditah. Jātigato'bhedaḥ, vyaktigataśca bheda iti naikasya dvayātmakatā—iti saṃkāparihārāya jātivyaktyoścānyonyabhedābhedā uktah; tannirvahanāyākārāntorānvayādarśanāt pratītireva śaraṇamityāśrītā, ataḥ—tannirāsāya prathamam, jātivyaktyorbhedenaiva pratīteḥ—abhedasya pratītivirodham darśayati—idamitthamiti.

specific distinctions. The bheda is ultimate. The appeal to a third term is open to infinite regress.¹

To avoid this difficulty, Vedānta Deśika accentuates abheda, integrity of existence, which denies all bheda. But he equally refutes the conception of Integrity as abstract or transcendent oneness and in its place institutes like Rāmānuja the concrete unitary conception of Being which as absolute does not deny, but, on the other hand, embraces infinite qualifications while it realizes its concrete Integrity.²

The theistic Philosophers propound the reality of jīva, Īśvara and prakṛti. They do not materially differ. The formal difference originates in the logical attempt of reconciling these reals in the Absolute. And the Absolute is the Divine personality which does not deny, but, on the other hand, accepts finite personalities as complementaries to its own existence. The conception of personality at once necessitates the position of separate finite existences, and the understanding of it as divine and absolute immediately requires the inclusion of them in the richness of Infinite life. This implication is present everywhere in Madhva, Nimvārka, Jīva Gosvāmi and Rāmānuja.

¹ Vide *Nyāyasiddhāntaśāstra*, p. 96.

*Abhedo hi bhedaḥbhāvaḥ atastam ca tadabhavaḥ ca kathamekatraikadai-
vādhyavasyema bhedaḥbhāvatiriktastvabhedo nāstyeva jātyākāreṇābheda iti cet
tarhi jātyādābhedo vyaktyādiṣu bheda iti naikasya bhinnābhinnatvaḥ,
jātyavyaktyādikamapi mithobhinnābhinnamiti cet idam svarūpenaiva vā
kāranāntareṇa vā pūrvatra virodhaḥ utratrānavasthādidoṣaḥ.*

² Vide *Śrībhāṣya* and *Śrūṭapraśāṅgikā*, p. 75, ll. 1-5, 15-20.

CHAPTER III

APPEARANCE

Avidyā, its epistemological and creative function—The creative function not always recognized in the Śaṅkarites—Appearance a psychological illusion, Rāmānuja's seven anupapatti (charges) against Avidyā—Advaitists' reply—Fundamental difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja in the test of Truth—Both accept the positiveness of Experience, Rāmānuja accepts its truth, Śaṅkara denies its absolute truth—Test of Truth—Experience and Intuition—Will, Reason and Intention—Illusory perception—Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha,—Māyā, its meaning and import—in Śaṅkara and Vaiṣṇava teachers—Vallabha on Māyā and Avidyā—Causation as viewed by Vedantic teachers—Pariṇāmavāda, Avikṛta priṇāmavāda, Vivarttavāda—Causality and identity—The identity of material and efficient causation—Rāmānuja, Jīva Gosvāmi, Vallabha accepts the identity, Madhva denies—Dualism of Śāṅkhya in Vaiṣṇavism—Difficulty of Vaiṣṇavism to assimilate Prakṛti in the Absolute—Līlā or self-expression—Śaṅkara's explanation—Līlā in Vaiṣṇava teachers—Its meaning and significance—Causality fully considered—Causality as expression and causality as transformation—Vallabha's three stages of knowledge—Vācaspati on causation—True import of Vivarttavāda—Personality of Īśvara—Infinitude and personality—Kaiṅkaryā—Spiritual initiation, spiritual birth—Formless form—Consciousness of divinity—spiritual figure—Jīva Gosvāmi advances reason for spiritual figurate—Nyāyāmṛta, Valadeva and Lokacārya on the problem, Puruṣottamacārya and Vedānta Deśika on the question.

Love and its Dialectic—The dialectic expression through Śakti or Being-for-Expression and liberated finite selves—Love consciousness, its expressional diversity—Rāmānuja, Nimvarka, Madhva, Vallabha, Jīva Gosvāmi and Bengal School—The characteristic of Bengal School—Forms of fellowship—Reality

and ideality of fellowship—Aggressive and submissive types of love-consciousness—Absorption of the object in the locus in love.

Vedāntic theory of jīva or finite consciousness—The psychological self of the Śaṅkarites—The metaphysical self of the Vaiṣṇavas—Atomic conception of self.

Śaṅkara draws a distinction between Reality transcendental and Reality empirical. The empirical Reality is supported in avidyā. The order of appearance has an existence so long as sentient experience works. Experience functions through the senses and mental consciousness but in transcendent isolation empirical or pragmatic order has no Reality. Consciousness alone exists in dissociation and separation from the sense and will-operation. The universe of sense-perception and will-emotion complexes has been denied a reality in the permanently objective order. They have been referred to the realm of avidyā, and the psychological revelation of turiya-consciousness has been called in to support the conclusion of the transcendent position of Vedāntic logic.

The dynamic aspect of experience has found little or no value in Śaṅkara's philosophy. Śaṅkara has laid supreme stress upon the transcendent consciousness and has thrown away the immanent aspect of experience as philosophically unsubstantial, though it has a value for exoteric purposes. And it should be noticed that the humanistic tendencies and impulses of art, religion, beauty, and social sympathy have been delegated to the plane of immanent consciousness. These impulses, however lofty and noble, may have a value in the divided vision of life but have no place in the expansive undivided transcendent consciousness.

At the basis of immanent experience lies avidyā

which has the double capacity of concealing the truth of identity and holding a scene of multiple existences. Avidyā has an epistemological and a creative function. It screens our consciousness. It has individuating capacity. In Vedāntism the epistemological aspect has been more emphasized and the whole order of existence has been supposed to be a psychical illusion and nothing real. The vyavahārika existence and the pragmatic value of the experienced order have been set aside. The prātibhāsika existence or psychological ideality of it has been emphasized.

But in any case avidyā is the root cause of the cosmic appearance, be that appearance extra-mental or objective, mental or subjective. But both these forms are prevalent in Advaitism. If the objective order is guaranteed some constancy and externality, it is supposed to be rooted in māyā. The Vedāntists use the word in a cosmological or ontological sense. The word avidyā is used in the epistemological sense.

But in Saṅkara's system the epistemological functioning of avidyā is more significant than its creative functioning, for no sooner does the epistemological functioning cease than the truth of identity is revealed and the creative functioning gets a rude and a sudden check and in no time dies out. The epistemological functioning is accepted by all, though the creative functioning has not been accepted with equal emphasis. Those who regard the creative functioning as equally important have to maintain an objective extra-mental world. We notice, therefore, a tendency among a certain section of the followers of Saṅkara to dispense with the creative order as a subjective illusion acquiring an apparent objectivity through inter-subjective intercourse.

This avidyā hides the identity-consciousness though it has its locus in it. The identity-consciousness is the locus as well as the object of avidyā. Avidyā has no definite origin. Still it is not eternal. It vanishes at the dawn of identity-consciousness. It has, therefore, a mysterious existence. It is neither sat or asat. It is an intermediary existence and is called illusory (mithyā). And of its existence we are directly or immediately conscious. The witness-intelligence reveals its existence to us. The charge of begging the question—avidyā creating sākṣi (witness) and sākṣi revealing avidyā—does not stand, for, as Vācaspati points out, the percipency is a potent fact, and its isolation and transcendence as witness-intelligence cannot in any way be affected by its association with avidyā. The percipency is then independent of avidyā and its operation. The very existence of avidyā is revealed by this percipency of witness-intelligence.¹

Rāmānuja has raised certain subtle objections against such an existence. These objections are ontological, epistemological and logical.

One cannot determine the locus of avidyā (āśraya anupapatti). It cannot be either Jīva consciousness or Brahman. Jīva is a mode of consciousness, a mode created by avidyā. Jīva cannot support it (the position of Vācaspati). Brahman is consciousness and opposed to Nescience. Brahman cannot support it (the position of Sarvajñātmuni.)²

¹ Vide *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 585.

Ajñānasya cidbhāsyatve api cīteḥ svaprakāśatvena tad bhāsyatvāt. . . . Ajñānasya cidāśrayatve cidādhīnasthitikatve, pi citi avidyāśritatvatadadhīnasthitikatvayorabhāvāt.

² Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 73 (Narasimhācārya's Edition).

Sā hi kimāśritya bhraṃsaṃ janayati? Na tābajīvamāśritya; avidyāpa-

The authors of the Nyāyāmṛta and the Srutaprakāśikā have also pointed out that Vācaspati's argument is vitiated by a circle. The position of another nescience different from the limiting one does not give any relief. It leads to a regress. Moreover, who determines this jīva? It cannot be jīva himself, for, it begs the question, nor Brahman, for, it has no ignorance.¹ These charges, as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out, are false. The fallacy that jīva has its origin in avidyā, which, it, again, supports, is no fallacy, for, both of them are co-eternal. The percipency of jīva is not dependent upon avidyā. Avidyā can put a limitation upon its being but cannot totally eclipse it. Its percipii presupposes consciousness. And nescience and consciousness are not exactly inter-dependent. Nescience has its locus in consciousness, but consciousness exactly is not located in nescience.² And lastly the jīva and Īśvara consciousness have an origin in nescience. They are creations of it, which ultimately must be supported in jīva-consciousness and located therein.

Sarvajñāta Muni and Vivaraṇācārya locate avidyā in Brahman. The author of the Nyāyāmṛta thinks it impossible, for, Brahman is opposed to avidyā and cannot support it.³ Vivaraṇācārya replies that Brahman is not opposed to it.

The position and negation of avidyā and its location in Brahman all come under conceptual thinking, but Brahman transcends it. And so long as avidyā is

rikalpitatvājīvaabhāvasya. Nāpi brahmāśritya; tasya svayaṇprakāśajñānasvarūpatvenāvidyā virodhitvāt, sā hi jñānabādhya'bhīmatā.

¹ Vide Nyāyāmṛta, vol. ii, p. 352.

Kiṃca jīveśvarayorjīveśvarābhyām kalpitatve ātmāśrayāt. Īśvara (Brahmajñ) jīvakalpitatvenyonyāśrayāt.

² Vide Advaita Siddhi, p. 585.

³ Vide Nyāyāmṛta, p. 338.

operative, its basis and object are Brahman. It is posited and denied in it, though it is not denied by it. The determinate and indeterminate concept of Brahman originate with this position and negation of avidyā in Brahman.

This way the fallacy of begging the question does not rise, for percipiency and location have different origin. Consciousness modified by avidyā is the percipient, consciousness unmodified is the locus.

Avidyā, as an existence, escapes logical and categorical determination. It is neither sat, nor asat, the sat is permanently objective. It is identity-consciousness. The asat does not exist, nor is its existence conceivable, e.g., sky-flower. Avidyā is not sat; had it been so, it would not have been destroyed, nor it is asat, for then it would not be the *materia* of illusory existence. The former denies the possibility of liberation, the second makes it positive, and the basic principle of the world-illusion. It is and is not. Rāmānuja considers such an existence an impossibility and far removed from experience, and that which is removed from experience is not true. Something appearing in experience cannot be false.

The author of the Śrutaprakāśikā contends that an existence which is neither real nor false does not meet experience. Existence must be either real or non-real. It cannot be both at the same moment. Had it been so, it would produce an all round confusion in knowledge, in experience and in categories.¹

This contention of Rāmānuja—that which forms the object of experience is true—dispenses with the distinction between illusion and realities. The transitory appear-

¹ Vide *Śrutaprakāśikā*, p. 170.

ances are not truth, though they are objects of knowledge. 'Anything appearing, and therefore true' is a proposition, logic cannot give assent to. Truly things which appear in experience cannot be either sat or asat; they are not sat, for concrete existences have no permanence, nor asat, for they appear. The conclusion is necessarily forced upon us; they are mysterious. Rāmānuja seeks to make all objective experiences valid, a conclusion not supported by facts.¹

The Śaṅkarites analyse existences into three groups :—

- (1) Transcendentally real.
- (2) Empirically real.
- (3) Tucca or imaginary.

Brahman is Real. Imaginary existences are no existence. Empirical real is of two kinds, the one has a pragmatic importance and value (e.g. the ordinarily objective things), the other has no pragmatic reference (e.g. rope-serpent). This distinction is not universally accepted. The author of the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktvāli sees no reason for drawing a line between illusory existences.

This elaborate analysis has made it possible for the Śaṅkarites to affirm existences that are at once real and non-real, and they cannot accept all appearances to be truth, though they can readily agree to their positive and determinate character. The fundamental difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and other theistic thinkers originate from the standard and test of truth. Rāmānuja accepts the validity and value of experience in knowledge and to him and his followers whatever appears before or forms the object of consciousness is

¹ Vide discussion on *Sat Khyātivāda*.

truth. The main function of consciousness is to enlighten experience, and it would be the height of folly to go against the evidence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness cannot go against its own revelation and commit suicide and self-negation. The evidence of self-consciousness even in false perception cannot be doubted; that something appears and that it is real is a judgment which has theoretically the highest value, although its falsity is soon discovered when it escapes practical determination. Its theoretic assuredness is a fact, though it is a moment after declared false, because it fails to satisfy.¹

Madhva, like Rāmānuja, would accept the evidence of self-consciousness in false perception, which is false, not because the appearance itself is false, but because a particular appearance is taken in for a completely different one. The falsity is in non-discrimination and consequently mistaken or wrong localization. The appearance is not false but the localization.

Śaṅkara accepts the positiveness of appearance, for it is a fact in knowledge and cannot be ignored. He agrees so far with Rāmānuja and Madhva, but its positiveness and definiteness in spatial or temporal localization are no mark of its truth. Śaṅkara's test of truth is purely metaphysical. A thing may appear or may not, but this does not constitute its truth. A positive appearance which subsequently dies out is no truth. The epistemological or psychological test of truth as appearance to or object of consciousness has been set aside in favour of a transcendent test, for the

¹ Vide *Śrūtaprakāśikā*, p. 170.

Sato'sadvilakṣaṇatvamāsataḥ sadvilakṣaṇatvaṃ ca hi dṛṣṭaṃ, na tveka-syobhayaavilakṣaṇaṃ dṛṣṭamiti vyāptivirodhaḥ. Sadasadvilakṣaṇatvaṃ kvacidapi na dṛṣṭaṃ, sadasadātmakatvaṃ dṛṣṭamiti.

epistemological dualism has no room in the transcendent identity of being.¹

The self-conscious evidence of an appearance in false perception does not prove its enduring truth. The falsity of the appearance, Śaṅkara holds, does not consist either in the wrong localization or non-adaptability for practical purposes, but in the denial and negation. Śaṅkara affirms that the projection is true and real, and as appearance it has, for the time being, a real existence; it is not the appearance of something previously perceived, nor the false location due to a confusion. But the projection is declared false and non-real as soon as its locus is perceived. As appearance it is then both true and false, real and non-real. Appearance, because of the evidence of self-consciousness, cannot be held true for consciousness reveals its existence as much as its non-existence. The self-conscious evidence is no guarantee of its truth. On the other hand if the evidence of self-consciousness is to be believed in, we must accept the illusory (the real-unreal) character of an appearance. The self-consciousness evidence, therefore, cannot testify to the truth or falsity of appearance. This truth or falsity must be determined by a possibility or an impossibility of an enduring affirmation and existence.²

Ajñāna has no definite origin though it has a definite end. The author of the Nyāyāmṛta makes an oversight when he asserts that the avidyā in rope-serpent has not this indefinite beginning, for this ignorance is a concrete functioning of the primary

¹ Vide *Śārirakabhāṣya*, p. 449.

Tacca samyagjñānamekarūpaṃ ; vastutantratvāt. Ekarūpeṇa hyāvas-thito yo'rthaḥ sa paramārthaḥ.

² Vide discussion on *Khyātivāda*.

ignorance. The division of *tulā* (secondary) and *mūlā* (primary) is arbitrary though useful in impressing the distinction of realities, having or not having pragmatic value. But both are in essence the same, the *tulā* is the concrete application of the *mūlā*.

Again, the positive character of *avidyā* has been called in question, for something positive originating *bhāva* is almost contradictory. It breaks the community of the nature of cause and effect and the *Nyāyāmṛta* reports that if a position (*bhāva*) can give rise to a negation (*abhāva*) then a reality can cause an illusion.¹

Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī points out that positiveness and truth are not identical. An appearance, either of *bhāva* or *abhāva*, is positive, since it is, but it is not true, since it is not. Positiveness (*bhāvatva*) denotes difference from mere negation or *abhāva*. To indicate this difference, *avidyā* is said to be positive but it is not truth and truth is that which exists eternally in one mode of being.²

The community or identity of cause and effect is not a fact, and cannot be established; had it been so, an illusory effect would not have been illusory, for the locus of such an appearance is not phenomenal or illusory. The locus is the changeless being. The *satya* is never a transforming *causa materia*, though it is the locus of the entire causal-effectual chain. The *Śaṅkarites* affirm that effectual changes are possible of *avidyā*, but never of the *Sat-Brahman*. The positive *avidyā* is liable to transformation and here

¹ Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, voi. ii, p. 299.

Abhāvasya bhāvopādānkatve asatyasya satyopādānakulvāpātāt.

² Vide *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 544.

Bhāvatvaṃ cātrābhāvavilakṣaṇatvamātraṃ vivakṣitam.

the law of community (and not identity) of cause and effect may be true. But the truth of *turiya* Brahman is fixed and unchangeable.¹

It may be argued: *ātman* is the positive of all positives. And why should it not be the *causa materia* of the universe?

The objection really overlooks the nature of material cause. The positiveness of existence does not constitute the materiality of causation. Materiality lies in the possibility of transformation in the form of effect and this possibility is denied in the case of *ātman*.²

The *Nyāyāmṛta* contends that *ajñāna* is non-existence prior to *jñāna*. Let this be the cause of the world-illusion.

This makes knowledge, even illusion, impossible, for illusion to be illusion must appear, and this supposes the priority of *jñāna*. The consciousness of *ajñāna* is *jñāna*, which is naturally prior. Besides, the prior non-existence as such has in itself no character. It acquires a character in relation to a particular object or thing. This speciality or particularity at once marks it off as the originating cause of something particular, but it is not sufficient to produce the non-specialized world-illusion. The prior non-existence indicates a stage in the origin of effect, it is just the state where the effect has taken no concrete shape but is about to take it.

Next come the epistemological difficulties. If *avidyā* is positive,—and positive it is,—and inert, it must have

¹ *Vide* Discussion on Causation.

² *Vide Advaitasiddhi*, p. 545.

Bhāvatve ca bhāvopādānakatvaniyamāditi—cenna ; ajñānasya bhramasya ca bhāvavilakṣaṇatve'pyupādānopādēyabhāvopapattēḥ. Nahi bhāvatvamupādānatve upādēyatve vā prayojakam ; ātmani tadadarśanāt, kimīvanva-yikāraṇatvamupādānatve tantram.

a percipi. This percipi can either be pure or (reflected) vṛtti-consciousness. The former makes avidyā as much real as pure intelligence, and its reality consists in percipi, for anything not perceived does not exist, and since this percipi is an everlasting fact, its esse will necessarily be continuous. This renders liberation, the cessation of avidyā, impossible.¹

The latter is evidently an impossibility. A vṛtti consciousness (mental modification) requires the illumination of witness-intelligence reflected in another vṛtti and so on. This leads to a regress ad infinitum. If avidyā is revealed to a reflected consciousness, liberation will be impossible.

Madhusūdāna Sarasvatī points out that avidyā is revealed to witness-intelligence, and not to pure consciousness. Its percipi is not Brahman, for it has no object and it does not reveal, though it is intuition itself. The witness reveals avidyā, which forms an accident to it. And if one can transcend the witness-state, avidyā has no existence for one, and the continuity of avidyā is neither actual nor desirable. Liberation is cessation of ignorance, and this one feels if one can cross the state of sākṣī and fix one self to the transcendent isolation often experienced in witness-consciousness.

The assertion of the Nyāyāmṛta that the percipi of avidyā is its esse is not a fact, for the Saṃkarites maintain the co-eternal existence of avidyā and intelligence. The location of avidyā in Brahman is denied,

¹ Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, vol. ii, p. 335.

Kimcāvidyākiṃ suddhasākṣicailānyenaibabhāti kiṃvṛttipratibimbitenatena. Nādyah. Nirdoṣacitprakāśyatvenājñānasya pāramāthikavāpātāt. Mokṣepitapratītyāpātteṣu . . . Vṛtterapivṛtityamītarapratibimbīla sākṣivedyātvenavasthāpātēna tad-pratibimbitatadvedyātmamokṣeṣi vṛttipratītyāpātācca.

for Brahman is expression and expressiveness is an attribute of sākṣī or witness-intelligence, but not of Brahman.¹

The witness-intelligence which is reflected consciousness in avidyā-vṛtti (avidyā modification) is expressive of avidyā. The charge of infinite regress is futile, for a vṛtti does not require the illumination of another, it is capable of illuminating itself; and Brahmānanda points out that sākṣī, the percipient-intelligence, expresses avidyā as an object of knowledge, positive in nature, different from mere non-existence or tucā.

Further, the apprehension harboured by Rāmānuja that avidyā by concealing identity-consciousness naturally kills it—and concealing in this case is actually killing and not merely preventing its origination, for identity-consciousness does not originate—is groundless, for it has been asserted by Śaṅkara that in superimposition the locus is not affected in the least by avidyā and its products. Again avidyā cannot totally eclipse identity-consciousness. Its own percipi is a positive proof of the conscious esse.²

Rāmānuja thinks that this charge is not tenable in

¹ Vide *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 575.

Sā cāvidyā sākṣivedyā, na tu śuddhacitprakāśyā. Sākṣī cāvidyāvṛtti-pratibimbitacaitanyam. Tena nirdoṣacitprakāśyatvenājñānasya pāramārthikatvāpattiḥ mokṣe'pi tatprakāśāpattiḥ, na ca tadānīmavidyayā nivṛt-tatvāt prakāśābhāvaḥ, pratitīmātraśārīrasya pratītyanuvṛttou nivṛtlayogādityādi doṣānabakāśaḥ.

² Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 168.

Avidyayā prakāśaikasvarūpaṃ brahma tirohitam—iti badatā svarūpānāṣa eboktaḥ syāt.

Vide *Srutaparakāśikā*, p. 168.

Jñānam hi dravyam tasya svarūpātirekeṇa saṃkoca vikāśātmakamavasthādvayamabhyupetyam, atastattirodhānam karmaṇā tatsaṃkocah; tannivṛtistuprasarah, sa eva prakāśaḥ, sa cānityaḥ. Tasya nityatve'pi nityasyajñānadravyasya svaprakāśatvabādaḥ svaprakāśana rūpaprasaṅgāhkratvanibandhanah. Atoḥ avasthādvayasyāgamāpāyitvāt—dravyam nityameva.

the dynamic conception which admits of expansion and contraction of consciousness, but behind these functionings, consciousness is a constant experience. The author of the Śrutaprākāśikā points out that Rāmānuja's position can safely accept the successive appearance and disappearance of conscious functioning, but in Śaṅkara's identity-consciousness the possibility is denied, and hence if obscurations due to avidyā is to be accepted, naturally the fact of its ever being concealed becomes an inevitable conclusion. But surely this is an overshot.

Avidyā, to the Śaṅkarites, is not the negation of knowledge or consciousness. It is not the prior non-existence of knowledge, for consciousness and its prior negation cannot simultaneously exist.

Again, avidyā is not opposed to jñāna, for two opposites cannot co-exist, nor is it a complete negation of jñāna, its knowledge is a denial of this assertion. It is to be conceived as positive, different from consciousness, but not completely opposed to it. It is opposed to knowledge but not the contradictory or denial of it.¹

Rāmānuja has pointed out that avidyā, according to the above affirmation, has always a reference direct to jñāna, be it conceived as a negation, opposite or contradictory, of jñāna. Since it cannot be conceived in itself apart from this reference, why should not we regard it as a prior negation of consciousness, rather than a positive something opposed to knowledge. Experience also reveals prior negation of consciousness.

¹ Vide *Advaitacintā Koustabha*.

*Ajñānantu jñānasāmānyavirodhi,
Tasmāt jñānasāmānya virodhi,
Bhāvarūpamajñānamavaśyamaṅgikārttavyam.*

Vide *Citsukhī*, p. 57.

*Anādi bhāvarūpaṃ yat vijñānena vilīyate.
Tadjñānamiti prajñālakṣaṇaṃ samṅracakṣate.*

Samkara denies that nescience has any direct reference by way of contrast or negation to knowledge. Nescience is conceived and truly conceived in itself as an existence, and for mere existence it does not require any reference to knowledge by any inherent necessity, though, it is no doubt true that its existence is revealed by consciousness. This revelation apart, nescience has no reference to knowledge. Logically the prior non-existence must have a particular locus and a reference. It cannot be an absolute or indefinite concept. This requires the particularization of the prior negation as negation of knowledge. This specialization and definiteness at once deny its own knowledge and consciousness. Of course, it can at once be said that prior-cognition refers not to the basic consciousness, but to particular states of ignorance. But even this particularity of prior-non-cognition requires an objective reference either known or not known. If it is already known, we cannot any longer speak of its prior-non-cognition. If it is not known, we cannot specialize the prior-non-cognition, which without particularization is not definite, and an indefinite prior-non-being cannot have a logical support, for it makes everything originate all possible things.

And, again, the prior-non-cognition cannot account for the non-specialized ajñāna of suṣupti. The even continuity of non-cognition of suṣupti at once requires a definite existence which is indeterminate in character. This conscious non-cognition cannot be explained away in negative terms. It is not altogether opposed to knowledge, for it is expressed; nor is it prior-non-cognition, for the prior-non-cognition, as referred to above, cannot be non-specialized and indeterminate. The indeterminate suṣupti is a positive proof of the

existence of avidyā as an actuality. It is an indefinite, indeterminate, positive existence.

The contention that the direct experience 'I do not know anything besides me' refers to definite ignorance but not to indeterminate nescience does not stand logical scrutiny. This definite ignorance may imply either a mode of nescience or a definite negation of knowledge. The former accepts the positive character of nescience. The latter denies it, and it is involved in subtler inaccuracies of prior-non-cognition. The dynamic character of notion may imply and actually does involve an expansion and a contraction in determinate consciousness, for determinateness at once necessitates a definiteness in expression which immediately calls for a contraction. This contraction, Rāmānuja characterizes, is a prior-non-cognition. It is a negation implicit or explicit of another determinate expression. The contraction connotes a negative sense. It is nothing positive.

But it may be argued that the contraction is as much a positive functioning as expansion and expression. In this sense it has a positive character and is not to be understood in a negative way as the opposite of expansion. It cannot be contradictory. It can indeed be contrary but a contrary does not mean a mere negation, but a positive affirmation. This also lends a positive character to ajñāna.

We conclude: Rāmānuja and the theistic school deny nescience, Śaṅkara accepts it, consciousness in Śaṅkara is static, in Rāmānuja, Jīva Gosvāmī, Madhva, Nimvārka, Vallabha it is dynamic. The Absolute in Śaṅkara has no history, it is a fact, the most positive fact in experience, though it transcends experience, its formation, history and development. Śaṅkara's Absolute

is complete transcendence of being, the denial of all relational concepts, Rāmānuja's is essentially one which does not deny, but harmonizes all relational concepts in its being though it also transcends them. It is not a scheme of relations though every relation is a moment in its being.

In Śaṅkara experience has lost itself in intuition, in Rāmānuja experience has a place and forms an important factor in the integral whole in intuition. Intuition, in one case, transcends experience, in the other it absorbs and assimilates experience. In Rāmānuja, therefore, every element of experience has a value and an existence, even false percepts are to him not totally false, they have an existence but an existence that does not satisfy practical demands. The Madhvites, like Rāmānuja, accept the truth of experience though they would ascribe false percepts to misdirected localization; but none of the elements, the locus or the percept, are false; the falsity lies in the apparent synthesis of two elements quite different and discrepant. The synthesis is false but not the elements. It unites those which cannot be united. The relation, the synthesis, and the reference are illusory. Appearance, therefore, (even false appearance), has a place in the order of existence and is to be assimilated in Being. The Śaṅkarites can accept the pragmatic value of appearance and would readily grant into it a positive reality but would deny absoluteness to it. It is the creation of practical reason which carries with it the duality of subject and object, self and not-self, appearance and reality. And so long as practical reason dominates, the realm of appearance would find a place side by side with the transcendent Being. But the intuitions of practical reason, though apparently self-evident to pragmatic

and empirical consciousness, have no transcendent existence, and pure reason accepts them as categories of existence true only in divided vision of life in immanence.

In Saṃkara the claims of practical reason have not been synthesized with the affirmation of transcendent intuition. The division between pure and practical reason is clear and definite. The immanent existence with its promise and potentiality has been denied a being in transcendence. The division of pure and practical reason has been resolved into a harmony in the theistic teaching of the dynamic conception of life and experience, the affirmation of practical reason becomes one with the intuitions of pure reason.

And will and reason are not contrary factors in life. The dynamic view of consciousness has rendered this synthesis and fusion possible, a synthesis which the Saṃkara Vedāntists think well-nigh impossible. To them willing or energizing is operative in nature's plane and the supra-natural is transcendent quiescence far above nature's formative functioning. The dynamic interpretation of life-consciousness makes it possible for the theists to refute this assertion that willing is a formative principle, ultra-blind and unconscious. On the other hand the theists would point out that willing is equally operative in supra-natural plane and manifests tendencies which would at once mark it as conscious, or to put in other words, consciousness is essentially willing. We cannot draw an artificial distinction between them. The same reality which is consciousness is also willing or it is the willing-consciousness or self-conscious willing.

Saṃkara's stress on the completely static transcendence has, no doubt, created a gap between the

transcendent consciousness and the immanent experience and he has been forced to explain away the intuitions of practical reason as quite illusory and false in metaphysical import. Rāmānuja has healed up the gap and the intuitions of practical reason have an epistemological basis and a metaphysical meaning.

This has been made clear in their interpretation of illusory-perceptions. In Śaṅkara avidyā or nescience is the root cause of illusory-percepts. It hides the locus and makes new projections. This projection is not non-real, for it appears and not real, for it is denied, no sooner than the locus is disclosed clear before view. But this projection has an objective reference inasmuch as the percept is not a mere hallucination. And the temporal and spatial reference lends to it a realistic touch. A mere subjective impression has no localization in space and time. It is of the mind, it remains ever as a mental content.

Again, the content of an illusory perception is not to be confounded with memory-images. A memory-image occupies a position in mental-continuum and has no reference to anything outer. It cannot be mistaken for reality so long as there is clear consciousness of its being a memory-image. To say that false perceptions are due to the confusion between a memory-image and an object owing to non-discrimination is quite fallacious, for the very consciousness of its being a memory-image at once bars the possibility of a confusion.

The false percept, therefore, is not a memory-image, nor is it purely subjective. The conclusion naturally follows that it is entirely a new creation; something similar to it might have been perceived, but not the false percept itself. The Śaṅkarites characterize such an appearance as mysteriously real affecting our

emotional and volitional nature. Its value for the time being establishes its so-called truth. The false percept has, therefore, a pragmatic value and importance but has not transcendent reality. It has also an objective meaning. Indeed, there have been Vedāntists of the extreme type in Śaṅkara School who would deny objective existences and make false perceptions entirely subjective, for to them all existence is purely dream-like appearance. Appearance is purely subjective and a false appearance surely can have no objective meaning or intention. Whatever a false appearance may be, objective, quasi-objective or subjective, the Śaṅkarites distinguish it as something newly created or originated, something which was not previously in the realm of experience, and which will ere long have no place therein. This twofold character makes it at once a creation and a false creation. But nevertheless it is creation.

The world of experience subjective and objective is a false show on the locus-consciousness. The intuitions of practical reason, the epistemological relativity are all working of avidyā, which hides the locus and creates implications of practical and theoretical reason.

Rāmānuja accepting the truth of experience cannot naturally accept the above interpretation of false perception. Nothing to him is quite false, as everything has its proper place in the system of reals constituting our experience. A confusion can, indeed, arise between a presented datum and a represented image, or between two data of experience. Super-imposition naturally connotes false ascription of an idea to a thing which it is not. It cannot imply a new creation, which is neither sat or asat. Such a reality is far removed from experience.

Experience never deceives us but gives us knowledge of actual and existing facts. The object appearing in false perception is not illusory but real in the sense that it actually exists, for, according to the Pañcīkaraṇa, every material existence is a mixed substance. None are pure. The mother-of-pearl has in it the element of silver and when silver appears we have the cognition of something that is really existent or sat.¹

Madhva and his school accept with Rāmānuja the truth of experience but offer a different theory of false perception. To them the elements of false perception are not false, for they are facts of experience. The falsity consists in wrong localization, and the localization is due to defective vision, which takes in a superficial picture of the locus. This picture calls up in memory, by the law of similarity, the original impression of a thing alike in appearance, but different in reality from the locus. And this impression is mistaken for reality.² The Naiyāyikas have the same conclusion with a little difference of explanation (*vide System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*).

Vālkrṣṇa Bhatta, the author of the Prameya Ratnāṇḍava (and a follower of Śuddha-advaitabāda of the Vallabha School) has attached an epistemological significance to illusion. An illusion is due to the functioning

¹ Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, p. 12.

Satkhyaātīrnnāma jñānaviśayasya stiyatvam. Tarhi bhramatvaṃ kathamiti ced viśayavyāvahāra bādhādbhramatvam. Tadupapādayāmaḥ-pañcīkaraṇa-prakṛtyayā pṛthivyādiṣu sarvatra sarvabhūlānāṃ vidyamānatvāt. Ata eva sūktikādau rajatāṃśasya vidyamānatvajñānaviśayasyasatyatvam. Tatra rajatāṃśasya svalpatvāttatra na vyāvahāra iti tajjñānaṃ bhramah. Sūktyaṃ-sabhūyastva jñānādbhramanivṛttiḥ.

² Vide *Nyāyāmrta*, vol. ii, p. 423.

Tasmādanirvācyakhyātyasaṃbhavāt udvuddharūpyasaṃskāra sacivaṇḍu-śleṇḍriyaṇṣvasannikṛṣṭaṇṣukīḍaṇṣamatyaṇṣādrūpyātmanāgṛhṇātīyaṇ-yathākhyātirevayukṭā.

of avidyā, which dims the clarified philosophic vision of truth and sets up in its place a distorted view of things.

This distortion is the creation of māyā, which eludes our vision and originates a false impression, an impression not inherent in the thing in its true perspective. Vallabhācārya writes, 'thus deluded the intellect sees the thing transfigured but the thing is not transfigured.'¹ Vallabha draws a distinction between a thing and its transfiguration. Māyā functions in two ways: (1) firstly, it covers the thing in its true colour, (2) secondly, it creates a false impression. A false perception then is the presentation of a thing in a way, which does not hold it up in its true bearing, and which it actually is not.

In other words, it gives us knowledge not in its true perspective. Vallabha does not believe, like Rāmānuja, in the truth of experience immanent and positive, for it fails to represent the undivided nature of things in the integrity of the Absolute, a knowledge accessible to a vision uninfluenced by the inherent tendency of intellect to present a separatist's consciousness. Again this theory is distinguished from the anirvacanīyavāda of Saṅkara. Saṅkara accepts a creative functioning, besides

¹ Vide *Prameyavatnārṇava*, pp. 2, 3.

Ataḥ sarvasya sarvarūpatvāt sarvasya sarvatra vidyamānatvācca sarvasya brahmatvamīti śuddho brahmavādaḥ. . . . Vyāmohikā māyā jīvaṃ vyāmohayitvā tadīyabuddhou prāpancikasadvastusadyaṣaṃ māyikaṃ padārthamutpādyā purāṣṭhitaviśaye prakṣīpati. Tudā padārthagrahaṇe tasyāpi grahaṇāt tadviśiṣṭajñānaṃ bhramātmakaṃ bhavati. . . . Tayā vyāmohitā buddhiḥ padārthā anyathā manyate, na tu padārthā anyathā bhavanti.

Vide *Subodhinī-Śrīmatbhāgavat*, ch. ii, 9, 33.

Tayā vyāmohitā buddhiḥ padārthā anyathā manyate na tu padārthā anyathā bhavanti buddhyarthamevahi pramāṇāni sādhanāni ca kānicidbuddhi doṣanivartakāni kānicidguṇādhāyakāni māyā ca dvidhā bhramaṇaṃ janayati vidyāmānaṃ na prakāśayati avidyamānaṃ ca prakāśayati.

the epistemological functioning, of avidyā, and this creative power sets up a subjective-objective appearance which possesses a particular spatial and temporal reference. In fact, it has the same position with the locus. Vallabha and his school do not go far. They simply accept the epistemological functioning of avidyā which presents things in their bare isolation and concreteness and covers from vision the inwardness and identity of their being in the Absolute. But this identity is not exclusive of their individual nature and being. The individuality is retained, and not merged in the Absolute, though the individual being, apart from its reference to and position in the Absolute being, has no clear meaning and has actually been deprecated. The positive experience of isolated facts is false.

We should now make a comparative study of the different senses in which māyā has been used by various Vedāntic teachers.

The word māyā has been used by Saṁkara and his school to denote the creative force of Īśvara, and the word avidyā, the epistemological functioning of hiding up things. But in the absolute monism of Saṁkara this distinction has an empirical or pragmatic significance. From the higher transcendent outlook this distinction has been withdrawn, and importance has been laid upon the epistemological significance. The different senses in which the terms have been used by the Śaṁkarites have been fully explained in my System of the Vedāntic Thought and Culture. But for our present purpose, we can say this much that some of the Śaṁkarites,¹ e.g.,

¹ Vide *Advaita Cintā Kaustava*, p. 48.

*Ajñānabhedena jīvabheda'vaśyamabhyupagantavya sarvaśāstra-prāmā-
nyāt na ca jīvabhede, anekaprapañceśvarakalpanāpattiritivācya—iśāpātteḥ.
Na ca pratyabhiññāvirodha tasyā bhramarūpatvāt . . . evaṁ prakṛte'pi śva*

the authors of the Advaitā Cintā Kaustava, the Advaitā Siddhānta Muktvāli have gone to the extreme of obliterating the distinction between māyā with a creative significance and avidyā with an epistemological significance and opine that the world-order including man, nature and God are creations, completely meaningless, from the transcendence of pure intuition. And the world-concept is an illusion of avidyā or nescience. This school cannot accept the truth of creation even in pragmatic sense and, in consistence with the transcendence of Vedāntism, has characterized the world-vision as a subjective, though innate, projection of avidyā, in itself nothing real.

Still, the Śaṅkara Vedāntism has a cosmological side, and the more ancient among Śaṅkara Vedāntists have accepted the creative functioning of māyā and have thus laid a foundation for cosmogony of Vedāntism. Māyā in this sense is the śakti of Īśvara. Everyone accepts the two-fold capacity of nescience, the power of hiding things from view, and the power of individuation, of showing the one as many, be this power merely a subjective projection or a real creative force.¹

Rāmānuja, and the theistic teachers accept māyā as the creative principle, it is the śakti underlying nature's operation, inert but put under and controlled by Īśvara. It is called prakṛti, or abyakta. It is eternal

svāṣṭhānakalpitaprapañcasya svasvāṣṭhānopahitacaittonyamīśvara eka eveti nūnekesvara kalpanāpattiḥ sarvatāntravirodhā vā.

¹ Vide *Vivaraṇa*.

Virūpajanakatvā kāranecchādhinatvākāreṇa vā māyā iti vyavahāraḥ Ekasminnapi vastūni vikṣepaprādhānyena māyā ācchādanaprādhānyenāvidyēti.

Vide *Brahmānandī*.

Yatra māyā śabdēna sadasadvilakṣaṇatvarūpānirvācyatvasya nirūpanānarha vicitrakāryajanakatvarūpamāyā.

and positive. It is not to be confounded with the *māyā* of the Sāṅkara School, which, though positive, is not eternal. And the creative significance of *māyā* is less prominent in Śāṅkara than in the theistic school, for there is a view-point, which denies creation or cosmological evolution and regards the world as a transcendental illusion. But in the theistic school also *māyā* has an epistemological significance, inasmuch as it has an influence upon finite conscious unit in dimming their spiritual insight and attracting them to the pleasures of a divided and egoistic consciousness on nature's plane.

Rāmānuja says that the word *māyā* is indicative of mysteriousness, something incapable of complete understanding. It is the wonderful creative capacity of Parama Puruṣa through which it can realize its will and purpose.¹ Venkata Nāth Deśika has the same thing when he says: the primal-prakṛti, the principle immanent in evolution, is called *māyā*, because of its possessing capacity for producing wonders or mysteries of creation; it is called prakṛti, for it unfolds or evolutes modes of existences out of it; it is called avidyā, as it is opposed to knowledge and inert in existence. Lokācāryā, the author of the Tattvatraya has the same definition of *māyā*.

It has sattva, rajas, tamas as its constituents. He elaborates the concept. It is eternal and completely subject to Īśvara's will. It obscures the vision of truth and retards the joy of bliss. It originates false knowledge. It connotes not mere negation of knowledge,

¹ Vide *Nyāyasiddhāntjanam* by Venkat Nātha Deśika, p. 8.

Vicitrasṛṣṭyupakaraṇatvānmāyā vikārāṇprakarotīti prakṛtiḥ, vidyāvirodhādibhiravidyādiścoccyate.

nor mere difference from knowledge, but a positive contradictory to knowledge. It is creative.¹

Nimvārka, Jīva Gosvāmī and Valadeva have no difference with Rāmānuja regarding the conception of māyā. Jīva Gosvāmī calls it the outer śakti of Īśvara, having no direct touch with Īśvara, though it is subordinated to Īśvara's will and purpose. Puruṣottamācārya in the Vedānta Mañjūṣā says that the Pradhān is led to activity in the way as directed by the unseen destines of jīvas by the will of God.² Valadeva in his Govinda Bhāṣya calls māyā prakṛti. It is an equilibrium attained by equalization of sattva, rajas, tamas, the three constituents of māyā, and is not to evolve the mysteries of creation by the Īkṣana—initiative sight of Īśvara. Both of them have also pointed out the epistemological significance of māyā of creating confusion, producing an egoistic consciousness, and fastening it to nature's wheel.

Vallabha and his followers make a distinction between māyā and avidyā. Māyā is the śakti of Īśvara, by which Īśvara brings out the creative order of itself, for which any ascription of motive, but spontaneity of delight in the manifold, would be incompatible with the conception of Īśvara as the supremely perfect being.³

¹ Vide *Tattvatrayam*, p. 48.

Avidyāśavdo vidyābhāvasya vidyatarasya vidyāvirodhinaśca vācako yadyapi . . . jñānavirodhitvenā'vidyetyucyate. jñānanandayorvirodhiti . . . vicitrasyatikāratvañca parasparavilakṣaṇavismayanīyakāryakaratvam. Evaṃ bhūtaicidvastunaḥ kāryakāraṇa rūpeṇānekavidhatvamāha.

² Vide *Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā*, p. 24.

Avyaktam kāraṇam yattat pradhānamṛśisaptamāḥ. Procyate prakṛtiḥ sūkṣmā nītyam sadasādātmakam. Anadījīvādṛṣṭānusārinyā śrīpuruṣottam-ecchayā bīkṣiptam sad guṇavaiśamyam bhajate.

³ Vide *Suddhādvaita Mārtaṇḍa*, p. 19.

Svamate māyāyā api, mama māyeti vākyaḥ bhagavacchaktitvenatasyāscābhinnatvena na paramatavanmāyāsamvandaḥ. p. 2. Nāmarūpabheda jñāna-mevāvidyakaṃ, na tu te. Evaṃśajīvabheda jñānaṃ tathā kāryakāraṇabheda jñānamiti.

Māyā has a two-fold capacity, evolution and involution, āvirbhāva, tirobhāva. It makes thing appear before and disappear from, our vision. But this does not commit it to an epistemological principle. It is a power inherent in Īśvara through which it can operate this successive appearance and disappearance. But this disappearance is not the working of nescience, which means obscuration of vision of things actually present. Had it been so, it would have no place or room in Īśvara. Such an obscuration is the functioning of avidyā, but not of māyā. Āvirbhāva connotes the function of evolving, tirodhāna, the function of withdrawing. Besides this creative functioning, the author of Suddha Advaita Mārtaṇḍa speaks of the epistemological principle of nescience which originates the differential consciousness where there is none. The objects are real, the sense of division and individuality is illusory and the working of māyā.

We should note that the distinction we draw here between māyā and avidyā has not been strictly adhered to in the works of Vallabha and his followers. Sometimes, māyā and avidyā have been used in identical sense and the epistemological functioning of hiding from view a thing and creating a false notion has been attributed to māyā. At least the term has been used in this sense by Vallabha in his Bhāṣya Subodhinī on Śrīmat Bhāgavat. But the author of Suddha Advaita Mārtaṇḍa and its commentator Rāmkrṣṇa have often distinguished their functions, referring to māyā, the creative functioning, and to avidyā, the epistemological functioning. We accept this distinction, because it is convenient, besides, it is on a line with the usual distinction held by the Vedāntin.

We may trace our chain of thinking. Being is consciousness and bliss. In Saṃkara, it is static

expansiveness, in Rāmānuja and other Vedāntists, it is dynamic fullness. Besides, the static principle of Brahman—Being, Saṃkara speaks of the dynamic principle of māyā, the basic principle of the creative order. And it is the only dynamic principle in Saṃkara. But in the theistic teachers, besides māyā, the physical-dynamo immanent in the world of nature, there is the spirituo-dynamo in the super-sensible world, which though transcendent in its operation, still offers the primal momentum to the creative instinct of māyā and breaks its equilibrium and temporary quiescence, which it acquires after a long course of travelling in a particular cycle of evolution and involution.

Before we actually come to the study of the creative process, our outlook will be clear from the beginning if we have a preliminary knowledge of the exact sense in which causation is viewed by Vedāntic teachers. And this will throw illuminating light upon the creative evolution, and its relation to Brahman.

The Aristotelean or the Naiyāyika distinction of the kinds of causes does not find ready acceptance with Vedāntic teachers who make a more convenient classification of causes as material and efficient. This distinction has really no value in Śaṃkara, for Saṃkara identity is the only truth. The manifold existence has been explained away as illusory. No doubt, this metaphysical attitude apart, Śaṃkara seeks to retain, for the prejudiced consciousness, a theological attitude in philosophic vision and attempts to make synthesis of causation with identity. And the fruit of this synthesis is the celebrated Vivarttavāda, which simultaneously accepts and denies causation.¹ A moment's reflection will

¹ See discussion on Causation.

make it clear that Vivartta is rather a denial than an acceptance of causation. And this is just in conformity with the logic of identity and transcendent oneness. The creative effort is an expression of will and will operates upon nature's plane and beyond this, its effort does not reach the supra-natural Nirvānic plane of existence. Even this retention of creative effort has no true significance inasmuch as Saṃkara Vedāntism lays no stress upon creative evolution which is touched with a side-glance with a view merely to indicate Advaita as the denial of the creative-manifold rather than to start a cosmological theory of the evolution and involution of the world-process. Śaṃkara has to interpret the śruti-texts and thus to offer a creative theory, and the śruti combines a common sense theological attitude with a far-reaching metaphysical insight. With this inner meaning of Saṃkara's theory, we can proceed to study in what sense māyā and Brahman are causes of the cosmic order. Brahman in relation to māyā is Īśvara. Īśvara is the efficient cause, māyā, the material cause. But māyā, as a separate entity, is not the cause. Śaṃkarites maintain the identity of *causa materia* and *causa efficiens*, and Īśvara in association with māyā is the cause.

The difficulty which arises before Saṃkara to assimilate the theological with the metaphysical attitude is not experienced by Rāmānuja and the theistic teachers. Philosophy to them does not experience any opposition between the different attitudes of consciousness. Indeed, its problem is to make a synthetic fusion of these attitudes. The logic of causality has not been surrendered by them to the law of identity. A dynamic unity has been established in place of static identity and in dynamic unity, identity and difference play their

individual parts. Identity and causation, thus, are not separate laws. Causation makes explicit what is implicit in identity. Causation accentuates the discerning consciousness, identity, the synthetic consciousness. Creativeness then has a definite place in the dynamic unity, for causation is a law that holds true both in natural and supernatural plane, though its mode of functioning is different. In the natural plane, it functions as a creative-evolutional process, in the supernatural, as a principle of self-expression in delight. But nowhere the creative or expressive effort is denied. In the nature's plane this effort is succeeded by an effort in the contrary direction, involution; in the supernatural plane this effort is continuous and the opposite course does never set in, for it represents the truth of absolute life. We speak of a creative effort in nature, for the dynamic stress here has a beginning, though this definite beginning is not a new creation out of nothing; it is the beginning of a cycle, after a cycle has run its destiny and attained its fulfilment. We speak of an expressive effort in the Absolute, for the dynamic stress here is a determinate expression of being.

Here, again, to all theistic teachers *māyā* is the *causa-materia*, *Īśvara* is the *causa-efficiens*. Rāmānuja, Valadeva, Jīva Gosvāmī—all emphasize the identity of material-efficient causes, as the material cause has not an independent existence of its own. Rāmānuja lays stress upon the directness of relation between *Īśvara* and *māyā*, Valadeva and Jīva Gosvāmī, on the indirectness of relation. Rāmānuja characterizes both *jīva* and *prakṛti* as predicates of *Īśvara*, and as such the relation here has an inwardness, which it does not possess in Jīva Gosvāmī and Valadeva, who characterize

māyā as the 'outer-force' having no direct contact with Īśvara, though to avoid a dualistic appearance, they would describe it as a śakti of Īśvara. Māyā has not a direct touch with Īśvara, though Īśvara energizes it to action. This directness of relation has made Rāmānuja's system open to criticism, for it makes unconscious and innate prakṛti to be the predicate of Īśvara, which is essentially conscious. Evidently an impossibility.

Madhva avoids this difficulty by denying the identity of *causa materia* and *efficiens*. He keeps them separate. But prakṛti is subject to Īśvara. As a real, it has an existence dependent, and it is energized by Īśvara and subordinated to his will.

Vallabha holds the identity of efficient and material causes, for māyā to him is the śakti of Brahman; and Brahman wills to be many, it brings out the entire system. The creative system is the expression of his being.¹

Whatever may be the relation between the two causes, identity (direct or indirect) or difference, the retention of māyā or prakāti as a second substance raises a metaphysical difficulty of great moment—the difficulty of assimilating two incommensurable substances. Even if it is said that māyā transforms according to Īśvara's will, still the intractableness of matter has the potentiality and possibility of offering, by nature, a resistance to the conscious energizing. Rāmānuja's integration of māyā in the being of Īśvara is no help, for māyā has an inertness, which makes it a substance opposed to Īśvara. Though these Vedāntic teachers

¹ Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, vol. iii, p. 501.

Ētena prakṛtīviśiṣṭaṁ brahmopādānamitīnirastam.

Vide *Aṇu-Bhāṣya* (Benares Edition), p. 84.

have tried to remove the metaphysical dualism of Sāṃkhya by denying to māyā an independent existence, still the dualism remains. Even Jīva Gosvāmī's characterization of māyā as the śakti of Īśvara brings no relief, for Īśvara by nature cannot possess a śakti, which is contradictory to its being. The dualism of consciousness and matter hangs in some form in these thinkers, and there is no reasonable escape out of it. But the theistic view has this relief that it institutes the complete subordination of prakṛti and its transformation under conscious initiation in place of unconscious evolution of the Sāṃkhya system. Nature, in Sāṃkhya unfolds herself by a blind necessity, a necessity which in the end reveals a purpose either to offer its choicest products for soul's enjoyment or to reveal her inward worthlessness that the soul might know itself and be free. Unconscious nature thus assumes the character of a means or intermediary towards an end. This revelation of a purpose forbids the later teachers to speak of unconscious performance of a play. Nature has, therefore, a conscious guidance. It offers itself as an instrument to God for His līlā-bibhūti. The demand of unity is thus satisfied by complete subordination of prakṛti.

Śaṅkara feels the difficulty of assimilating an inert prakṛti in the Absolute and characterizes māyā as the śakti of Īśvara, but the inherent weakness of this position must have been felt by him and his followers who at no moment find escape either in subjective idealism or in transcendentalism. Really the conception of māyā as the creative principle is a puzzle, for it is hard to reconcile the conception of creation with the conception of the transcendent Absolute. Vedāntists of all types, objective idealists or transcendentalists put

a stress upon the transcendence of Īśvara, for the Īśvara of Vaiṣṇava thinkers or the Absolute Brahman of the Śāṅkarites has not its true being revealed anywhere in the world of māyā or prakṛti.

Consistent thinking requires that either we must deny creation and the creative manifold or we must accept the creative manifold to be the self-expression of the Absolute ; but it is difficult to accept an expression of the Absolute through inert nature, though the theists have not refrained from accepting it. Śāṅkara and his followers adopt the former hypothesis. Rāmānuja and others adopt the latter.

The creative impulse is inherent in Prakṛti, it awaits a glance, a consent, as it were, from Īśvara to set itself working. In the fullness of time, the creative seeds begin to fructify, but before they can do so, they require a sanction from Īśvara. The initial sight energizes prakṛti. This is the only conscious influencing, if there be any, in creation. This divine influx, direct or indirect, binds Īśvara to the creative order. Besides this, it has no other relation to it. The creation is, therefore, called līlā of Īśvara ; but for this influx, the term līlā would not be appropriate, inasmuch as Īśvara would be an indifferent on-looker and reduced to the category of the Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya system.

The Vedāntists of all schools give their support to the doctrine of līlā, but the explanation differs to suit different philosophic casting. Līlā signifies a spontaneous sportive activity, as distinguished from a self-conscious volitional effort and stress. The idea of a free movement and movement in delight is expressive of līlā.¹

¹ Vide *Brahmasūtram*, Śāṅkara *Bhāṣya*, Adh. 2, Pāda 1, Sū. 33, pp. 480, 481.

Evamāśvarasyāpyanapekṣyakimcitprajānāntaram svabhāvādeva keva-

Samkara lays emphasis upon the spontaneity of movement. The creative impulse in māyā works spontaneously, and Īśvara in association with māyā is the creator, but this does not imply that Īśvara attains a definite purpose in this. Our emotional and volitional nature may demand the conception of a being superior in power and wisdom, and so long as empirical consciousness dominates līlā has a meaning in this sense that it does not reveal the thing in its true colour before us, but draws up a picture for which we cannot assert any particular reason, and which is merely an appearance suitable to the capacity, and understanding and fulfilling the purpose of one to whom it appears and does not represent the real nature of being. In affirming the cosmic move being initiated by a conscious impulse, the Samkarites trace the cosmic evolution to Īśvara, though in calling it spontaneous the plausible meaning of the cosmic effort is lost. Līlā is a mystery and reason fails fully to grasp it. Should we confess that in Samkara's philosophy līlā has no important significance, inasmuch as Samkara denies creation in a real sense, and since the cosmic evolution proceeds according to the sum-total of karma of the previous cycle of existence, the whole thing has an airy import, so far as Brahman or Īśvara is concerned.

But the case is otherwise with Vaiṣṇava Philosophers. Līlā here has a wider, deeper meaning. To them, it is not only a self-conscious spontaneity, but a move of delight as well, spontaneous negatively because Īśvara has no definite purpose to fulfil, positively

*am līlārūpā pravṛttirbhaviṣyati. Nahīśvarasya prayojanāntaram nirūpya-
mānam nyāyataḥ śrutito vā samvhaṭi . . . Tathāpi paramēśvarasya
līlaiva kevaleyam, aparimilaśaktitvāt . . . Naivātra kimcitprayojanamut-
prekṣhitum śakyate ; āptakūmaśruteḥ.*

because it is free expression of his delight-self, delightful, because it is a free movement in bliss.¹

The functioning of will for a definite purpose is the work of a finite being. Īśvara's is willing but willing to no definite purpose, it must necessarily be an expression in delight, for bliss is its soul, delight, the expression.² A step further and we may add that even volitional effort is centred in delight. Willing is a move to and in delight. And because in finite consciousness such a move is directed beyond self, we become apt to identify willing with a conscious striving for the removal of a want or a need. But deeper psychological analysis reveals that willing is fed in delight, the final satisfaction consequent upon fulfilment. Willing is then the search and the expression of delight-consciousness in finite being and expression solely in the infinite.

Corresponding to movement in delight in the inner being of Īśvara, we have a reproduction of this movement in its outer being as constituted by māyā; and in this sense līlā in nature's plane is the reflection of līlā in spiritual consciousness. The transformation of māyā at the will of God demonstrates

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, vol. ii. (Madras Edition), p. 65.

Tatthaiva parasyāpi brahmanah.

Saasankhalpamātrāvaklipta jagajjanmasthitidhvaṃsāderlīlaiva prayojanamiti niravadyaṃ.

Vide *Govindabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra. Adh. 2, Pāda 1, Śrī, 33. Paripūrṇasyāpi vicitrasyaiva pravṛttirīlāiva kevalā natu svaphalābhisaṃdhi-purvikā. . . . Lokasya sukhonmattasya yathā sukhodrekāt phalanirapekṣā nṛtādīlīlā dyśyate ; tathesvarasya ; tasmāt svarūpānanda-svābhāvikyebalīlā. . . . Sṛṣṭādīkaṃ Harirnaiba prayojanmapekṣya tu ; kurute kevalānandādyathā mattasya nartanam. . . . Vinā phalābhisaṃdhi mānandodrekeṇa līlāyāta ityētāhat svikārāt.*

² Vide *Vallabha's Anubhāṣya*, p. 146.

Nahi līlāyām kimcītiprayojanamasti. Līlāyā eva prayojanatvāt. . . . Līlaiva kevaleti vā.

the dependence of māyā. This dependence is significant, for it establishes the lordship of Īśvara everywhere. Īśvara possesses a mysterious power by which this subordination of māyā becomes possible; though an apparent contradiction exists between Īśvara and māyā, still the power of Īśvara, a complete comprehension of which, is not within the bounds of categorical thinking, renders possible what is apparently impossible. This acintya-śakti introduces an element of mysteriousness in the conception of Īśvara who escapes all of our attempts at logical determination and categorical definiteness.

Śaṅkara's thesis of Brahman is intelligible. But the position of māyā, and its denial, though a fact of positive experience, has in it a mysteriousness which defies intellectual assimilation. Indeed, it is difficult to logically reconcile the claims of identity and causation; to retain the former Śaṅkara sacrifices the latter and with it the reality of the immanent experience. The divided life and consciousness with its imperative ethical and religious demands, and its entire foundation has been laid in a mystery and the silence of transcendence offers no explanation to it. As such māyā has been ushered in to supply the missing link between transcendent consciousness and immanent experience. Rāmānuja and the theistic teachers deny this quiescent transcendence and retain the possibility of a conscious awakening both in immanent and transcendent experience; yet they suffer from the difficulty of reconciling māyā to the Absolute; no doubt, this difficulty has been sought to be explained away by the inexplicable power of Īśvara. In both systems inexplicability somewhere in some form remains.

The rational quest of man tinged with a glow of

pride to conquer truth has the rude shock of at least discovering that truth in its nakedness is not revealed in the search. Some mysteriousness, some confusion hangs in the intellectual horizon ; the intellectual pursuit ultimately takes rest in humility and submission.

We next come to the consideration of the principle of causality as held by the Vedāntists. Causality has different treatments in Rāmānuja, Vallabha, and Saṁkara. And there runs a synthetic development of the concept through them. The clear understanding of the Vedāntic position, therefore, requires a full treatment of the theory with comparative touches on the reading of the problem by the other schools.

Rāmānuja and the theistic school have accepted the dynamic theory of causation, with the consequent possibility of pariṇāma and transformation.

Dynamism is the central concept and the whole trend of the systems gravitates towards it. The law of causation is a derivative concept, involved in the dynamism of nature. Sāṁkhya has the same view with this difference that dynamism in Sāṁkhya is essentially physical, in the theistic philosophers it is spiritual-material, spiritual in the inner being of Īśvara, material in the physical world ; this material dynamism receives influences and stress from the spiritual dynamo. But whatever the difference may be, we cannot speak of effectuation in the spiritual dynamo, for effectuation presupposes the absence of the effect, the process of origination, though in this case nothing originates out of nothing. In the spiritual transcendence, we have a dynamic expression, nothing happens here, for everything is explicit ; causation is thus denied in spiritual life, and not expression. The mediateness of differential thought is every now and then integrated

in the immediateness of spiritual unity. Integrity has its expression in difference, difference its being in integrity, immediacy in mediateness, mediateness in immediacy.

The immediate-mediateness is apparent in spiritual being, for nothing in it is potential. But in nature's plane, we cannot expect the immediacy of unity, for such a unity is self-consciousness and is true therein, but not in a plane which exists not for the self, but for the other. It is a being, but unlike self-consciousness, it is not a being-for-self, but really a being-for-other. This Being-for-otherness at once marks it off as an object, rather than an expression of Being (or Being-for-self). The law, therefore, which holds true in the Being-for-self as the law of identity holds true in Being-for-other as the reflection of this law, but the Being-for-other at once grafts upon it a form which to some extent distinguishes it from identity, though the sense of unity is never lost. And this law is causality.

Causality is identity applied to its functioning in nature. Difference does not exist materially though a formal distinction has become a necessity, and this necessity arises from the nature of functioning. In the one, if there is functioning, it is only an expression, in the other, it is origination. Expression in dynamism is ever explicit in, and non-different from, the identity of being. Origination in dynamism is an event and makes out what is implicit in the identity of being.

This origination differentiates causation from identity. Origination is a beginning and a beginning of a continuity, which implies a dating and a directing in time. But expression is an endless continuity, where time does not and cannot operate. Causation and time are categories

that can be applied to nature and its functioning and are indissolubly connected.

Causation in the realm of Prakṛti is also dynamic, it is also the expression of a force or a power operating. But where the expression in spiritual consciousness is no event, nor a happening, the origination is a phenomenon, a functioning of force or power in a definite point of time. The concrete functioning is a phenomenon, yet the phenomenon is not the cause though it invariably antedates the effect. The effect is the expression of the cause, though the expression here requires a grouping of conditions external and internal favourable to the transformation of the dynamic potency. Effectuation is essentially transformation which is at once a process and a product. Though this theory of causation is essentially dynamic, it has also a phenomenal aspect, in so far as it accepts the fact of transformation and origination.

Indeed, in the dynamic theory of causation, transformation of the cause from one state to another is a special character, and, though in transformation the essence is kept in tact, yet transformation is a happening in a definite moment and as such the effect requires a process of transmutation before it can appear as existence.

Quite similar to the above presentation of causation, is Vallabha's own theory of causation. Rāmānuja accepts a transmutation of the cause-form and its reappearance in effect-form where the transformation is supposed to be real and wherein lies effectuation; Vallabha does not insist upon this transformation. He draws a distinction between a transformation which effects a change from a previous state, which is no longer within the bounds of the effect to attain and a transformation which effects a change from a prior

state, which is within the bounds of the effect to attain, e.g., Milk-curd illustrates the first, Gold-ornament, the second.

The former admits the possibility of a movement in the direction from the cause to the effect, the latter, in two directions: from the cause to the effect, from the effect to the cause. In the second we have a re-transformation of the effect into the cause. This potentiality of re-transformation really puts a different construction upon the theory. It acquires a new meaning and a deep significance. In this sense, Vallabha, like Rāmānuja, draws no distinction between identity and causation, for causation, as interpreted by him, is more of an expression, than a transformation. The possibility of an effect appearing out of, and again disappearing into, the cause, makes it really an expression of the cause-being, rather than its transformation. Really the interpretation of the theory in this way leaves no room for the separatist or distinguishing consciousness between cause and effect, and as such, the law of causation here has been merged into identity of expression. Vallabha does not draw any distinction between causation and expression, the theory of Abikṛta Pariṇāma really identifies the cause and the effect.¹

Causation, in Rāmānuja, is a functioning in Being-for-other; in Vallabha, it is functioning in Being-for-self, for he does not recognize any Being-for-other. We read in the Prameyaratnārṇava, Prapañcaviveka²:—

¹ Vide *Suddhādvaita Mōrtanda*, p. 8.

Yathā sarpaḥ saralaḥ kuṇḍālākaraśca bhavati. Tadvat brahma sarvā-kāraṇaḥ bhavati. Na hi sarpaśya kuṇḍālākāre ko'pi vikāraḥ. Bhāṣye tu, sarvāṇi taijasaṇyavikṛtānityuktaṇi. Evaṃca suvarṇasyānekākāratve'pi na suvarṇasyānyathābhāvaḥ.

² Vide *Prapañcavivekaḥ*, p. 5.

Ataḥ prapañcasya brahmābhinnatvāt satyatvamaṅgikāryaṇi śrutisaraṇaiḥ.

‘Since the cosmic manifold is non-different from Brahman, its truth is to be accepted in Brahman. Those that perceive the emergence of the world-process from, and its consequent disappearance in, Brahman, are labouring under avidyā.’

And it comes to this that, truly speaking, there is no causation, for everything has its existence in the being of Īśvara. Īśvara is identical with its expression. Expression there is, but no origination.

Though this identity-being is the truth of the causal theory, still the causal-concept is retained to denote the individuality of effects and this is the requirement of metaphysical consciousness which cannot transcend discursive thinking and marks the difference of effect in the identity of the cause. We should note here that this identity is the identity dynamic, which implies a difference in unity. This unity-difference concept is what we can achieve in our logical intuition. Though expression is identical with Being, still, in the dynamic consciousness the expression is different from the expressed.

Vallabha recognizes three stages in the unfolding of consciousness. (1) Popular consciousness influenced by avidyā receives the particularity of things. It is essentially a differential consciousness. (2) Metaphysical consciousness is thinking in concepts and as such employs the concept of cause and effect, the relation of unity and difference in the interpretation of things. Even in the dynamic view of things one cannot transcend this limitation of categorical understanding and so long as logical consistency is the demand, understanding

*Ye punarutpattivinaśkutsitatvabhedādayo dharmāḥ pratiyante, te māyikā
iti sudhībhīrākalanīyaṃ.*

anyhow assimilates experience in a synthetic whole. (3) Spiritual or intuitive consciousness, which presents the dynamic unity in its synthetic immediateness, absorbing and assimilating within it the mediateness of the metaphysical consciousness. The categorical consciousness is logical and analytic, the intuitive consciousness is psychological and synthetic and this synthetic vision is the culmination of our evolution in spiritual consciousness.¹

The theory of causation as *pariṇāma*, or transformation, or as expression, or immutable transformation, *avikṛta pariṇāma*, presents the dynamic view of life in its causal aspect. And in the immanent sense, Śaṅkara also accepts the reality and eternity of effect and refutes the unreality or illusoriness of effects.² The effect is not imaginary or *asat*. The *asat* or non-existent cannot appear; whatever appears must be supposed to be existent before, though it may be hidden from view. Under opportune circumstances, and in fullness of time, the effect-form comes out of the cause-form. Śaṅkara has gone further and urged for the continuity of the effectual transformation on the strength of the evidence of the transcendent Yogi-consciousness, which reveals the past and the future just like the present. God's foreknowledge has also been adduced in support of the reality, continuity, and eternity of effects. Śaṅkara, in empiric sense, has given the full weight of his opinion to the dynamic theory.

¹ Vide *Prapañcavivekaḥ*, p. 4.

Ayaṃ prapañcaḥ adhikārbhedena tridhā bhāṣate. Tatra brahmabhūtānāṃ brahmātmaka eva suddho bhāṣate. . . . Śāstrotpanna jñānināṃ tu brahmadharma māyādharmayuktastattaddharma satyatvamithyātvavivekapūrvakam bhāṣate. . . . Avivekināṃ tu brahma dharma māyādharmā yuktastattaddharmānāmekarūpa jñānapurāṣaram bhāṣate.

² Vide *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, ch. i, *Brahman* ii, Commentary of Śaṅkara.

The dynamic theory—be it transformation or expression—if it establishes anything clearly, establishes the identity of being in causation. Effectuation is only apparent, it indicates a change of form in transfiguration ; though the transmutation is supposed to be real, it is at best a phenomenal change. The change is not real ; at least, as a reality, its nature escapes determination. If transformation implies the change of the complete being of cause, knowledge becomes impossible, for it makes the cause appear what it is not, at least the identity between the cause and the effect breaks. If transformation implies a change in the portion of the cause, the question arises :—is the portion different from or identical with the entire being of cause. If different, we are to make an impossible synthesis ; if identical, the complete being is changed, the effect becomes entirely a new thing. Vācaspati has the above criticism on the dynamic theory and points out that the theory does not give us any clear sense and the doctrine cannot be accepted in the way in which it is put. If any insistence is put upon the importance of transformation, the theory is open to the above criticism. The real import of the theory lies in establishing the identity of the being, rather than the truth of causation, or in other words causation has phenomenal but no noumenal import. In fact, there can be no substantial mutation as the theory supposes ; if there is a mutation, it is only of the form. No doubt, it can be urged that mutation in form is also real and has a being in the unity of Reality ; it is real and important in its significance inasmuch as it presents the immediacy of being in its mediacy and holds up Being in its concreteness and definiteness. Śaṅkara and his followers would maintain that it is at best a metaphor. The momentous

problem is—Is the phenomenal concreteness really definable and categorically determinable? Mediateness is what immediateness is not, the difference in mediateness is missed in the identity of immediacy, the relational import of mediateness has no room in the integrity of immediacy.

Indeed, the whole difference converges to one and one point only, the static and the dynamic view of life and consciousness. Vācaspati, following the static conception has fought out the possibility of synthesizing immediateness with mediacy.¹ Even this difficulty is experienced in the theory of expression, for a mediateness, a relational consciousness, is also involved in it and refers us to the same difficulty. Philosophy swings like a pendulum between two fundamental concepts—static and dynamic, and once we accept any one of them, the course of the subsequent thought is to a general extent determined to suit the original moulding. The dynamic vision has been accepted by Śaṅkara as the popular solution but it has been thrown overboard by the denial of the theory. He finds the difficulty of reconciling the relational or dynamic view of causation with the law of identity, for causation is a relational concept, and identity denies relation; the one is the necessity of thought, the other transcends thought and its operation. A relational synthesis requires the working of causal-concept. Hence it has been necessary to define causation in a way which can preserve harmony with identity. Indeed, the dynamic view of causation has been

¹ Vide *Bhāmātī*, p. 117.

Pariṇāmīnityatā hi na pāramārthiko, tathāhi—tatsarvātmanā vā pariṇāmedekadeśena vā. Sarvātmnā pariṇāme katham na tattvavyūhatih. Eka-deśapariṇāme vā sa ekadeśastato bhinno vā'bhinno vā. Bhinnas cet katham tasya pariṇāmah; nahyanyasminpariṇāmanamāne' nyah pariṇānate'tiprasaṅgāt. Abhede vā katham na sarvātmanā pariṇāmah.

sacrificed to the static view of identity. To Saṃkara the dynamic view is also a relational concept, and accounts for phenomenal changes.

Vivarthavāda is, therefore, the denial of causation and the assertion of identity.¹ It presupposes pariṇāma, or effectual transformation, for the identity is intelligible as the denial of the manifold. This denial requires a position, and as such we posit a world through a law of causation and then deny it to indicate the illusoriness of position and the reality of the identity. To establish unqualified monism on a secure basis, Vedāntism simultaneously asserts and denies the manifold-existence in the identity of Being. If the world of appearance altogether be denied an existence in identity, there would arise a gulf between the transcendent being and immanent experience, and a metaphysical dualism would be the result. To counteract this possibility of thought the manifold world is posited, and then denied. Logically, affirmation goes before denial, 'is' before 'is not'. Sarbajñatmuni is true when he says that vivartha presupposes pariṇāma.

We may still go further and say that vivarthavāda is a frank confession of a failure to exactly determine causation. A change supposes a difference, for without difference it is no change.

But it is hard to conceive a difference and an identity together. The difference of the effect cannot co-exist with the identity of the cause. Vācaspati²

¹ Vide *Samkṣepaśārīrakam*, p. 40. Ch. II. (Benares Edition.)
Vivartatvādasya hi pūrvabhūmīr
Vedāntavāde pariṇāmavādah.
Vyavasthite'smin pariṇāmavāde
Svayaṃ samāyāti vivartavādah.

² Vide *Bhāmati*, p. 118.

Kaḥ punarayaṃ bhedo nāma, yaḥ sahābhedenaikatra bhavet Paras-

thinks synthesis impossible. He inquires, what is this bheda, which is supposed to co-exist with abheda? Are they mutually opposed? If so, cause and effect will be totally different existences, non-compatible in nature. If there is difference, there is no identity, if identity, none can conceive a difference. So the attempt to establish difference in identity in causation fails completely.

Rāmānuja has raised an objection against the doctrine of identity as applied to causation. He writes, ¹ 'Those who maintain the identity of the cause and the effect, and yet ascribe falsity to the effect, really do not prove the non-difference of the cause and the effect, for the true and the false cannot be one and the same. This being so, the alternative conclusion of Brahman being illusory, and of the world being real, may also follow.

This charge is evidently due to a failure to distinguish the law of identity, which has a transcendental import, from the law of causality which has an empirical import and to understand the true meaning of vivartha, which does not establish, but, on the other hand, practically denies causation. Śaṅkarites never maintain absolute identity of cause and effect in the sense of transformation, though the substantial identity is never denied. Rāmānuja's charge cannot arise if we bear in mind that Śaṅkara's philosophy accepts nothing but an abstract identity. Causation is a dynamic concept and since

parābhāva iti cet, kimayaṃ kāryakāraṇayoḥ katakahātakayorasti na vā. Na cet, ekatvamevāsti, naca bhedaḥ. Asticedbheda eva nābhedaḥ. Naca bhāvābhāvayoravirodhaḥ; sahāvasthānāsambhavāt.

¹ Vide Śrībhāṣya, p. 43. Vol. II. (Madras Edition.)

Ye tu kāryakāraṇayorananyatvaṃ kāryasyamithyātvaśrayeṇa varṇayanti, na teṣāṃ kāryakāraṇayorananyatvaṃ sidhyati satyamithyāarthayorāikyā-nupapattēḥ; tathāsati brahmaṇo mithyātvaṃ jagatassatyatvaṃ vā syāt.

Saṅkara denies māyā in the transcendent sense ; his philosophy has no true significance for any other concept besides identity, and so long as māyā operates we have a causation in dynamic sense, operative only in the phenomenal universe, and this phenomenal universe has ideality but no reality. And, so long as this māyā is actively functioning, Saṅkara's philosophy maintains the duality of transcendent Being and the immanent experience, and causality is a concept of this immanent order. Its import, thiswise, does not affect the transcendence of Being.

The dynamic concept is invariably associated with the personality of Īśvara, the locus of śakti. This locus in Saṅkara is an abstraction of Being. But, since in the theistic teachers the śakti is the radiating energy and power of Īśvara, it must be conceived as its expression. Īśvara, then, is a concrete personal being, personal in the sense of possessing a being of its own, concrete because this being of Īśvara is different from others.

Though Īśvara possesses a personality of its own, still it maintains its infinitude by its śakti, a power which gives support to all existence and carries the fruits of karma to its doer. Everything submits to its will. It saves finite beings from the travails of birth and death in the karmic plane by grace. In a word, its capacity is unlimited, infinitude implies this inexhaustible source of power and capacity, both qualitative and quantitative. Absoluteness connotes the fixity of being through all expressions. Īśvara, as an infinite and absolute Being, conveys the idea of a centre of infinite expressions in energy and consciousness.

But the existence of finite things is no bar to its infinitude, for, as all Vaiṣṇava Philosophers have asserted that nothing exists quite independent of Īśvara.

Rāmānuja's assertion of finite things and beings as predicates of Īśvara, Jīva Gosvāmi's affirmation of the bahirangā śakti as located in jīva śakti; jīva śakti as located in svarūpa śakti; Nimvārka's denial of the independence of prakṛti or spiritual reals (nature or man), all have the effect of propounding the infinitude of Īśvara.

The infinitude of Īśvara again does not deny the personality of finite reason and consciousness, for the finite existences are real in the totality of being, and the evolution in consciousness and spirituality generally develops the vision of the unity of being. And in the fullness of spiritual attainment, the false egoistic consciousness created by māyā is displaced by the consciousness of Kainkarya, a follower. The thin veil of māyā sets up a false individuality and consequently a false freedom of karma on nature's plane. But the dawn of knowledge transforms the self-directed move of will from its occupation in nature's plane to the self-resigned spontaneity of love and service. In the course of this transformation will does not lose its individuality, but is spiritualized and is moved by the clear consciousness of being no longer the agent, but merely an instrument or a medium of service. This spiritualization or intellectualization of will is no surrender of its freedom, but an expansion of being in the divine life and activity. Freedom in this plane meets no restriction, and gradually the movement of will becomes a matter of our being than an occasion of choice. The Vedāntists of all schools have laid stress upon this freedom of being and movement in a supernatural consciousness. Will in nature's plane is to a great extent determined by extraneous causes, though its relative freedom, the freedom of choice, is retained to accept imperatives of duty and to reject prohibitions of conscience.

The transfiguration of our personality unfolds the eternal relation that exists between God and Man. This transfiguration may be fitly described as the opening of the inner consciousness in wisdom and spirituality, and with it begins the initiation into the better and truer life—a life of more expansive consciousness, finer delight and greater service. Apart from this general import of spirituality the Vaiṣṇavas accept the possibility of enjoying the hallowed presence and the sweet touch of the bodiless bodily presence of the divinity. A glorious vision opens in love which reveals the formless form of the divine.

The topic is of absorbing interest to the Vaiṣṇavas and is closely connected with the dynamic theory of expression. And the possibility of Īśvara's assuming a concrete expression or form is a topic so momentous in our practical look of life and love, that we can hardly avoid a close treatment of the subject to examine the logical ground and validity of a notion which excites the devotional attitude of the heart and is supposed to give it satisfaction and rest.

The Vaiṣṇava teachers deny a physical form to the divine. They maintain that the divine has a shining form, not a material cast, but a self-effulgent spiritual figure. The Vaiṣṇavas lay emphatic stress upon rūpa (form) consciousness. The arūpa (formless) consciousness has its being and locus in rūpa (form) consciousness. This form-consciousness is not to be conceived as an occasional or temporary expression. Valadeva in his *Siddhāntaratna*¹ affirms the co-reality of

¹ Vide *Siddhāntaratnam*, p. 50.

Viśeṣyeṇa svarūpeṇa saha tasya samvando nityaḥ apṛthaksiddha viśeṣa-natvāt. Nityasamvandhāpekṣīnyeva svarūpānatīrekavacāṃsi.

Bhagavān and its form. Both are non-different or identical.

And for this affirmation they advance specially the Sruti texts and spiritual experiences. The Vidvatanubhūti (the intuition of the wise) has been a ground for such a conviction and belief. But such a possibility has been retained to connote the real import of the Absolute. If the Absolute is expansive and all-pervasive only, it is no Absolute, for it denies by its exclusive expansiveness the concrete expression. And anything truly Absolute must be simultaneously all-pervasive and concrete. Aparicchinnatva (unlimitedness) and paricchinnatva (limitation) are not contradictories; they two together give us the full import of the Absolute and the finite.¹ The being which can appear both as unlimited and limited, abstract and concrete, is really infinite and truly indefinable, for it denies all logical determination and is the synthesis of what is apparently contradictory. And this possibility is potential in the dynamic theory which synthesizes the concepts apparently contradictory from the static standpoint. Concreteness is not then opposed to the expansion of Being.

Though Bhagavān and its concrete striving and effulgent expression are identical, yet a difference in them has been conceived possible by the acintya śakti of Īśvara according to Jīva Gosvāmi, by viśeṣa according to Madhva (Nyāyāmṛta).² Valadeva has also the same affirmation. A difference is appreciated where there is none through viśeṣa. Jīva Gosvāmi says that Brahman by its mysterious power can show itself either as bodily or bodiless, but all the time it retains its uniqueness and

¹ Vide *Bhāgavatsandharva*, p. 81, ll. 17-18.

² Vide *Sarva Saṃbādini*, p. 143.

Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 497.

fixity.¹ It can assimilate in its nature these contradictory appearances and still at the same time remain what it is. The Nyāyāmṛta has almost the same conclusion when it states that the integral Brahman can assume a form, by viśeṣa.

Lokācāryya conceives such a possibility. Īśvara has a beatific form, which surpasses intellectual apprehension. Vallabha and his followers also support this conclusion. Puruṣottama Kṛṣṇa is the Absolute being, having different concrete expressions.² The concrete personality of the Absolute is not always appreciated and understood and it is then that the Absolute appears as the all sameness and generally is designated as akṣara. But the akṣara-being is an apparent homogeneity of consciousness, a homogeneity which soon reveals heterization which is integrated in the concrete unity of Puruṣottama. And Puruṣottama is the fullness of Being. Puruṣottamācāryya has the same conclusion. He affirms that the beatific concrete form of bliss is attainable through devotion. The form of bliss is, therefore, no creation or appearance of māyā.³

Vedānta Dēśika also accepts this possibility and he goes on to say that Parameśvara has forms, real or non-real, corresponding to eternal or eventual desires. The former is his being, the latter, an appearance. The latter sometimes becomes an occasional necessity to meet a temporary purpose or end in the regulation of cosmic events.

Dialectic in Love

Even in the expression of the Absolute Life in love and joy, the Vaiṣṇava teachers have conceived stages

¹ Vide *Sarva Saṃbādinī*.

² Vide *Prameyaranārnava*, pp. 1, 2.

³ Vide *Śrutyānta Suradrūm*, p. 184, ll. 12-13.

of increasing psychological complexities in the harmony and delight of infinite life. Rāmānuja and all Vaiṣṇava teachers have accentuated a transcendence in infinite life, a transcendence which the infinite can alone enjoy, a transcendence in love, glory and joy. The fit, the adept only, can have the privilege to enjoy self-revelation of the infinite to itself in transcendence which is the highest expression of delight. The self-expression on nature's plane through māyā is a shadow of the true and the actual life of love, and the finite consciousness cannot be long satisfied with the opportunities and privileges offered to it on nature's plane. The delight of communion with the universal self in its self-expression through nature, society and humanity soon requires a greater fulfilment of enjoying the sympathetic and synthetic response through the entire being of ours of the self-revelation of the infinite to self, and in this attitude of Being there is no Being-for-other (in the sense of an inert extraneous existence), it is all Being-for-itself.

But the expression of self to self at once necessitates a self-analysis and a self-difference in the infinite life—a difference which keeps up the dynamic character of Bhagavān (Being-for-self). This difference we can indicate by the phrase expression (technically called Śakti). Bhagavān (Being-for-self) and śakti (expression) are identical in reality, though a concrete conception demands a difference between them. In the dialectic expression of love-life difference heightens the truth and reality of unitive consciousness and brings out the infinite phases of love and its promises. The difference sometimes appears to die out in the unitive consciousness only to reappear in a new form and exhibit the rhythm of love-life in a new strain and sweeter vein.

The difference then is no difference, but a key to the subtler and finer forms of expression.

The Vaiṣṇava philosophers conceive a state in the development of finite consciousness, when the jīva-consciousness realizes its unity and fellowship with Bhagavān (the Being-for-self) through Śakti (the Being-for-expression). This realization may assume many forms in reference to the character of the expression, intellectual, devotional, or loving. Every one of them expresses a higher rhythm and the difference indicates the various symphonies of the rhythmic expression. The Vaiṣṇava teachers retain the possibility of enjoying the varying phases of Bhagavān (Being-for-self) through Śakti (Being-for-expression), and none of them can be set aside as an unimportant detail or element in infinite life. With this truth, it is, no doubt, possible to feel or enjoy a particular tune of the rhythmic life, for the moment while remaining unconscious of the other. It is this partial vision of Being-for-self that accounts for the accentuation of one aspect of the Infinite life rather than the other.

In Rāmānuja the vision of an expansive delight first appreciated by intellectual sympathy and consequently filtered down to heart, exciting devotional attitudes is more apparent. The expression of Infinite life in knowledge and immensity with sublime touches on feeling, in short an intellectual communion with silent devotional attitude,—an attitude free from the heights of emotional outburst, marks out the life of realization and attainment. But gradually the Vaiṣṇava teachers have left this intellectual mooring in realization and accentuated the expression of Infinite life through love, faith and glory. The intellectual penetration and communion are almost absent in the later Vaiṣṇavas ; some have accentuated

ated a communion in love pure and simple, some in love mixed with mystic practices. Nimvārka and Keśava Kāśmīra have laid stress upon love and communion as felt in the calmness of meditation, a silent delight attained through quietness of meditation in which the sense of yoga (union) is more manifest. Vallabha has more appreciation of the expression of sweetness and glory of Infinite life in the vibrative impulses of unqualified love. The Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism has laid a deep stress upon the unalloyed loving expressions of divine sweetness and joy in the life of realization. The intellectual appreciation of the majesty, the delight accompanying communion through intellect and heart in the depth of meditation has found little recognition in Jīva Gosvāmi, Valadeva and others. Valadeva has, no doubt, sought almost to identify knowledge and devotion, still the peculiar vibrative expressions of love-consciousness distinguish it from intellectual calmness. No doubt, both are delightful, but whereas the delight in the one is more pensive and calm, the delight in the other is more intensive and quick. The one has a vision sublime and extensive, the other, a vision and a beatitude with expressions of maddening attraction in sweetness and beauty. Psychologically speaking, a contradiction is manifest between these appreciations and from the nature of the case it must be so, for the heightening in intellectual activity and enjoyment has the effect of quieting down the love impulses and their flashes.

However different these expressions may be, they must not be thought as completely distinct from one another, though an expression apparently may keep a countenance and an attitude dominating either in love or vision, or service. But this diversity is no plurality, it is no multiplicity. It is the expressional diversity in the

Identity of being in its infinite aspects. The Being-for-expression reveals infinite attitude, and but for them the divine life would be all sameness and devoid of the peculiar joy attendant upon the ever-increasing variety of expression of love, knowledge, beauty and goodness.

The Vaiṣṇavas conceive a plane of existence in which these expressions in infinite complexities are actualities, a supra-natural plane in which the Bhagavān (Being-for-self) is one with and constantly enjoys the Śakti (Being-for-expression). It is self-expression, an expression in which the self posits itself and its expression antithetically and again draws in the antithetic expression in its higher being of synthesis. In the concrete synthesis the antithesis of expression is necessity, but this antithesis is no denial or the opposite of the thesis. It is antithetic only to indicate its concreteness and definiteness from the thesis, otherwise the thesis cannot have the delight of expression, nor can the expression find its being in the synthetic unity of the thesis. This process of self-expression, therefore, in this plane is an uninterrupted continuity in knowledge, love and joy. The finite self can in its height of spiritual consciousness attain an occasional fellowship with this life of love and delight so long as the body lasts, but the philosophic vision of its being as a being for Bhagavān (Being-for-self) through Śakti (Being-for-expression) prepares it for the highest consummation viz., for the attainment of a spiritual companionship with all the privileges of beatific existence. And these privileges it begins to enjoy with the shuffling off of this mortal coil with the full fruition of its energizing in the physical plane of existence. The self-expression of the Infinite can then be enjoyed by the finite self when it realizes the

inwardness of its being in the Infinite and itself as a centre which can receive and return responses of love and delight. This psychological vision at once brings in a transformation in the adept, who no longer thinks himself an active agent, but a centre to contribute to this play of the delight of self-expression. Thus far the Vaiṣṇava teachers agree. But with the advent of Caitanya the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism has conceived higher and loftier dialectic in love, and sweeter and more enchanting raptures therein. In following their conception we must bear in mind the stress they have laid upon the expression of Infinite life in love and beauty, an expression which, according to them, affords greater delight than the intellectual appreciation of majesty. Indeed in the Bengal School, Bhagavān (Being-for-self) is all sportive delight in love and joy. The grandeur and sublimity of the Infinite life have been thrown into the background; it is still there, but in the height of love, the self-revelation on a deeper basis in delight requires the temporary withdrawal from vision of the Infinite in its majesty. Deep within the self-expression, a necessity exists, the necessity of an inner revelation in sportive delight, a revelation which is accessible only to love. But this revelation in love had a two-fold character, a revelation in which Bhagavān (Being-for-self) is always an associate to Śakti (Being-for-expression) in its infinite modifications, a position conceived and accepted by all Vaiṣṇavas, and a revelation in which Bhagavān is not simultaneously present with its Śakti (Being-for-expression) in its infinite vṛttis or modifications. Love in its deeper being manifests a dialectic movement in which fellowship is asserted and subsequently denied. It has a law in it to effect variations in delight and make delight more

delightful by constantly self-asserting and self-denying. But this self-denial has a character peculiar to itself and different from the original antithetic movement of self-expression. The antithetic move in self-expression is not so much a denial of Being-for-self, it is a projection, and as a projection an antithesis is inherent in it to indicate its individuality. But the denial here is a self-absence either from the projective forces of expression or from the finite consciousness. The self-denial is then a momentary absence of fellowship in actuality and objective sense. Such a denial is a law unto love. The effect is to make one feel the separation which becomes all the more painful because of the recollection of the delight of fellowship and unity in love. Love has this inherent virtue in it that it does not always afford pleasure but brings in its train the mellowed sweetness in tears and makes the successive appearance and disappearance of fellowship a fact and a reality in realization. The denial or separation has the effect of heightening the delight of love-union or integration.¹

The self-denying process opens a retrospective vision of the fellowship in delight, a memory which soon recalls all experiences of love-ecstasy and invariably heightens a yearning to experience and enjoy it again. But the self-denying activity of love still asserts, and the search for a fellowship in trans-subjective reality is soon directed inward and satisfied by a fellowship in ideality. We draw this distinction between reality and ideality of fellowship, for, though in spiritual consciousness the

¹ Vide *Ujġvalanīlmani*, *Nāyikābhedaṣprakaraṇa*, *Vipralavdhā*.

Vyathamānāntarā proklā vipralavdhā manīṣibhiḥ. Nirvvedacintākhedāśru-mūrcchāniśvasitādibhāk.

Vide *Prītisandarbhā*, *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*.

Sa vipralambha vijñeyah sambhogonnatikāraka iti.

ideal is the real, still the self-denying process of love makes a distinction between a fellowship in transcendent but objective consciousness and a fellowship in transcendent but subjective consciousness. This subjective or ideal fellowship is the reconstruction and reproduction of the real fellowship in being. These perspectives, real or ideal, are experiences in spiritual consciousness, created by the self-asserting and self-denying process of love.

But even in this ideal fellowship a state is soon reached wherein love reveals an attitude of identity-consciousness. The ideal fellowship is created by the self-denying process of love, but the self-denial is soon followed by an intensive self-integrative process potentially involved in denial, it is an integration in denial, but an integration from which the thought of the denial is absent. It is not the trans-subjective vision of love and its unity. It is the subjective vision of love and its identity. The ideal fellowship soon reaches a plane where love opens up another vista in realization, the thought of a difference and a distance dissolves, and the dynamic effort of love reveals a phase of identity consciousness in delight wherein the heart, sick of a separation, begins to lose itself in the love-consciousness. Love reveals itself in identity by completely overshadowing the loving-consciousness—consciousness wherein the depth and intensity of feeling of separation brings in by a dialectic process neither a fellowship in actuality nor a fellowship in ideality, but a seeming presentation of the love-object. It is no union in separation, but a revelation in the dynamic effort of an identity-consciousness in self-denial. This is the highest effort of love at self-assertion in self-denial. But this denial of

loving consciousness and its overshadowing with the simultaneous presentation in it of the love-self in individual identity is to be distinguished from the identity-consciousness felt in intensive integration in the height of love-assertion. The usual fellowship always presents an unity of loving and loved-consciousness, a unity which always keeps up the differentia. But in the intensity of loving-attraction this dual-consciousness is soon dissolved in the identity. In fact, it is an appearance of identity on the ground of a difference, momentarily held in abeyance. But in love-integration the identity is established between the two by effacing the difference and this is an experience felt by-and equally true to-both the subject and the object. The former is a subjective experience of identity, the latter an objective experience on the background of trans-subjective unity. But this identity consciousness revealed in the dialectic effort of love is not to be confounded with the identity-consciousness in static cognition. It is one of the complexities of love, a vision and a realization that is peculiar to love itself. In the intensity of loving consciousness the sense of a difference for the moment is overpowered but not completely lost. The identity is, therefore, a temporary phase in love-consciousness with all its attendant peculiar delight and represents the highest beatitude in love-dialectic, but it cannot, on that account, be a state permanent, for, in the ever-changing life of love, a fixity of existence is not thought either possible or desirable. The beatitude of love is a beatitude in delight-manifold, which all the more heightens the delight by presentation of contrasts in love-consciousness of separation and union, difference and identity. The dialectic march in love does not rest here. It soon reveals opposing attitudes in

love consciousness :¹ (1) an attitude of aggressiveness and (2) an attitude of submission. The former is expressive of an assertive consciousness and the attendant delight is the joy of conquest and mastery of possession. This assertive consciousness keeps fresh the dialectic opposition in love, an opposition absent in submissive consciousness. But even in aggressiveness love has the sole object of gratifying the love-object, it has no personal interest, though it appears to be conscious of its personal joy and to be anxious to enjoy it by demanding rather than seeking a fellowship in love. But the central impulse is to create sources and channels of delight and gratifications of love-self. Love offers unceasing intoxication and attraction and keeps up its unbreaking continuity. Herein love exhibits its conquering and commanding nature. But to keep up the dialectic antithesis, which is so natural to love, love soon posits an opposing attitude of submission and resignation. Love exhibits an extraordinary degree of self-forgetfulness in the anxious solicitude for the enjoyment of the beloved. It is not only a submission of the being of love, but it is chiefly a resignation from which the motive of self-delight is absent. It is a state of entire forgetfulness of the self and its delight and a state of self-absorption in the thought of the beloved and care for its joy and delight.

Love manifests a phase in which the delight of the beloved becomes the only delight of self. Love offers a new experience of delight in the consciousness of

¹ Vide *Uj्जvalānīlamanī Sakhi-prakaraṇa*, Slokas 12-13, 13-14.

Mānagrahe sadodyuktā tacchaitihīye ca kopaṇā. Abhedyā nāyake prāyaḥ krūrā vāmeti kīrtiyate.

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Asahā mānanirrvandhe nāyake yuktavādīnī, Sāmaabhīstena bhedyā ca dakṣiṇā parikīrtitā.

being an instrument of service and delight. It is the delight of a loving passiveness, the delight of a denial of all delight. But it is not a state of self-absorption—denial has a concreteness and a character. It has a personality, which absorption lacks. The consciousness of a difference is clear, though in this consciousness nothing has a place besides the effort of completely giving up the very being of love-self. This giving up may bring a self-forgetfulness, but is no absorption, which denies the possibility of eternally loving and denying. The delight of absorption is attained in the depth of communion and has a particularity of unruffled calmness. But absorption denies the possibility of love and service, which requires the retention of a differentiating consciousness though in the love-dialectic a fit of absorption is not an impossibility, yet this is, again, an aspect in the complexities of loving-consciousness.

But love even in absorption reveals a dialectic move. It may express an effort in which the loving consciousness absorbs itself in the being of the beloved, the locus in the object. Love here manifests itself in the two-fold process of taking in and giving up. The locus gives up, the object takes in. Such is the absorption commonly felt and experienced in love-consciousness. But the opposite move of absorption of the object in the locus is a rare possibility, though not a complete impossibility. Rare it is, for it is giving up the very being of the Delight-self and its absorption in the locus. It requires the denial of the Delight-self to feel and understand the delight of denial. The bliss afforded in the denial of loving-consciousness has its own particularity, which the Infinite love cannot ordinarily feel and enjoy, for in the dialectic move of love, the antithesis has always

a tendency to come into the thesis and the thesis is conscious of the synthetic response which it receives and feels. The original antithetic move is a move in delight and the delight is delight for the self. But in this move Bhagavān cannot enjoy the delight which the Śakti (Being-for-expression) feels in giving itself up for the joy of Bhagavān, the Being-for-self, and dialectic diversity of love soon manifests a tendency in Being-for-self to feel the depth of bliss which Being-for-expression and finite self actually enjoy in loving devotion and denial. And with this tendency, besides the original antithetic movement, a move of denial in Being-for-itself is the effect and God-consciousness soon begins to reveal itself as loving-consciousness of a devotee. This is the highest form of self-denial and the best and most startling expression of beatitude in love, a state wherein the highest position in love-consciousness becomes the highest denial, an integration of the denial with the position, but one in which the character of the denial is more marked and actualized. The position remains in the background of consciousness. It exhibits a concrete expression of resignation and surrender, though all the time it receives them from within as position. The outward expression is the denial of loving-consciousness which the inward being of love receives. It is the giving and taking in one being and in one form, the highest symbol of union of a loving and a receiving consciousness in love. The receiving consciousness manifests itself as loving, the loving as receiving. This is the highest synthesis in the dialectic of love.¹

¹ Vide *Bṛihatbhāgavatāmṛta*, v. 3.

*Svadayitanijabhāvaṃ yō vibhāvya svabhāvāt
Sumadhuramavatīrṇo bhaktarūpeṇa lobhāt.*



Vedāntic Theory of jīva or finite self-consciousness

We can introduce here the Vedāntic theory of jīva. To Saṁkara the jīva has a continuity of existence from eternity, through cycles of birth and death, though this continuity has a break with the dawn of identity-consciousness. It is essentially a reflected consciousness and is associated with the sum total of psychoses, generally called vṛttis in Vedāntic literature, and in Saṁkara's system, the idea of congeries of vṛttis is more prominent than their assimilation in a dynamic integrity. No doubt, the concept of an 'I' the unity of synthetic apperception, is more or less apparent in conscious life, yet this 'I' is nothing real but a reflection. But, on the other hand, we must not think that the 'I' is the mere sum total of the psychic states. The idea of an integrative and unifying principle subsists through all psychical changes.

Saṁkara avoids two extremes of reality and complete unreality of the ego. The ego is a scientific and a pragmatic reality. It has a psychological or epistemological ideality, but no transcendent reality, a psychological continuity, but no metaphysical unity.

So far the Śaṁkarites agree. But as soon as they begin to define its nature, they differ. Here again, we come across two divergent theories:—The doctrine of Reflection (known as Ābhāsavāda) and the doctrine of Modification (known as Avacchedavāda). This difference originates from the manner in which we view the jīva-consciousness. Ābhāsavāda makes jīva a reflection and as a reflection it has purely a psychological appearance, hardly any reality. The psychological ideality is here complete. Avacchedavāda makes jīva, a mode of absolute consciousness—a modification which is no

real modification (for the Absolute is a plenum) but a creation of āvidyā. We have here the transcendent consciousness circumscribed; as transcendent consciousness, it has a reality, but the limitation of avidyā grafts upon it an ideality in the sense of a divided and limited consciousness. Another form of the doctrine of reflection is found in the Vimba-Prativimvavāda of Prakāśātaman Yati, which holds that the reflection is false, but what appears in reflection is true. This also retains the psychological ideality of self on the background of its metaphysical reality.

Both ābhāsavāda and prativimvavāda are theories of reflection employed as analogies to explain the relations of the immanent and the transcendent aspects of Caitanya. There is a very subtle distinction between these two points of view, though, on the face of it, they appear as but one.

In ābhāsavāda, the reflection, as such, is false, because it is regarded as different from the thing reflected, while, in prativimvavāda, the reflection is as true as the thing of which it is the reflection, in so far as the reflection is taken to be not only not different from but identical with the thing reflected, which, under reflection, is only seen in another form, the appearance of difference consisting in the way in which the reflection occurs.

Regarded in these lights, in ābhāsavāda, the immanent aspect of Caitanya is false, in contradistinction to the transcendent, but, in prativimvavāda, on the contrary, the immanent is quite as true as the transcendent, both being the same but appearing as different.¹

¹ Vide *Brahmānanda's Ratnāvali*, p. 114.

*Svarūpato mithyābhūtaṃ prativimvavitivādaḥ ābhāsavādaḥ
Svarūpataḥ satyaṃ prativimvatvarūpeṇa mithyābhūtaṃ
vimeva prativimvamiti vādasya Vivarāṇoktasya prativimvavādat
vamiti.*

Rāmānuja and the teachers of the Vaiṣṇava school maintain the reality of the self, and they draw no distinction between the metaphysic reality and the psychological or epistemological ideality of the self. To them the distinction does not hold true. The self is a dynamic reality, though atomic in nature. It has the capacity of expansion and contraction. The psychical states are assimilated in its nature ; they are really expressions of its own being. The nature of the self as the synthetic unity of apperception is drawn out more emphatically in the theistic affirmation than in the Śamkarites. The theistic affirmation avoids both extremes of the static and the associanistic accounts of the Śamkarites and the Buddhists.

The author of the *Nyāyā Siddhāntjanam* is inclined to ascribe the function of expansion and contraction to *dharmabhūtajñānam*.¹ Lokācāryya accepts the same conclusion.² But this distinction is a superfluity, *dharmabhūtajñānam* is inherent in the self as an attribute.

The theistic position also refutes the Naiyāyika affirmation of consciousness (*jñāna*) as originated out of the union of the self and mental consciousness and throws it away as an impossible hypothesis. It is indeed a strain on imagination to think that consciousness, originally non-existent, comes into being on the union of things avowed to be non-conscious. Consciousness is the very essence of the self.³

Indeed, in the dynamic conception the distinction stands only to indicate the functioning of consciousness rather than connote any difference, expansion of

¹ Vide *Nyāyā Siddhāntjanam*, p. 62 (a few lines at the bottom).

² Vide *Tattvatraṇya*, p. 13.

³ Vide *Govinda Bhāṣya*, p. 552, chs. 2, 3, *sūtra* 26.

purity and integrity of being—a nativity which it acquires, again, through a course of spiritual bringing and adaptation. Every Vaiṣṇava teacher accepts the possibility of enjoying the continuous Delight of love, an expensive being in love, but this possibility it acquires in association with svarūpa śakti of Īśvara. The atomicity of jīva-consciousness conceived as a spark of the Infinite consciousness or a predicate or śakti is retained even when jīva-consciousness has the magnifying touch of the Infinite self. This touch can expand its vision, and it can enjoy the expansive life of Absolute consciousness, but its being remains what it is, an atom in the delight of spiritual consciousness freed from the contracting influence of avidyā and understanding the expansive life in spirit as an undivided, continuous and integral life.

Rāmānuja has emphasized the reality of the three-fold function of the self. Every Vaiṣṇava teacher has followed suit, except Vallabha, who denies ānanda to the individual self. But if Vallabha is understood aright, he must be supposed to mean that jīva-consciousness cannot be possessing bliss, which is the being of Īśvara or Bhagavān. When, therefore, he denies ānanda to jīva he must be doing it in the sense of bliss, but he cannot of course mean by ānanda, humanistic impulses of pleasure, the delight of the enjoyer, the vaktā, as Lokācāriya calls it. This affirmation is true in a general sense. But in the unfolding of spiritual consciousness, stress has been laid more or less upon the importance of one or the other of the functions. Rāmānuja has an eye upon the due importance of knowledge as well as service, and in his system the spiritual pursuit has been associated with the joy of service and fellowship. The intuitive effort is

here synthetic and the synthetic effort has its illuminating touch upon will and its impulses. With the satisfaction of intellect, proceeds the functioning of love and will. But in Vallabha and in Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism the love and the service consciousness, the devotional and the volitional consciousness have found more recognition. We confess we cannot describe their systems as anti-intellectualism and volitionalism, for such descriptions are inadequate. The systems fully recognize the due importance of all the functions of consciousness, but they undoubtedly have emphasized the volitional and love consciousness as presenting the condensed essence of our spiritual being.

CHAPTER IV

AN ESTIMATE

Śaṅkara's divisions of Existence—The character of finite and infinite experience in Śaṅkara—Spinoza and Śaṅkara—Śaṅkara and Bradley—The character of experience in Vaiṣṇava teachers—The relation of man and nature to God in Vaiṣṇavism—Rāmānuja, Madhva—Rāmānuja's and Jīva Gosvāmī's conception of dialectic—Their agreement and difference—Attempts at the conciliation of difference with identity in Rāmānuja and Jīva Gosvāmī—Conception of bheda and its forms examined—Māyā explained, māyā in Vaiṣṇava and Advaita Vedānta.

We have finished the statement of the comparative studies in fundamental metaphysical concepts. We now offer a further explanation and a few critical reflections.

Śaṅkara's division of existence, transcendental, empirical as vyavahārika and empirical as prātibhāsika presents a complete analysis of Being in all its phases.

Empirical existences are facts of finite consciousness. They appear, and appearance lends them a colour of truth. We cannot deny them. But all these appearances have not the same hold upon finite experience and consciousness. And this fact leads us to think of degrees of reality.

The prātibhāsika existence commands the lowest degree, vyavahārika existence, a higher degree. The one is a mere appearance to consciousness and has no claim upon us, the other has a claim upon our personality, feeling and willing. Not only this, even in the scale of existence the one appears and claims to be

more real and durable than the other. In other words durability has varying degrees and intensities. A varying degree naturally suggests a beginning. An initiation which may rise and fall in being cannot claim to be the Absolute reality, which, as absolute, must deny variation or degree of reality.

That this variation is a fact to finite consciousness, Śaṅkara does not deny. Its character as real is also accepted. But because it is a degree, it is denied an absolute character. Śaṅkara is frank in his confession that we meet in experience such variations in the degree of being, and so long as experience (finite) persists we cannot avoid them, but on that ground we cannot accept them as truth. Variation and degree cannot connote the full being and imply necessarily a partial being and a partial non-being. A partial non-being characterizes its illusoriness and unreality.

A partial being is true as being and illusory as partial. Being is a continuum and a plenum. Partiality of being is a creation and a false creation of relative consciousness which, as relative, cannot transcend the division and posits to the unilluminated intellect the degrees of reality. And so long as the intellect works, we cannot but accept this division and grades of being. Partiality then does not posit anything new but presents to finite consciousness the same reality in degrees. And as such this presentation can claim truth relative to that experience and that consciousness. It comes to this, then, partiality is not by itself a character of being, but an acquired appearance of being in relation to consciousness to which it is reflected. In other words, partiality is relative to finite vision and finite experience, and has no place in the Absolute.

Experience in Śaṅkara has a single character inas-

much as it is an experience in finite consciousness. In the finite centre experience is real and has a value, but the Absolute is no experience, though it is the datum of all experience. The finite conscious life constitutes its history of experience out of the presentation of the Infinite to itself, though the Absolute, strictly speaking, has no presentation and denies all experience. In Śaṅkara's system it is convenient to make a distinction between the experience of finite consciousness, the sum-total of experience as focussed in Infinite consciousness and the Absolute. Śaṅkara accepts, besides finite experience, a totality of experience immanent in finite experience centres. But none of these centres of experience, individualistic, collectivistic or immanent grasps the Absolute, for in them a sense of division still persists. The immanent and all-inclusive consciousness, though it represents the centre of all centres of experience and is fully aware of the entire experience and presentation still suffers within itself a limitation of the division of subject and object. And so long as it has the consciousness of a presentation, it has a sense of an outness, which is a barrier to its absoluteness. And an outness, which is an expression of self to self, though often claimed to be not strictly an outness, cannot be reconciled in the Absolute, for an expression has a differentiating implication inasmuch as it is an effort to be away from the centre. Śaṅkara has, therefore, conceived the Absolute to be denying all relational consciousness, it is the centre which has no circumstance, it is the focus which shines in itself, but does not throw out its splendour. It is expression. It is real, for it is continuity. It persists. And Śaṅkara claims that we finally get to such an existence, which denies and transcends all relational import,

We can compare Śaṅkara with Spinoza and Bradley. Śaṅkara avoids Spinoza's acceptance of the Absolute as the denial of all attributes and the substance of all attributes. This is an apparent contradiction. Śaṅkara is clear in denying all modes of existence as illusory and in accepting the identity as the Absolute reality. The Absolute is reflected in the relational consciousness as the datum of all existence, which, as datum, supports and sustains all, but which, in reality, denies a plurality of existence. The plurality is seen in the Absolute, is read in it, but, in fact, the Absolute does never support plurality nor contain it as elements of its own fulfilment. We are naturally confronted with a puzzle, everything is sought in the Absolute, is attributed to something which denies it completely.

Śaṅkara in this way draws an absolute distinction between the transcendent and the immanent being. And he makes the Absolute completely absolute by denying the immanent being and consciousness, whereas consciousness is truly transcendental, though it has an appearance of an immanence. Philosophy in Śaṅkara is a denial of immanent life and an assertion of transcendent consciousness. Though Śaṅkara would accept a continuity of the immanent life, still he would not conceive and grant a history in the Absolute. And he has sacrificed the history to the fixity of an unchangeable and unchanged Absolute. Philosophy is essentially a transcendence in which the immanent life and consciousness has no meaning, no existence. Śaṅkara has not reconciled the claims of relative experience and transcendent consciousness. Such reconciliation has been thought an impossibility and to the integral Absolute has been sacrificed the truth and revelations of relative consciousness. This plurality of relative con-

sciousness is due to nescience. It has no *raison d'être* in the Absolute. Śaṅkarites, to be consistent, make the experience in nescience to be an unceasing continuity. To the position of another principle, Śaṅkarites object not, as this position has a meaning and a sense for the relative consciousness, and, as such, cannot break the integrity of the Absolute. Indeed, Śaṅkara is bold enough to affirm that we cannot harmonize the claims or demands of the absolute and the relative consciousness, and instead of integrating the relative with the Absolute, he and his school have completely done away with the relative and preserved the Absolute intact. Indeed, the Absolute has been made so much transcendental that we may even conceive the continuity of a psychological or scientific relativity side by side with the Absolute without any harm or detriment to its absolute character, and philosophy can be satisfied in teaching this much that in the continuity of self-conscious experience nowhere do we come across the Absolute. To know this is true wisdom, and this knowledge sets us free and helps us to properly evaluate the opportunities and privileges of our finite existences. The charge of dualism cannot arise, for though in our experience an immanent life and consciousness runs side by side with transcendental being, still in the silence of this transcendence, avidyā with its relativistic consciousness has no hold nor any play. A dualism is possible in human consciousness, but not in the Absolute which denies all divisions, all plurality.

A deistic charge of dualism may be conceived in the admission of two existences transcendent and immanent. But really there are not two existences, the Absolute is the metaphysical reality and the only reality, the appearance is not the reality, though it has an

expression. And in so far as appearance has a reality, it is non-different from Being. And in the extreme section of the Sāṃkarites the order of appearance has been reduced to psychoses, saṃskāras and ideas projected outward. The world has been reduced to a psychological illusion. Even if we do not go so far, we cannot ascribe to appearance any reality, for Being is the only reality. Spinoza's is a double-faced reality. It appears as thought, just as it appears as extension. Advaita Vedānta cannot accept this. It reduces all existences to consciousness. Nothing inert exists.

Consciousness never appears as thought or extension. It has no appearance. The appearance is the creation of avidyā. It is not in the Absolute. Vedāntism, as a philosophical discipline, is an improvement upon Spinoza in categorically accepting the Absolute as the denial of all relations and in attributing appearance to avidyā and not to the Absolute. Avidyā and finite consciousness are mutually inter-dependent ; avidyā is a fact to finite experience, but not to the Absolute. But how side by side with Absolute consciousness this polarity of opposites exists, how, if not in the Absolute consciousness, but in it as locus, the finite centres of consciousness are formed, are problems that pass human comprehension and the philosophy of Absolute monism has sought to solve the problem by categorically denying it. Everything is not simply error, but illusion. Śāṃkara, unlike Bradley, can find no room for the details of experience in the Absolute. The Absolute is no unity, no synthesis, but an identity. Though Śāṃkara denies the many in the one, still he feels that the many cannot be a complete negation. It has an existence. Here is the problem. He cannot deny the many, nor can he find a

place for it in the one. He leaves the problem of the one and the many as almost insoluble and inexplicable. Human reason is not equal to the task. The reality of the many may not be felt in liberation, still the appearance requires an explanation. And this seems to be a puzzle. The impress of transcendent consciousness the empiric mind cannot receive and hold and the faculty of intelligence is inherently incapable of transcending the relativity of subject and object. Śaṅkara seems to feel that philosophy cannot sufficiently comprehend how the one becomes the many. This appears to be the implication of the māyā doctrine. In Bradley the Absolute is 'the unity in which all things, coming together, are transmuted in which they are changed all alike, though not changed equally'.¹ 'In this unity relations of isolation and hostility are affirmed and absorbed,'² the Absolute is each appearance and is all, but it is not any one as such . . . appearance without Reality would be impossible, for what then could appear? And Reality without appearance would be nothing, for there certainly is nothing outside appearance'.³ Bradley's Absolute is an all-inclusive unity, an unity in which relations are transmuted, but not completely lost and totally eclipsed. 'The Absolute stands above its internal distinctions. It does not eject them, it includes them. The Absolute is the concrete identity of all extremes.' It is exactly the point where Bradley differs from Śaṅkara. To Śaṅkara the Absolute is the abstract identity. It denies difference and refuses relations. Bradley does not make it clear how the Absolute retains within it 'all extremes'. Do they maintain their identity in the Absolute? If so, the Absolute has, then, infinite

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 488.² P. 488.³ P. 487.

differences in its concrete identity. But are not differences mutually opposed? If they are, they cannot be harmonized in the Absolute. If they are not, then there is no difference, all is sameness. The anxiety to retain all concepts of our finite experience in the Absolute in a harmonious fusion may be the demand of our heart, but it cannot stand the scrutiny of logic. Though Bradley always affirms that the Absolute transcends the differences of finite experience, still he never affirms that the Absolute denies them.

In fact, such a conclusion is against the spirit of his philosophy. These differences are fused in the harmony of an absolute unity, but are not totally lost. The Absolute then comes to be a system of relations, a system in which every element of experience has a place and a meaning harmoniously blended with infinite other elements. It may be more, but that we know not. So far as clear thinking is concerned Bradley's Absolute is the fusion and a harmonious fusion of all elements, all relations constituting experience. But this whole is not the sum of its parts. 'The coarse notion of the whole as the sum of its parts' has 'long ago been shown to be self-contradictory in principle'.¹ 'The parts are members, the whole is an organic unity in which they function'.² Bradley then clearly recognizes the reality of the Absolute and the finite centres and their distinction. But how with this distinction retained in Being, the Absolute can be truly absolute passes intelligent comprehension. And Bradley himself (*Appearance and Reality*) says, 'We do not know why and how the Absolute divides itself into centres or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one. The relation of the

¹ *Logic*, pp. 95, 694.

² *Mind*, p. 32, January No. 1925,

many experiences to the single experience and so to one another is, in the end, beyond us'.¹ The most important question of Philosophy remains unanswered. Bradley accepts the truth of 'many' and 'single' experiences but he confesses he cannot find between them any conceivable relation. The common appeal to organic fusion and unity of experiences really dispenses with the reality of 'many' experiences inasmuch as 'the many' has a subordinate place there and its being and experience become lost in the one. A subordinate reality is no reality, because it is not an independent centre of experience. It is not the effective 'many', but shadows and appearances falsely called realities.

The Vaiṣṇava teachers have accepted the truth of experience in all its grades and even in false or illusory appearance. Rāmānuja has not denied the truth of the appearance. Nothing is false, since it appears, it has a reality. Since reality is truth, there is nothing illusory, nothing mysterious—nothing which appears but does not abide. Indeed, no Vaiṣṇava teacher has challenged the truth of experience, and the whole philosophy is conceived in the same spirit. Though the truth of experience has been accepted by the Sāṃkarites, it has been sublated in a particular point in consciousness. Experience is, therefore, not inherent in consciousness, but only acquired. In Vaiṣṇavism it is inherent in consciousness, in the sense that consciousness creates or evolves it. Experience is expression. In no stage is conscious life devoid of self-expression. The Absolute in Vaiṣṇavism is the all-encompassing experience. It is fundamentally and essentially experience. Unlike

¹ P. 527.

the Śaṅkarites Vaiṣṇavas have no division of more real and less real existences, though, no doubt, they have conceived different aspects of Being.

But the main difficulty of Vaiṣṇavism is centred in the conception of the Absolute. After a clear acceptance of finite selves and nature (Prakṛti) to be reals, it is surely a difficult problem for Vaiṣṇava teachers to assimilate these existences in the Absolute. We have already studied the different attempts at this assimilation. If the finite selves are a reality, do they not constitute a barrier to the Absolute? Call them dependent reals or śaktis or by any other name, the bheda is apparent so long as these reals or śaktis form centres and apparently centres which the infinite cannot deny, but must necessarily accept as elements which are ready formed and permanent. Rāmānuja has sought to improve his position by the introduction of the adjectival theory, by making finite selves and nature predicates of the absolute Being, so that the Absolute has no difference with them and is absolute only with them. Nature, man and God constitute the absolute whole. Nature and finite selves inhere in God as its attributes.

There may be some improvement in thus directly relating finite selves and nature to God, but other difficulties make their way in this direction. How is nature related to God? This has been a perplexity to theists in all ages.

If the relation between Nature and Brahman be direct—and direct it is—according to Rāmānuja,—we should expect that mutations in nature have an influence upon Brahman, for a change in attribute calls for a change in substance. At least these changes must be regarded as changes in one aspect of Being. We cannot say that these mutations of prakṛti do not affect Brahman

in the least, for in the unity of Being how can we conceive changes in one aspect to be confined to it without affecting the whole? And mutation in Brahman is inconceivable, for transformation can be conceived of matter and not of spirit. Transformation in the one aspect and expression in the other can be hardly reconciled into a unitary conception.

Jīva Gosvāmī perceives this difficulty and characterizes prakṛti as an outer śakti, not in direct touch with Īśvara. The relation is indirect. But such an attitude can hardly satisfy the philosophic instinct.

To characterize māyā as bahiraṅgā Śakti indirectly related to Brahman makes Brahman completely transcendent, for this indirect relation is, strictly speaking, no relation; in the series of relations it is the third. Māyā is related to jīva, jīva to svarūpaśakti, svarūpaśakti to Īśvara. It is the creative energy but the creative energy of prakṛti has no direct touch with Īśvara. Īśvara becomes completely transcendent. By characterizing māyā as śakti Jīva Gosvāmī tries to evade the charge of complete transcendence, but, even then, in making the divine influence occasional (at the time of initiating the cosmic evolution) in its interference he has a trace of deism in his system.

Again, in Vaiṣṇavism the relation of finite selves to Nature has not been adequately explained. Nature and spirit are incommensurable, but still a free interaction of the one upon the other is apparently accepted. This interaction cannot be from the nature of the case direct, it must be indirect through the intervention of God. At least this seems to be the conclusion of Rāmānuja when he makes nature and finite self both directly related to God. Such seems to be the position of Nimbārka also. Though Jīva Gosvāmī conceives a direct

relation between *jīva* and *prakṛti*, yet such a relation becomes clear in a scheme of pre-established unity and harmony; otherwise to conceive a direct intervention every now and then seems to be against the spirit of transcendence prevalent in his philosophy. Vaiṣṇava philosophy is not explicit upon this point. We are led to think that it contains in it rudiments of occasionalism and traces of pre-established harmony.

The relations of souls (as *suddha cit*) to *prakṛti* and its evolution in nature have strictly no meaning. The souls cannot be conceived as attaining perfection through the course of existence in nature, for, however this course may be helping in the perfection of functions, these functions are finally appendages to the soul and not its inherent capabilities. The evolution is here confined to natural self and not to the spiritual self and the natural self is the creation of *māyā*. The finale of evolution is thus lost. In fact, such evolution is to be transcended before we can have the spiritual unfolding in the infinite. To begin with pre-existent finite souls and to have a history of evolution of these souls in association with *prakṛti* and then to urge their final emancipation in dissociation from *prakṛti* seems to be a hopeless confusion of thought.

The finite selves are represented to have a two-fold relation to Brahman and to *prakṛti*. This seems to be an impossibility. If the finite souls are seated in Brahman—or their consciousness opens up to the Absolute—as they must be, being the attributes or *Śaktis* of the Infinite, their relation with *prakṛti* becomes impossible. For this relationship implies a fall from its purity. To say that these selves are supported in the Infinite, but the Infinite is not their object, and that their consciousness and experience are not indrawn towards the Infinite but

rather outdrawn towards nature is to lend countenance to hypotheses :

1. These souls are not pure consciousness.
2. These are subject to ignorance or avidyā.

The former is *ex hypothesi* denied. The latter is accepted. But the acceptance of the latter requires an additional hypothesis of avidyā. Some of the Vaiṣṇava teachers (e.g. Jīva Gosvāmi) advance an additional hypothesis of eternal demerit because of the finite souls' natural outdrawnness from the Infinite (compare the Christian doctrine of eternal sin).

This limitation of ignorance is not compatible with the purity of souls. How avidyā can act upon souls is not clearly explained. A being, which is by nature pure consciousness, cannot be supposed to be influenced by an extraneous inert existence, at least it is difficult to conceive how such a thing can effect a limitation.

The doctrine of outwardness is also inexplicable. The outwardness is either inherent or non-inherent in the soul. It cannot be inherent. For then emancipation would be impossible. If it is non-inherent, it becomes an accident, to explain which, we are to fall back upon the hypothesis of avidyā. Outwardness, therefore, does not constitute an additional hypothesis. To say that atomic consciousness is limited and, therefore, liable to ignorance makes ignorance inherent in the finite consciousness. With this hypothesis the conception of a state of existence of the finite souls freed from all ignorance and impurities in fellowship with the Infinite becomes impossible. In fact, the more we think, the more we are led to believe that the finitude of souls cannot be reconciled with the conception of Brahman-likeness of these souls in liberation.

Nowhere in the history of the theistic thought do

we come across a satisfactory solution of the relation of nature to God. How the divine influence can act upon *māyā* is not logically explained. The influence has been merely assumed in the subordination of *māyā* to *Īśvara* and in the conception of *Īśvara*'s inconceivable power the theological attitude finds the convincing explanation.

The finite selves are centres of definite experience and have, therefore, a reality, a constancy. Now if they are attributes of the Infinite, they are either nothing real or as much real as an attribute. In that way they have nothing their own. The Infinite has an expression through these attributes. But this way all reality in the true sense is taken away from finite centres. The concrete reality is one reality, the adjectives are never so much real as the reality, otherwise they would not have been assimilated in the all-inclusive reality. This integration of the adjectives in the Absolute takes away from the adjectives the true sense of reality. Even if the finite experience has a reality it is either different from or identical with the Absolute experience—if different, it is beyond and independent of Absolute experience, if identical it has no reality. Rāmānuja's characterization of the finite as an attribute leaves no room for finite experience and being. Nimvārka's description of finite beings as dependent reals and Jīva Gosvāmī's description as dependent śakti allow a reality to finite selves and admit a difference. It is not easy to assimilate them in the Absolute.

Madhva's position is not clear. His denial of *bheda* and institution of *viśeṣa* in place of Rāmānuja's *viśeṣaṇa* (adjective) and Nyāya's *samavāya* (co-inherence) to retain the absolute integrity of Being is, no doubt, novel and

philosophically bold, inasmuch as Madhva accepts a number of categories. Viśeṣa is infinite in number and inheres in things, eternal and non-eternal. Consequently, viśeṣa itself becomes eternal and non-eternal. Viśeṣa is confined not to bhāvas only, it is extended to abhāva, non-being, or negation. It brings out its particularity by undeniable reference to a position (bhāva). Viśeṣa distinguishes a negation from another negation. The Madhvites have made its application universal. Veladeva confines it to the distinction of attributes in the infinite and not to absolute categorical divisions. Here he breaks off from the Madhva tradition.

The Madhvites must have their inspiration from the Vaiśeṣikās, who conceive viśeṣa to distinguish eternal existences which are otherwise indistinguishable in quality, action and form (akṛti) e.g., atoms, liberated souls.

Madhvites' conception differs from the Vaiśeṣikās. Though the Vaiśeṣikās maintain that existences in form, quality and action are almost identical, still they never expressly or implicitly hold the identity or integrity of their being. They are individually separate, though there is nothing in them to indicate their individuality. To mark this individuality, viśeṣa is a necessity.¹

A differentiating consciousness is, therefore, a natural demand in Vaiśeṣikās, but not in Madhva, for Madhva lays more stress upon integral than upon differentiating consciousness. A differentiating consciousness is not normally possible and in fact, does not exist, but is conceived through viśeṣa.² This viśeṣa is indefinite in

¹ Vide (*Praśastapādabhāṣya and Nyāya Kandali*, pp. 332, 334 (Benares Edition).

² Vide *Madhvasiddhāntasāra*.

Madhva logic, because it, like the m \ddot{a} y \ddot{a} of Śaṅkarites, institutes something which actually does not exist. This indefiniteness is really mysterious and defies logical determination, and to attempt to establish an integral Absolute which denies difference, but which causes difference to appear is certainly mysterious, and to lend the mystery an appearance of logic, a category, viśeṣa, has been conceived. Bheda is real, unreal, or illusory. It is not real *ex hypothesi*. If the bheda is unreal, how can an unreality be even made apparently real? If bheda is really non-existent, how can it appear? If it can appear without being real, it is illusory. The contention of Madhva, that viśeṣa creates bheda where there is none, makes this bheda itself unreal and illusory and the being integral. Bheda has, therefore, the appearance and not the reality. The contention of the Nyāya Sudhā that, in order to indicate specific differences in the Absolute viśeṣa is an implicate, makes specific differences real and more prominent than integrity. It can reasonably be held to make explicit what is implicit in existence. But an implicit existence is by no means non-existence. If so, specific differences become a reality.

The viśeṣa itself is as an existence. How does it stand in reference to integral Being? If it is different from the Absolute it breaks the integrity. If it is non-different from it, how can we conceive it as viśeṣa? Do we require another viśeṣa to conceive its difference? Madhvites say, No. To avoid regress, viśeṣa is conceived as self-determined and does not require further reference. Though Madhvites try to reconcile the claims of identity and difference in this way, yet they seem to have put more emphasis upon identity and to make difference apparent.

It is also maintained that viśeṣa is necessary to make

the *bheda* intelligible in common reference, (e.g. of *sat*, *cit*, and *bliss*), to denote the distinctive attributes and make them clearly definite from one another. This does not observe the law of parsimony and forces us to an infinite regress. An attribute, even if it inheres with other attributes in a particular thing, is, as it is, quite distinct and does not require a third element to distinguish itself from others. It is superfluous. And, moreover, the distinctive connotations of terms of common reference are enough to indicate the mutual differences in implications of terms. To introduce *viśeṣa* to indicate this difference is only to make matters complex. It gives us an endless continuity of differences. Valadeva also accepts *viśeṣa* to indicate the differences of the attributes inherent in God. Jīva Gosvāmī does not accept it and regards the distinctive attributes as *vṛttis* of *svarūpa Śakti*, the identity of Śakti expressing itself in a variety.

Rāmānuja's Being is no synthesis of being and non-being. It is concrete being, but not becoming. *Abhāva* is no category. The concrete being by any movement of thought cannot imply a non-being in becoming. Being is the first position in thought which in its inception at once grasps its concrete character. It may demand an analytic and a subsequent synthetic movement to understand itself and its attributes in difference and identity, but thought this wise has no reference to *abhāva* or non-being. Non-being has a presupposition of being and can refer to a concrete reality, but never to Reality or Being. In this Rāmānuja's dialectic is an improvement upon Hegel. In Rāmānuja's dialectic the analytic activity of thought has a reference to attributes, which, in the synthetic activity, is grouped into the concrete being. In the

expression of self-conscious activity there is no dialectic of opposites—affirmation and negation; it is the dialectic of affirmation and distinction, and the synthesis is a concrete concept. Distinction may imply a difference, but a difference is a position, not a denial. The thesis of affirmation is made concrete in the synthesis by reference to this distinction, but for which both become abstract and, in Croce's term, pseudo-concepts. The underlying logical principle is the law of identity and not contradiction. In fact, Rāmānuja has denied all reference to contradiction. In him as much as in Śaṅkara identity is the fundamental principle, though he cannot accept an absolute identity but institutes in its place a concrete identity which implies distinction and determination, but not negation. The affirmation is made determinate affirmation by distinction, and in determination both affirmation and distinction are assimilated and unified. In this Rāmānuja's attempt is better than attempts at a dialectic fusion of opposites.

This topic has a bearing on the doctrine of experience. The real self-conscious experience, is, according to Rāmānuja, concrete. It is not below or beyond relations. Experience is a unity, be it immediate experience or Absolute experience. Self-consciousness is the *locus standi*, and in self-consciousness the duality of subject and object is the essential characteristic of experience. Self-consciousness is a relational and unitive consciousness. And whenever these characteristics are wanting, we have no experience and no self-conscious intuition. Jīva Gosvāmi does not go so far. He insists that immediate experience is non-relational. Though the determinate consciousness builds up a relational and unitive consciousness on this basis, still the immediate is not and cannot be relational.

Jīva Gosvāmī conceives a 'this' and a 'that' in experience. The former is simple affirmation beyond all terms of relation, the latter is definite perception with reference to relation. 'This' is a mere affirmation, something felt, but not cognized. It is the psychological minimum, and it emerges in definite consciousness as 'that' with all determinates of thought-consciousness. Jīva Gosvāmī has two stages of simple apprehension and definite cognition in experience. He breaks with Rāmānuja in holding that relational consciousness appears in a definite stage which presupposes a non-relational homogeneous basis. Experience then has an indeterminate stage. He begins with an immediate apprehension in which relational differences are not apparent. He admits that differential concepts are developed in it. An apprehension then is incomplete knowledge which reaches a higher and a complete being with the cognition of relations.

This non-relational apprehension is certainly not self-conscious experience and has not its determinate unity and continuity, for the idea of unity implies the working of a relational consciousness. The indeterminate apprehension is then a stage which is below experience involving a distinct sense of subject and object and a subjective construction and an objective reference.

This simple apprehension strictly defies understanding. Jīva Gosvāmī calls it *Nirvikalpa*, a homogeneity out of which the relations and differences emerge—a homogeneity called indeterminate because its concrete implications are not in sight. Jīva Gosvāmī recognizes a development of psychological consciousness from simple apprehension to definite perception and accepts them both as stages in psychological consciousness. Rāmānuja does not recognize simple apprehension,

though he accepts stages in perceptual consciousness, partial and complete. Rāmānuja's psychological minimum is determinate cognition, an incomplete judgment. Jīva's psychological minimum is simply apprehension. Though Jīva accepts simple apprehension as the basis of relational and determinate consciousness, still he never implies that determinate consciousness is opposed to simple apprehension. It is a stage leading on to determinate consciousness.

In this character, it is certainly not the intuition of the Śāṅkarites which transcends the duality of the subject and object and the concrete unity of self-consciousness. In Jīva Gosvāmī the indeterminate apprehension is involved in self-consciousness. In Śāṅkara self-consciousness is denied in indeterminate cognition. In Jīva Gosvāmī, the indeterminate cognition is one in which the dialectic diversity and unity have not as yet been developed, in Śāṅkara, it has no character and no dialectic development. It is the denial of the dialectic thought and consciousness, or in other words indeterminate cognition (Brahman) in Śāṅkara is the abstract apprehension, in Jīva Gosvāmī it is the nascent thought. The immediacy in Śāṅkara is the immediacy of intuition, the immediacy of Jīva Gosvāmī is the immediacy of an implicit notion.

In the dialectic mode of thought, thought posits simple cognition and concrete differences as two abstractions and unifies them in a determinate cognition. The dialectic move is more clearly marked in Jīva Gosvāmī than in Rāmānuja, who immediately sets up the determinate character of a notion and has not referred to its implicit character in the first act of position. In its very first inception thought cannot understand its relational unity, but posits itself as an implicit notion, a

bare cognition which acquires through reference a clear determinate character. This marks out the difference between Rāmānuja and Jīva Gosvāmī. Rāmānuja's denial of this nascent thought and his affirmation of consciousness-activity as concrete self-reflection makes his position and dialectic somewhat different from Jīva Gosvāmī. Jīva Gosvāmī's position seems to be better here, for thought in the last stage of its dialectic move brings out its complete concrete character, which in its initial stage, supposes an indeterminate character. The dialectic makes the indeterminate determinate. In Rāmānuja the determinate thought is made more explicit. Implicit notions are notions to Jīva Gosvāmī, they are not notions to Rāmānuja. A notion to Rāmānuja cannot be implicit.

In the history of thought the concept of difference has been a riddle. Rāmānuja and Jīva Gosvāmī, as shown above, have assimilated difference in identity and the resultant consciousness is a dialectic unity.

But can this difference be exactly determinate and assimilated in self-conscious experience? The dialectic of the Śaṅkarites has been essentially the negative art of refuting all relational and differential conceptions. Thought, in positing a thesis and in pointing to an anti-thesis, is certainly positing not only one difference but a manifold of differences involving a string of differences, separating one from another. And since differences are distinctions they cannot be synthesized in a higher unity. Unity defies logical determination. It is not identity, nor difference, nor their combination, for evidently a combination, this way, is not possible. The adjectival predication also connotes difference, difference posits a reference and a relation. To understand the relation as a relation implies a difference, and this again, implies

a reference. This is, no doubt, a circle. Difference distinguishes, separates, but does not unify, nor does it make a demand of unification, for to understand difference, thought demands a reference only, but not an identity. Unity and difference are apparently reconciled, but in theistic logic unitive consciousness truly defies logical determination. It is indefinite in theistic logic. The differences are either assimilated or not. If they are assimilated, they are no longer differences; if not, they exist as differences. The former abolishes them, the latter makes the synthesis impossible. It may be argued that assimilation is not absorption; true, but the retention of the individuality makes out the difference. In fact, the concept of difference is a puzzle in metaphysics. Exact determination of this assimilation is not possible nor clear.

In Vedāntic literature *bheda* is conceived either as *svarūpa* or *dharma*. The *svarūpa-bheda* is a non-relational integral existence. It does not require the invariable objective reference. *Dharma-bheda* is immanent and does require an objective reference, generally called *pratiyogi*. The consciousness of *svarūpa-bheda* is immediate, that of *dharma-bheda* mediate, inasmuch as the knowledge of *bheda* does not or does acquire an outward reference.

The Śāṅkara Vedāntists point out that the conception either of *svarūpa* or of *dharma-bheda* does not stand logical scrutiny. *Svarūpa-bheda* is an impossibility. The very concept of *bheda* is definite, and definiteness connotes determinateness. The determinate concept must bring in outward reference and limitation, which destroy its transcendent and absolute character. An absolute *bheda* in transcendent isolation is a contradiction in terms and inconceivable,

Bheda must necessarily be relational and immanent, and even of this relational and immanent conception, we cannot make a logical and categorical determination. A bheda must be different from what it distinguishes, this difference, again, leads on to another, and this to an infinite regress. The simultaneity in perception of bheda and its object do not give any relief. Anyhow the conception of bheda must end in accepting an endless series of differences. The conception of bheda is, therefore, not logically clear.¹

In absolute monistic Vedāntism māyā is an important category. Māyā, avidyā and ajñāna are often names used for the same thing, though in māyā the dynamic and the creative aspect is more predominant, and in avidyā and ajñāna, the epistemological function of screening the identity-consciousness is more prominent. But these minor differences apart, the Śaṅkarites accept it (1) as relatively real, distinct from the Absolute reality, (2) as having no definite beginning, and therefore co-existing with the Absolute, (3) as positive distinguished from abhāva or negation, (4) as opposed to knowledge, and (5) as vanishing in knowledge. These characters are almost universally accepted by Śaṅkarites. It is a continuous existence, beginning-less but not necessarily endless.

The real difficulty in the conception of māyā begins here, for it is opposed to common logic. To conceive the end of an existence, however apparent, that has no beginning is a strain upon thought. No definite conception can be formed of it, and as such it is characterized as both real and non-real, different from reality as well as from complete unreality. Such a position the

¹ Vide *Śrutyanta Suradruma*, p. 68 (*Bheda and Abheda*).

Śaṅkarites categorically accept, and even if the last character is denied, the Absolute identity does not suffer for it is ever what it is ; the continuity of the empiric order does not affect its being, it is completely transcendent. The Absolute is quite impersonal and māyā is not related to it, though in finite consciousness it appears as located in it. Māyā has an influence upon jīva which is, again, a reflection and not a reality. When the Śaṅkarites characterize māyā as both being and non-being, what they exactly mean is that because it appears and causes appearance, it is not a negation or non-being ; and because its appearance and itself die out when the locus-identity is apprehended it is not exactly being. Non-being and being are mutually opposed, māyā is non-being transcendentally and being empirically. It is not therefore the Hegelian becoming, the synthesis of being and non-being. Plato's matter, Sāṅkhya's prakṛti and the Vaiṣṇavites' māyā are positive realities. Śaṅkara's māyā is posited and consequently denied and does not belong to the same category of being. Madhusūdana says it is positive, but not truth. It has the appearance of existence, but not existence in reality. In order to be false, it should necessarily appear as real. A false concept is a concept, but not nothingness. Falsity has a character. Śaṅkara's Vedāntism following the psychological instinct does not deny the appearance in a certain level of consciousness, though it cannot form a definite conception of it; māyā eludes categorical determination. It is an indefinite concept. Though logically such nebulous character of māyā cannot be denied, still Vedāntism here follows the affirmation of psychological experience and accepts such a category because its affirmation and denial are facts of experience. Psychological revelations have in Śaṅkara's Vedāntism

greater weight than logical determination. In fact, the logic of Vedāntism has followed the lead of psychic experience. Though the demand of thought may not be satisfied, yet the fact of experience on that ground cannot be denied or minimized, and when a choice is to be made, certainly our experiences have a greater demand upon our consideration than thought concepts, for the former are of immediate and the latter of mediate consciousness.

CHAPTER V

THE CREATIVE ORDER

The true character of Vedāntism—Self-revelation of Īśvara to humanity—Psychological revelation superior to logical systematization—Creative expression in Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja—The account of Evolution in Śaṅkara and Śaṅkarites—Three stages in consciousness—The construction of saṃskāras and the construction of will—The elements of Evolution—The account of Evolution—Pañcikaṇṇa—Prāṇa—The account of conscious life and organs of relation—The five-fold sheath—Hiranyagarva—Taijasa—Īśvara—Prājña—The theistic account of Evolution—Expression and Evolution—Revelation through self and revelation through Nature—Cosmology of the Vaiṣṇavas—The account of creative expression in Nitya-Bibhūti—The conception of Vyūha—Vibhāvas—Avatāra or incarnation—Kinds of Avatāra—The account of creative expression, in Madhava, Nimvārka—The scheme of Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā—Of the Rāmānujists—Of the Madhvites—Of Nimvārka—Of Vallabha.

Both systems of Vedāntic thought draw their inspiration from the Sruti or the Upaniṣads; and in our discourse, especially on Creation, we must not forget that Vedāntism, from its aphoristic to its systematic and methodical treatment, has never freed itself from the supremacy and infallibility of the revelations of the Śruti. And Vedāntism may be rightly characterized as intellectual effort logically pursued to understand what is conveyed to humanity from Īśvara in the highest intuitions and self-opening. This character of Vedāntism has not been denied by any teacher from Vādarāyana to Jīva Gosvāmī. Indeed, we lose the inner meaning of the Vedāntic discipline if we forget for a moment that it is not only intellectual effort expressed in a system or

systems, but an effort to appreciate and synthesize the spiritual experiences as revealed in the texts. However much the commentators differ amongst themselves in the interpretation of the texts, none can deny their importance, and so long as their explanation or reasoning does not conform to the proper significance of the texts, the reasoning cannot be accepted. And naturally it is so, for the Vedāntic teachers have put more credence in the direct psychological revelations than in the mediate discursive thinking. Though in the later Vedāntism the logical effort has been intensive, still it has always sought confirmation in psychological revelation. The Vedāntic attempt in those days may appear dogmatic, but it must be confessed that the method of procedure, of which science makes so much, is the least important thing in the attainment of truth. The scientific demand of a methodical thinking is also subservient to the great end, the Light of Truth, and the search for truth has not had and should not have its paths confined and limited. Direct experience, not through the senses but through inner revelation cannot be, and has never been, neglected in the pursuit of truth and the facts thus acquired are facts in the totality of experience. Vedāntism is based upon such facts, which, later on, have been reduced to a system by the understanding and its concepts. Vedāntism is not dogmatism, it is intuitionism. In all its forms, it accepts the possibility of immediately apprehending truth, though this immediate realization has been sought to be established by a long process of reasoning.

And in the details of creation Vedāntism clearly perceives that logical thinking cannot go beyond certain fundamental concepts and has naturally to accept the authority of the Śruti in its affirmations; for these are based upon direct experience. In the cosmogony

therefore, we are to depend almost wholly upon the account given in the Śruti and its interpretations. No commentator has advanced any theory of his own, but has mainly followed the traditional account. And the problem here is of facts, and not of systematization, and naturally one has to depend upon the direct experiences revealed in the different grades of consciousness.

Here again, the two types of thought have divergent explanations of the Śruti texts, to conform their ideas of creation or evolution to epistemological and metaphysical settings. The Upaniṣads have a picture of creation, and they give us an impression that the becoming is the expression of the divine. The cosmos is a movement of the spirit in itself. It is the cyclic movement of the divine consciousness in space and time. It is an expression of 'Bliss.' It is not creation, but an expression, or more properly, an emanation, but an emanation which is periodical and has lapses in time, in cosmic pralaya. The world comes out in the process of self-alienation of Brahman. So far the Vedāntists agree. The ancient teachers of the Vedāntism think that this self-alienation takes place through māyā, the creative Śakti of Brahman.

Strictly speaking, all types of Vedāntism deny the dualism of the Sāṃkhya, and in its place institute monism in accepting the subordination of the creative potency and characterizing it as inherent in Brahman. It is called Śakti. This Śakti has at once distinguished Vedāntic conception of creation from the doctrine of special creation as well as from mechanical evolution. Vedāntism accepts evolution or eternal creation. This is true in a general way. But the basic difference of the static and dynamic conception has introduced elements, which have divided Vedāntists even on creative evolution.

Śaṅkara's system, so long as it accepts a statico-dynamic reality—and it accepts it in empirical sense—maintains the creative effort of Brahman as an effort of Bliss. It is an effort of self-expression of the Absolute under the conditions of space, time and causality.

Rāmānuja and the theistic teachers would accept the cosmic evolution as an effort of self-transformation of māyā as energized by Brahman. Creative order must be conceived as issuing out of Brahman in association with māyā and the dynamic effort must have a place in our conception of the Absolute. Even Śaṅkara and the Śaṅkarites cannot avoid this. But the basic distinction of the static and dynamic character of Being immediately introduces a difference in the cosmic conception. The rigid logical goal of Śaṅkara's system will be the denial of the cosmic evolution or involution, for the dynamic conception of life and experience has been overshadowed by the extreme transcendentalism of the static Absolute. Śaṅkara's system is practically a denial of the immanent experience, and all that is revealed in it except the transcendent intuition. Cosmology has been merged in epistemology and ontology identified with it.

Different is the cast of thought in Rāmānuja and theistic teachers. Theirs is the affirmation of experience, in its totality, immanent through nature and its operation, transcendent through spirit and its revelation. Cosmology, here, has as much importance as epistemology, for if epistemology is the dynamic expression of Being to itself and finite consciousness, cosmology is the expression of Being through nature to finite selves. Or in other words, we can characterize the process of knowledge and the process of evolution as the expression of the same effort of self-revelation through consciousness

and nature. Rāmānuja calls one the expression, the other the creative transformation. Madhva, Jīva Gosvāmī and Nimbārka have no difference with him in this. Vallabha has not drawn this distinction; to him the cosmic creative effort is also a self-expression. He does not, strictly speaking, maintain any creative transformation. To him the cosmic evolution and involution are processes of self-expression and self-withdrawal of the Absolute to and from human vision. Ignorance works out a barrier to psychic vision and the process appears as transformation of prakṛti, the divided vision no longer perceives the cosmos in the effulgence of the infinite Life and Light, but at once takes it as an effort of an outer force inherent in the prakṛti. Vallabha's cosmology has, therefore, a greater inwardness than Rāmānuja's, and, in fact, in him we cannot draw a distinction between his epistemology and cosmology, for he does not recognize any other effort but self-expression.¹ His philosophy has, therefore, been rightly characterized as the Śuddha-advaitavāda, pure monism, as distinguished from the absolute monism of Śaṅkara and the modified monism of Rāmānuja. From Śaṅkara he differs in accepting the dynamic conception of spirit and experience, from Rāmānuja in rejecting an additional hypothesis of an inert dynamic force besides the supreme self-conscious dynamic reality and stress. Now to begin the separate account :

(1) Śaṅkara and the Śaṅkarites : We have here three theories. The most extreme form holds the pure transcendence of intuition and denies all doctrine of creation or evolution. In the opening of transcendental vision, a stage is reached, whence we cannot feel or see

¹ Vide Discussion on *Avikṛta Parināma-vāda*.

the manifold of creation. It is the end of the highest effort of denial, the denial of the concepts and fundamental notions of the practical reason. And when the Great Denial is complete, the conviction is soon established that not only are the intuitions of practical reason false and the cosmos illusory, but they do not and did never, exist. The illusoriness of existence is still some form of Being; it has an appearance. But Vedāntism in its highest effort of realization does not hesitate to deny this character of appearance even to the cosmic manifold. It not only denies it, it does not recognize it at all. Denial presupposes a prior acceptance or assertion. It denies denial and assertion both and is still in the quiet of transcendence. This state is designated as the transcendent and non-creative plane, Ajāta Star.

(2) Next comes the stage of pure percipience which does not attach any objectivity to the manifold. It is a subjective creation. It exists only in the form of *dr̥sti*. It is an appearance and as appearance it is not independent of *percipi* or percipience. The notions of practical reason are mere notions or concepts, corresponding to which nothing exists, for nothing has existence beyond consciousness. To think that anything outside exists, or to lend to subjective concepts and notions an objective color, is to invert the true order and is a psychological illusion. Pure percipience in its highest stretch can only see the immanence of certain fundamental concepts in intuition, which as intuition surely transcends them. The intuitions of practical reason have not in this stage pragmatic significance. They have not as yet acquired it. They are there as mere empirical intuitions, fundamental psychological notions of which no mind is free. But they are still

notions floating eternally in the ether of consciousness and we must characterize them as *notions* of empiric consciousness and apart from empiric consciousness these have no reality. This pure percipience sometimes feels its transcendence as witness, sometimes feels it not. But in any case it does not see the extramentality and objectivity of the psychic manifold. Hence Prakāśānanda says, 'The wise consider the world as identical with consciousness, the ignorant as something objective.' Nothing is objective, nothing is real, save and except pure percipience. Percipi is the being of *esse*. Drṣṭi is sṛṣṭi. Confined within empirical intuitions this high intellectual isolation denies will and its activity and does not recognize anything besides these intuitions. The creativeness of will is denied, that of imagination is accepted. And as such the demand of will is neither felt nor perceived.

(3) Next comes the stage of practical reason, wherein the dynamic vision of life and consciousness is felt and accepted. But such a vision according to Śaṅkara and his followers is the effect of avidyā, the creation of nescience. Here the commonsense concept of jīva, Īśvara and prakṛti, the three fundamental intuitions of practical reason, are more definite in vision as centres of energy and activity. At this level of consciousness, will plays the most important part and darkened by nescience, the sense of a divided-consciousness with all the implications of such a life accepts the objectivity and reality of the manifold, for will has its satisfaction and natural fulfilment in a plane admitting of the realization of ends yielding satisfaction to the divided self-forgotten individuated consciousness. The wonder is that not a moment is lost to construct a world acceptable to will, and this construction becomes

complete in the hierarchy of ends. When we designate this plane of existence as the construction of will, we do not mean this to be an unconscious or individual will. The individual will is the reflection of the cosmic will and the cosmic will must have the enlightenment of consciousness. We mean specially this, for the becoming is a continuity in *māyā* energized by *Īśvara*. And so long as the dynamic experience predominates, the triple intuitions of *jīva*, *Īśvara* and *māyā* are necessary implications of will and its affirmation. Willing is energizing and energizing for a purpose. *Īśvara* has no purpose of its own, it must energize, therefore, for something else. And that is *jīva*. The spontaneous flow of life, goodness and knowledge must be, therefore, a purposeless activity with *Īśvara* but full of meaning and purpose to *jīva*; the more it feels the pulse of the spontaneous flow, the more it has the width of vision, serenity of life, and the purity of delight.

This construction of will may have two implications, (1) Subjective, and (2) Objective. The world may be taken as an outcome of pragmatic necessity, affording a pragmatic satisfaction, apparently objective, but in truth it is a subjective imaginary construction of the subjective will. Viewed this way the whole construction, strictly speaking, is still ideal; the touch of will makes the ideal appear as real. This ideal construction of will differs from the ideal construction of notions and concepts, and consequently the vision and perspective of the *sākṣī*, the percipient, are totally different from the promptings of the will-self. The former has a wise passiveness when it views the construction of *saṃskāra* and understands itself as transcendent Intuition. The groupings of *saṃskāras* can give us at best quite an illusory construction which has an ideality, but no reality. The

ideal volitional construction because of the stress and effort it involves has not the airiness of the empirical construction, but the reality and actuality of stress and dynamism. And the agent is here not only a percipient or a seer, but the logos of activity and wisdom.

Now this logos-will may have an existence different from or identical with individual will. To put it in Vedāntic terminology we may either conceive Īśvara to be a jīva, still different from the lesser and minor jīvas or install jīva in the place of Īśvara and leave aside Īśvara as an unnecessary and additional hypothesis. Jīva is dependent and Īśvara independent; jīva is controlled by, Īśvara controls, māyā. And rightly it is so, for in dynamic conception, that which regulates the stress has a superior power and intelligence than that which is regulated. But in the Vedāntism of Saṃkara there is no absolute difference between the two; with the expansion of being and intelligence—a possibility which is accepted by Vedāntists and inherent in the dynamic conception, the jīva acquires the Īśvara-hood, for it can transcend māyā and can reflect the entire cosmos. Saṃkara Vedāntism does not draw, like Rāmānuja, any absolute distinction between jīva and Īśvara. It is properly a distinction of the upādhi and not like the theists, a distinction of Being or reality. And the distinction of the upādhi is not an eternal distinction and can be with an effort set aside; for what after all constitutes the upādhi of jīva and Īśvara is the same māyā and its modification. Those teachers of Vedāntism who maintain the modes of māyā as upādhi and make the distinction between jīva and jīva and between jīva and Īśvara completely lose sight of the fact that māyā is dynamism and a categorical division of

parts is therein inconceivable. Māyā forms centres of forces and what is reflected therein is termed jīva, because of its limitation in being and knowledge. But these centres have the capacity of expansion as well as contraction, and with this the reflection therein will acquire a wide or a limited vision or being as the case may be or in other words they will be Īśvara or jīva. Thus the distinction between them is not basic and immovable. And we may further go and say that the same being is jīva and Īśvara at the same time; the same is the locus and the object of māyā; when the locus, it is jīva, when the object, Īśvara. The Īśvara is then jīva, the jīva, a Īśvara. The distinction arises from different angles of vision.

A contention may arise that such a theory would establish a multiplicity of Īśvara which would disturb the harmony of creation and the unity of purpose revealed in it.

This apprehension is groundless. Multiplicity of Gods would have been the consequence if the particular upādhi of the jīva in its divided dimension continued existing. But the elasticity of the upādhi makes it possible for the jīva to attain a larger vision and an expansive being, or in other words the condition of the jīvattva is removed. The jīva-hood is dead. Īśvara becomes revealed or manifest. The being of Īśvara is undivided and integral. In this process the jīva perceives the reality of Īśvara and is completely lost in it. If it continues to retain its individual existence for some time it never loses sight of the being of Īśvara everywhere, including its ownself. But a complete transformation takes place; he is no longer an agent of active initiation, but a passive medium, an outlet through which the divinity works out and reveals its purpose.

Indeed, the expansive being and vision have killed the outwardness and limitation of being, and in its stead established the truth of a single dynamic principle. Even those who hold the division of avidyā-units, cannot avoid the conclusion of the jīva projecting and constructing a world of its own, though in this theory we shall have a number of subjective universes. And in it there is nothing objective—an Īśvara, or a created universe. Īśvara is an illusory concept of the exoteric consciousness, and has no place in the scheme of theoretical concepts. And the whole experience, theoretical or practical, is the illusory construction of avidyā-units. Here in the dynamic concept of an integral māyā has given way to the concept of divided avidyā and therefore, the objective construction and meaning of the former has been replaced by a subjective construction and meaning of the latter.

We can speak of the creative evolution from the view-point which accepts the reality of Īśvara, jīva and māyā. The creative evolution is an effort of will, the primal will, to manifest itself. This will-construction is essentially different from the subjective will-projections. And in this sense only can we speak of the identity of *causa materia* and *causa efficiens*. Cosmology, in Vedānta, must necessarily accept an individuating dynamic and a guiding or constructing principle. The former is māyā, the latter is Īśvara, or simply we should regard evolution as the self-projection of Īśvara, a giving up of a part of its being; for Vedānta, unlike Sāṃkhya, maintains only one reality as the cause of the cosmic evolution, and so long as the transcendent intuition does not dawn upon us, we must explain the world-process as the history of self-expression in Bliss. The

development of the world process has a history of its own from eternity inasmuch as it is controlled by a law and reveals an order. The history repeats itself in the successive cyclic movement.

And for this, the Vedāntin accepts the sumtotal of karma forming the destined course of a particular cycle. But karma, the creative *adrṣta*, is a tendency acquired in the previous cyclic movement. But the karmic potencies are blind and cannot work out the potentialities, unless creation has its initial start and inception from Īśvara in his *prāthamic vikṣaṇa*, the first glance. The *adrṣta* is the aggregate of creative potencies, empirically eternal, though these potencies are the resultants of previous karma. Evolution is, therefore, controlled by an unseen formative principle which works out unconsciously, but none the less surely. But this unconscious effort of karma is regulated in the proper channel by the light of consciousness which controls it from within. Karma is inert, and so long as it does not receive the necessary sanction of Īśvara it is helpless and cannot have its fruition. Karma is subordinate to Īśvara, just like *māyā*; and this subordination has saved Vedāntism from the charge of dualism. The Vedāntism of Śaṅkara accepts the *vivartta sṛṣṭi*, according to the transcendental method, and the *pariṇāma sṛṣṭi*, according to the empirical method. In the later Vedāntism the former has been accentuated and drawn to its logical conclusion of denying the reality of the creative order and reducing it to the *saṃskāras* or psychoses. In the ancient Vedāntism, notably in the Upaniṣads, and in some neo-Vedāntic authors, we have an account of the *pariṇāma sṛṣṭi* of *māyā* as energized by Īśvara. We now follow the account.

The Picture of Creation.

In the beginning of a particular cycle or round of evolution, the entire world is covered up by death as the result of the periodical reabsorption of the world in Brahman. The elements, again, gradually emerge out of the state of absorption, and this may be called the evolution of the particular order. In the state of absorption we have only two elements closely mixed up, Brahman and māyā in equilibrium. Evolution is indicative of the disturbance in the temporary equilibrium. The creative power of Brahman, the seed-forces of things, the individual souls existing in their subtle bodies are all confused together and absorbed in Brahman.

(1) *As drawn up in the 'Vedānta Paribhāṣā' and the 'Siddhāntavindu.'*

The moment the temporary calm is disturbed by a necessity from within, there appear on the scene five elements. Brahman, conceived as creating or evolving from within, is called Parameśvara. The creative order has two aspects, the causal and the effectual. The causal aspect consists in Brahman's desiring to manifest, whence māyā is set to evolve from within, first of all, the five elements. Parameśvara is called Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva in reference to its upādhi. When Parameśvara has māyā in its causal aspect with sattva predominating as its upādhi, it is called Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu preserves the order. When Parameśvara has māyā in its causal aspect with rajas predominating as its upādhi, it is called Brahmā. Brahmā creates the order. When Parameśvara has māyā in its causal aspect with tamas predominating as its upādhi, it is called Śiva or Rudra. Rudra destroys the order. Māyā is the principle of

becoming or evolution. Evolution supposes dissolution. But this dissolution presupposes a state of growth and its continuity. Parameśvara, viewed in these different perspectives, is represented as the trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva.¹

Parameśvara is the direct author of the five elements, the līṅga or causal body, and Hiranyagarva. The authorship of the world of concrete effects—the order of nāma and rūpa—the world of finite modes—is ascribed to Hiranyagarva who energizes the cosmic elements and starts the process of quintuplication.

(2) *As Drawn up in the 'Pañcadaśī.'*

In the state of quiescence a change suddenly arises owing to the will of Brahman to express itself, and simultaneously the equilibrium of indeterminate māyā is broken. The primordial matter at once comes to a state of determinate existence owing to the break up and division of its constituent elements, sattva, rajas and tamas. When Brahman accepts māyā as its upādhi and informs it, especially when it selects māyā in its sātत्वic element as its upādhi, it becomes Īśvara. Brahman in association with this sattva is all-knower, as everything is clearly reflected in its intelligence which is free from coarser element. Īśvara

¹ Vide *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

Tatra Parameśvarasya pañcatanmātrātyutpattou saptaśāśvayavopeta-līṅgaśarīrotpattou ca Hiranyagarvasthūlaśarīrotpattou ca sākṣātkattīrtvam ; itaranikhilāprapañcotpattou ca Hiranyagarvadvārā Hiranyagarvo nāma mūrtitrayādanyaḥ prathamō jīvaḥ.

Vide *Siddhāntavindu*, p. 170, Kumraghona edition

Tatresvaro'pi trividaḥ. Svopādhibhūtāvidyāguṇatraya bhedena Viṣṇu-Brahma-Rudra-bhedāt. Kāraṇībhūta-sattvagunāvacchino viṣṇuḥ pālayitā, kāraṇībhūtaraajāupahito brahmā sraṣṭā. Hiranyagarvastu mahābhūta-kāra-nātvābhāvāt na Brahmā, tathāpi sthūlabhūta-sraṣṭītvāt kvacit brahmet-yupacayyate.

soon discovers the existence of *māyā* in its *tāmasic* aspect, which it energises and, as the result thereof, originates the elements of nature. We may regard this as the *aparā* (the lower) *prakṛti* of *Īśvara*, who by his *parā* can freely relate himself to *aparā* without being in any way determinated by it. This attribute of freely moving and relating himself to the *aparā* is a nature essential to *Īśvara*. This capacity of freely moving is called *parā*.

This gives us the material cause and the efficient cause in the conception of the *aparā prakṛti* and *parā prakṛti* of *Īśvara*. In fact, *māyā* is never completely independent, it is being energized by *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* as energizing and moulding the *aparā* by its own *parā* is characterized as predominant in *rājasic* element.

Brahman enveloped in *śuddha sattva* is *Īśvara*, and its chief attribute is intelligence and clear vision. This makes clear to us the sense in which the Vedāntists generally ascribe intellectual intuition¹ to *Īśvara*. He sees things rightly and truly, for his vision is never dim.

The *aparā prakṛti* lies at the root of the five subtle elements. It originates the ether, the air, the fire, the water and the earth at the command of *Īśvara*. These elements are pure and simple being free from any intermixture with one another.²

It conceived the idea, I will become many. I will propagate myself. So it created fire, this fire conceived the idea, I will become many, it created food.³

The *Taittirīya śruti* has it: *ākāśa* is first originated from the self-alienation of Brahman. *Vāyu* originates from *ākāśa*, *tejas* from *vāyu*, *āp* from

¹ *Svarūpataḥ pratyakṣaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ ca.*

² Vide *Pañcadaśī*.

³ Vide *Chāndogya*.

tejas, earth from āp. These are the five elements, often called sūkṣmabhūtas or subtle matter. These sūkṣmabhūtas are homogeneous matter. They originate in continuous succession. They are very subtle and do not admit of any use.¹

Vedāntism does not maintain the atomicity of matter. These elements of matter have distinctive qualities; ākāśa is instinct with sound, vāyu with energy, teja with the energy or heat and light, āp with the energy of exciting taste, earth with the potency of effecting smell.

The Order of Cosmic Evolution.

From subtle, matter originates the gross matter the sthūlabhūtas, generally called, the mahābhūtas. All the five sūkṣmabhūtas are elements in the composition of each mahābhūta. The gross matter, or more properly, the compound matter is evolved out of subtle matter by the process, known as pañcīkaraṇa. These mahābhūtas imbibe in them the distinctive qualities of the sūkṣmabhūtas and soon begin to manifest them. Ākāśa manifests sounds; vāyu, sound and energy; teja, sound, energy, heat and light; āp, sound, energy, heat and light and the capacity of affecting taste; earth, sound, energy, heat and light, and the capacity of affecting taste and smell.² Authorities

¹ *Parasmāt ātmanaḥ sukāśāt anukramena jātāni tāni ca atisūkṣmāṇi vyāvahārākṣamāṇi.* (Pañcīkaraṇa Vivaraṇa, Vedānta Manuscript, No. 46, Sanskrit College Library).

² Vide *Vedāntasāra*, p. 63.

Tadānīm ākāṣe śavdaḥ avibhajyate, vāyau śavdasparśau, agnau śavdasparśarūpāṇi, jale śavdasparśarūparasāḥ, pṛthivyāṁ śavdasparśarūparasagandhāśca,

seem to differ on this point. Sureśvarācārya appears to have ascribed these qualities to sūkṣmabhūtas.¹

The Pañcadasī has also accepted the distinction of the sūkṣmabhūtas and the mahābhūtas and ascribed these qualities to the mahābhūtas.² Vidvatmanaraṇjanī traces the origin of pañcatanmātra in continuous succession from abyākṛta. From these tanmātras originate the mahābhūtas, which manifest different qualities. The later Vedāntists seem to have been influenced by the Sāṃkhya scheme of division of the tanmātras and the mahābhūtas.

We have seen already that Vedāntism does not accept the hypothesis of atomicity of matter. Still the origin of mahābhūtas, out of the five homogeneous elements by pañcīkaraṇa, would suppose the disintegration in different proportions of each element and the consequent integration of them as complexes. Nothing new is originated thiswise, for the mahābhūtas are not something entirely different from the sūkṣmabhūtas. They are non-different from the causes, just as a piece of cloth is non-different from the threads. The sūkṣmabhūtas become mahābhūtas by an inherent necessity through pañcīkaraṇa. Vedāntism combines in it the doctrines of vivartta, pariṇāma, and ārambha. The creative order is the vivartta of Brahman, pariṇāma of Brahman as informing māyā; the sthūla-bhūtas, including mahābhūtas, are effects of the subtle elements originated from ātman—effects in the sense of transfigu-

¹ Vide *Pañcīkaraṇa Vārttika* by Sureśvara.

Āstidekaṃ param brahma nityamuktamabikriyam. . . .

Śaṁdasparśarūparasa guṇairāṣṣaturguṇāḥ.

Śaṁdasparśarūparasagandhaiḥ pañcaguṇā mahī.

Tevyah sambhabat sūtram līgaṃ sarvātmakaṃ mahat.

² Vide *Bhūtaviveka*, ch. i.

ration and not complete transformation of causes. Here is the trace of Ārambhavāda.¹ The physical cosmos composed of fourteen kingdoms of existences (seven higher, seven lower), the stock of provisions, the physical bodies of all creations have come out of the mahābhūtas.

The Process of Pañcīkaraṇa.

The process of combination is called pañcīkaraṇa, five-fold combination. This process of quintuplication is hinted at in the Chāndogya in the doctrine of Trivītkaraṇa, three-fold combination, or triplication (i.e. the subtle elements of tejas, āp and earth are compounded by the process of triplication). But, later on, in the Pañcadaśī and other works on Vedānta, it is carried to its proper conclusion in the doctrine of pañcīkaraṇa, for the original elements are five and not three.

But Vācaspati and the author of Kalpataru have broken away from the traditional theory of pañcīkaraṇa and lent a support to the doctrine of trivītkaraṇa. They seem to suppose that ākāśa and vāyu are elements which cannot enter into the process of differentiation and combination. They are the material support where upon the three elements by the process of triplication bring out the mass of concrete existences.²

¹ Vide *Vālabodhinī*.

Tasmāt tantubhyaḥ atiriktaḥ na pataḥ, kintu saṃyogaviśeṣaṃ āpannāḥ tattva eva pataḥ lāghavāt, atiriktatve mānābhābāt ca, evaṃ apañcīkṛtāni api pañcīkaraṇātmake saṃyogaviśeṣamāpannāni puñcīkṛtāni iti ucyante, natu apañcīkṛtevyāḥ pañcīkṛtānimulpadyante, ātmānaiva ākāśaḥ Atarva tattva-dīpane apañcīkṛtāni prarabdhabaśāt pañcīkṛtatām āpadyante iti uktam.

² Vide *Bhāmali Kalpataru*, *Br. Sūtra*, ii, 3. 1-17, *Br. Sūtra*, ii, 3, 10.

Vide *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 184.

Atra ca trivṛttam trivṛttamekaikāṃ karavāṇtīśruteḥ trivṛtkurvatu pade-śāditi sūtrācca trayāṇāmeva melanapratīteṣca trivṛtkaraṇamevā kecin-manyante.

The five elements soon, after their origin from the aparā-prakṛti, are disintegrated into parts, and these parts again re-combine to form the physical elements, the mahābhūtas. Each sūkṣma element is divided into two equal parts, of which, again, one part is divided into four equal parts. Then follows combination of these parts. When (for example) the one half of ākāśa is integrated with the sub-divisions of the air, the fire, the water, and the earth, i.e. one-half of the ākāśa with one-eighth of other elements, we have the first compound the sthūla ākāśa. Similarly when one-half of the element air is combined with one-eighth of the other elements, we have the second compound substance, air, and so on. In this process we get the five elements in mutual combination; we retain the same designation for each one of them, and the naming follows the predominating element of the combination, e.g. the first combination is called ākāśa or ether, for this element is the chief ingredient in it. These compounds, again, in other forms of integration and differentiation, give rise to the cosmic system comprising the fourteen worlds, seven in the nether region, four in the middle and three in the higher regions. We must confess that Vedāntism does not clearly explain how regions come to existence in the course of the process of cosmic evolution. We can only presume that the classification of these regions is chiefly due to their elements of composition.¹

The Planes of Existence.

The satya, jñāna and tapa lokas are kingdoms where the life's movement is free, and the soul's

¹ Vide *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 186, *Vedāntasāra*, p. 22.

vision is expansive because of the predominance of sattva over rajas elements in the composition of their being. The finite beings in the upward movement of evolution gradually reach these kingdoms and find rest in the satya whence they cannot fall away because of the acquired purity of their being which has fitted them for dwelling in the higher regions. They enjoy an expansive life. With the re-absorption of the world's process they attain the vision of identity and pass into the silence of existence. These kingdoms by the nature of the rhythmic vibration of the life-current passing through them make it possible for the progressive soul (who happens to reach them) to understand and enjoy a better life, to command a wider vision of truth, for which the soul is a sojourner from eternity. To speak in Vedāntic terminology because of the preponderance of sāt̥tvic element these habitations are full of life, serenity and everything which is the invariable effect of sattva. Here knowledge is intuitive, delight is serene, life is easy.

The lower region is formed out of the combination of component elements in which tamās predominates over other constituent elements. It is, because of this, full of darkness and makes the development of higher life and mentality hardly possible. It is consequently not an ordered system where the regulating life-force can make itself felt. Darkness, ignorance, and confusion prevail all round.

The intermediate state is characterized by the possession of the coarse matter, life and mind. Instead of being a disorderly chaotic mass (as in the lower region) it is a coherent and orderly system of things which makes it a place wherein life can grow and the mind can progressively work. Here life is free and

vision is clearer and more expansive. It is higher in order, because it is richer in life, freedom and delight. In these stages the rajas or active element is predominant. But the movement of freedom in svarloka and maharloka is greater in the sense of receiving higher responses of life than is possible in bhu and bhūbarloka.

Vedānta asserts that out of this process of pañcīkaraṇa, the physical bodies of all beings are created and the indriyas or senses are placed therein. The body, where, the predominant constituent element is sattva, is the physical covering of the deva; where the predominant element is rajas, it is the physical covering of the man; where the chief element is tamas, is the physical covering of lower animals.¹ In this way we can conceive a picture of kingdoms of beings, formed out of the aparā-prakṛti by the five fold combination of the elements.

The being who is conscious of the totality of concrete existence inhabiting the intermediate regions and regards himself as identical with this totality is called vaiśvānara or virāt. The virāt is the waking consciousness. Each unit of existence conscious of its physical covering is called a jīva—man, beast or deva as the case may be, inasmuch as it is conscious of itself as a unit, no matter whether the body is coarse or fine. Each of them is called in Vedāntic terminology a viśva. We read in the Gaudapāda's kārikā—viśva

¹ Vide *Ratnāvalī*, p. 186.

Ūrdhvaṃ gacchanti sattvasthā, madhye tiṣṭhanti rājasāḥ ityādi śrutyā ūrdhvalokānāṃ sāttvikādi puruṣapṛāpyatvokteḥ Sattvādipradhānateti-bhāvaḥ.

Vide *Siddhāntabindu*.

Tatra sattvapradhānaṃ, devaśarīraṃ, rajaḥ pradhānaṃ manuṣyaśarīraṃ, Tamaḥ pradhānaṃ tiryagādi sthāvarantaṃ śarīraṃ.

enjoys the gross physical things (visvāhisthūlabhūtnityam). These beings do not possess knowledge of identity and are, therefore, bound by their actions, good or bad, which determine the course of their existence, high or low. But the life of devotion and knowledge guides them on to the higher universes, whereas the life of action consequent upon the hankering after physical being, is the cause of bondage.

The Origin of Body.

The physical body with its appetites originates out of the mahābhūtas. The gross earth transforms into bone, flesh, nerves, skin and hair, the āp into bile, blood, semen, secretions, and sweat, the tejas into hunger, thirst, sleep, beauty and indolence; the vāyu into contraction, expansion, motion; the ākāśa into spaces of the stomach (belly), heart, neck and head. The author of the *Ajñānabodhinī* has given another alternative that the chief transformation of earth is the bone, of āp is the flesh, of teja the nerves, of vāyu the skin, of ākāśa the hair. The chief element in bile is teja, in sweat vāyu, in blood, earth. Apart from this the organic appetites and states of hunger such as thirst, sleep, anger, indolence, have been explained in this way by the ascription of them to one or more of these elements.¹ We have in the *Chāndogya* an analogous account of the process of nutrition and consequent distribution of different parts of the food throughout the system. This description is based upon the doctrine of trivikarāṇa; e.g., the food we take in is divided into three parts, one part is the refuse matter, the other transforms into flesh, etc., the other and the

¹ Vide *Ajñānabodhinī*, pp. 13-15, *Vedānta Siddhānta Ādarśa*, pp. 53-127.

finest part goes to the formation and growth of manas. It gives a support to the senses. The water we take is transformed into urine, blood and life. The oily substances are transformed into bone, marrow and speech. Manas, prāṇa and speech are supposed to be the finest modification of food, water and oil.¹

Prāṇa.

The word prāṇa has been used in different senses.

(1) Prāṇa is Brahman. All the devas, all the senses carry oblations to Brahman which is prāṇa. Prāṇa is the inmost of being, it exists behind the senses, the manas (Kauṣītaki, chapter 2).

(2) Prāṇa is the cosmic energy. It is the support of the creation.² This prāṇa originates from ātman. The devas, the natural forces and the indriyas derive their capacities and powers from prāṇa.

(3) Śaṅkara holds that prāṇa originates from ātman and it should not be confounded with the mūla prakṛti (na mūla prakṛtiviṣayam, chapters 2, 3, 4).

This prāṇa manifests itself chiefly in two ways :—

(1) as the energy inherent in all natural forces, in everything external :

(2) as the energy inherent in the inner organism, the vital force, the energies of the indriyas and of the active organs.³

The former may be called ādhi-bhūta prāṇa, the latter, ādhyātma prāṇa. Śaṅkara tells us in the commentary on Brhadāraṇyaka that those who worship prāṇa in its limited manifestation acquire a finite life. But those who worship prāṇa as the immanent cosmic

¹ (Chapter VI).

² Vide *Praśna Upaniṣada*, ch. ii.

³ See *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, *Br. Ar.*, ch. 5, *Mantras*, 5, 6, 7, 8, chs. 2 and 3.

life, are meant for eternal life.¹ This cosmic prāṇa, the collective dynamism may be called ādhidaiva.

The Origin of the Five Organs of Action and the Five Prāṇas in Individuals.

We have just seen the account of prāṇa in the cosmic sense. We are to see now how the five organs of action and the five forms of energy (prāṇa) keeping up the vitality of an individual organism are produced. The two are formed out of rājasic constituent of the five elements (sūkṣmabhūtas) individually or collectively. Individually, the rājasic element of the ākāśa is supposed to give support to speech, that of the vāyu, to the hand, that of the teja, to the foot, that of the āp and that of the earth to the lower organs of evacuation and generation respectively. Collectively, they originate the vitality of the organism, which regulates the inner functions. This may be called the individual vivifying principle, the mainstay of the physical frame. It is said in the Sruti, 'when the prāṇa goes out, all senses, including manas, go out, and when prāṇa is within, the others perform their functions regularly'. Prāṇa preserves the physical frame in existence, regulates the entire physiological process and makes the performance of higher functions possible in the physical frame.

The Account of Conscious Life.

The system of conscious life : the origin of the organs of sense and organs of relation (understanding).

¹ Vide *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1. 5. 13 and *Bhāṣya* thereupon, p. 247.
Vide *Bhāmāṇi*, p. 643.

*Yattvasya vibhutvāmnānaṃ tadādhidaivikena sūtrātmanā . . . tvādyātmi-
kena rūpeṇa.*

(1) As to the sense-organs: The Vedāntic psychology conceives *manas* as the central organ of the soul. It is supplied with knowledge of objects through the sense-organs. The sense-organs are the outlets through which the mental consciousness can go out and perceive the external objects.¹ These sense-organs are five in number: the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. They are evolved out of the five elements in their *sāttvic* aspects respectively. Corresponding to these five senses, there are five kinds of perceptions according as their object is sound, touch, form, taste or smell. These are the organs of sensibility supplying the material content of knowledge.

Here, again, the distinctions of *ādhyātma*, *ādhibhūta* and *ādhidaiva* are clearly borne out. The sense-organ is *ādhyātma*, its object is *ādhibhūta*, the corresponding cosmic force is *ādhidaiva*. Vedāntism places side by side the two worlds of subjective and objective orders and the synthetic unity of them in the cosmic life. *Ādhyātma* represents the subjective, *ādhibhūta*, the objective and the *ādhidaiva*, the synthetic or cosmic life. The manifested order is represented as the synthesis of the subjective and the objective in the life of totality. The senses are *ādhyātma*, their objects *ādhibhūta*; *dik*, *vāyu*, *āditya*, *varuṇa*, *aśvini* the corresponding *ādhidaivas*. This distinction has also been extended to the organs of action. The five organs of action—*vak*, hand, feet, the organs of generation and evacuation—are *ādhyātma* corresponding to the respective (1) *ādhibhūtas*—speech, gift, distance, pleasures of generation and evacuation and (2) *ādhidaivas*—*Agni*, *Indra*, *Viṣṇu*, *Prajāpati* or *Brahmā* and Death.² These senses are

¹ (We shall after a few pages give a complete description of the process).

² Vide Suresvara's *Pañcikaraṇa-vārttika*, *Śloka* 12-23.

not outlets through which the inner senses of antaḥkaraṇa go out. Every sense is endowed with power, e.g., the skin, as an indriya, is not the mere outer surface of the body; similarly the eye has the power of receiving the colours of bodies and so on. These capacities are different from the end-organs of the senses, though they are inherent in them.¹

(2) As to the organs of relation: The mind-stuff or antaḥkaraṇa is the inner organ. It is called the eleventh sense. It is to be distinguished from the organs of sense and the organs of action. Its special function is to give us the knowledge of things in succession. It is competent to receive all kinds of sensation.² It has four chief functions. It is divided into four parts, corresponding to the functions. This division is not real, but is merely expressive of its four chief modifications. Each unit of transformation is distinguished from others by a unique quality of its own. The antaḥkaraṇa is the name given to the totality of vṛttis or semi-spiritual functions. Vācaspati asserts that antaḥkaraṇa is one indivisible entity, though it can work in different ways. It preserves its integrity through differences of functions.³ Vedāntism does not lend support to faculty psychology. This antaḥkaraṇa is evolved out of the sāttva of the five elements (the sūkṣmabhūtas), taken collectively. Manas is the faculty of reflection. When the antaḥkaraṇa is in the state of

¹ *Ātmā-anātmāviveka*, pp. 10-12; *Vivaraṇāprameya Saṃgraha*, p. 185, ll. 10-15 (Benares Edition).

Vide *Vivaraṇa Upanaya*.

Na golakānīndriyāṇi nāpīlacchaktayo'pitu, śaktimat dravyarūpāṇi bhoutikānyavibhūni ca.

² Vide *Upadeśasahasrī*, p. 366 (Bengal Edition).

Buddhyārthānyāhuretāni vāk pānyādāni karmane.

Tadvikalpārthamanāḥsihaṃ mana ekādeśaṃ bhabet.

³ Vide *Bhāmāṭī* on *Sr.* 6, ch. 2, 4.

doubt, it is called *manas*. Curiously enough, this *manas* is, on the one hand, regarded as the central organ of perception, and, on the other hand, regarded as the organ of volition and the centre of all desires, and, sometimes, again, as the reservoir of sentiments and feelings. We are told that the senses cannot give us knowledge if the *manas* is not active.¹

The Vedāntic psychology makes *antaḥkaraṇa*, the inner organ of knowledge as well as of volition including feeling and sentiment. The same organ is represented as performing these functions, each one of which is called a *vr̥tti*, no matter whether it gives us knowledge or leads us to action. These *vr̥ttis* can be classified as giving knowledge or as exciting actions. The former is passive, the latter, impulsive. Hence we see that the same mind has been represented as the faculty of reflection, and also as the faculty of desire, deliberation and will. The *manas* has various modifications. (a) Some modifications corresponding to intellectual states : (1) *vicikitsā*—doubt, (2) *dhi*—cognition, (3) *śraddhā*—belief, (4) *dhṛti*—retention. (b) Some corresponding to volition and emotion : (1) *kāma*—desire, (2) *saṁkalpa*—decision and determination, (3) *vikalpa*—deliberation, (4) *vī*—fear, (5) *hrī*—shame, (6) *sukha*—pleasure, (7) *duḥkha*—pain.²

¹ Vide *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya*, p. 238, ch. 1. 3. 5.

Tasmāt yasyāsannidhou rūpādigrahaṇasamarthasyāpi sataścakṣurūdeḥ svasvaviśayasambundhe rūpaśvādādiñānaṁ na bhavati, yasya ca bhāve bhavati tadanyadasti manonāmāntaḥkaraṇaṁ sarvakaraṇaviśayopayogītyavagamyate.

² Vide *Mailtrā Upaniṣad*, vi. 30.

Vide *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1. 3. 5.

Kāmaḥ saṁkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā śraddhā dhṛtiradṛtirhrīrduḥkhaḥ hrīrītyetad sarvaṁ mana eva.

Vide the *Gītā*, ch. xiii. 6.

*Ichchā dveṣaḥ sukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ saṁghātaścelanā dhṛtiḥ,
Etad kṣetraṁ samāsena savikāramudāhṛtam.*

It must be noted here that *vṛttis* are often classified into three classes in reference to their constituent elements—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, e.g., liberality or resignation, etc., originate from the *sattva*; passion, desire, from the *rajas*; indolence, confusion, etc., from the *tamas* of *antaḥkaraṇa*.¹ This *antaḥkaraṇa* is related to the senses and organs of actions through the nerves. The *antaḥkaraṇa* is seated in the heart, with which all the nerves are connected, it can make use of these nerves and proceed to the senses, thence to outer objects.²

The distinction of *ādhyātma*, *ādhibhūta* and *ādhidaiva* has also been extended to the inner organ of *antaḥkaraṇa* and its functions. *Manas* is *ādhyātma* (subjective), its object is *ādhibhūta*; the moon is the corresponding *ādhidaiva*. Similarly *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *citta* are *ādhyātmās* with their corresponding objects as *ādhibhūtas* and *Vṛhaspati*, *Rudra* and *Kṣhetrajña* as the respective *ādhidaivas*. The *indriyas*, the *manas*, etc., are inspired by the corresponding deities.³

When the *antaḥkaraṇa* sees clearly the nature of anything without the least touch of doubt, when it has clear discrimination it is called *buddhi*, the faculty of discriminating knowledge. The *manas* reflects, weighs reasons for and against, the *buddhi* apprehends rightly, and perceives clearly. It is the faculty of clear discrimination and right apperception.

The *antaḥkaraṇa* has another *vṛtti* or modification

¹ Vide *Pañcadaśī*, ch. ii, 12, 14, 15.

² Vide *Manasollāsa*, ch. iv, *śloka*s, 9-11.

*Antaḥkaraṇa sambandhān nikhilānīndriyānyapi.
Rathāṅganemivalaye kilitā iva kilakāḥ.
Nāvhyo'ntaḥkaraṇe syūtājālasaṃsyūtva sūtravat,
Tāvistu golakāntābhiḥ prasarpanti sphuliṅgavat.
Karaṇāni samastāni yathāsvaṃ viṣayaṃ prati.*

³ Vide *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, ch. ii, i. 1-15 Sureśvara's *Pañcikarāṇa Vārittika*.

in the form of 'I' the feeling of individuality. It is the *asmitā*, the *asmi*—I exist. Apart from these there is the spirit of searching which is another faculty of *antaḥkaraṇa* called *citta*.¹ *Citta* is the spirit of search and the faculty of retention in the *Ātmanātmaviveka*.²

The Five-fold Sheath.

The *upādhis*, above noticed, which condition the individualization of the soul, may be classified in the following way :—

I. The coarse body, the fleshy covering, which the soul casts off at death.

II. The body which accompanies the soul beyond grave, which includes :—

(A) The subtle-body or the finer body consisting of—

- (i) the life organs—*prāṇa*—the vital currents supporting and preserving the organic existence ;
- (ii) the five organs of action including the tongue, the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and evacuation ;
- (iii) the five organs of sense including the organs of hearing, seeing, touching, smelling and testing ;
- (iv) the central organ of conscious life directing the organs of perception and the organs of action called *antaḥkaraṇa*, which,

¹ We have this division on the authority of the *Vārttika*. (Vide *Sloka* 33, 34).

Manobuddhirahaṅkāraścittaṃ ceti catuṣṭayam.
Sanḥkalpākhyāṇaṃ manorūpaṃ buddhirniścaya-rūpīṇi.
Abhimānatmakastadvadahaṅkāraḥ prakīrtitāḥ
Anusandhānarūpaṅca cittamityabhidhīyate.

² Vide *Vidvat Manoraṇjīnī*, p. 13.

again, is chiefly taken as (1) manas and (2) buddhi.

The coarse body is purely flesh. It is the dense cover (annamaya-koṣa)

The subtle body is divided into three-fold sheath of prāṇa, manas and vijñāna. The organs of vitality, and the organs of action combine to form the prāṇamaya koṣa, the vital cover. Manas with five senses forms the manomaya koṣa, the mental cover. Buddhi with the senses forms the still deeper covering, the vijñānamaya koṣa, the intelligence cover.

Authorities differ on this point. The authors of Vedāntasāra and the Tattva-anusandhāna hold that manas with the five organs of action forms the mental sheath, while the author of the Pañcadaśī opines that manas with five organs of sense form the mental sheath. This difference is due to different meaning put on manas, Pañcadaśī regards manas as the faculty of reflection, and it is only natural that it should connect manas with the sense-organs, for, they give it a direct report. Vedāntasāra interprets manas as the faculty of willing, and it is quite natural that it should connect manas with the organs of action, for action follows decision and will.¹

Consciousness as covered up in the intelligence sheath is the subject or the agent, the mental sheath if the instrument of empiric experience, the vital sheath is the effectual expression.²

(B) The causal-body. The inmost sheath of

¹ Vide *Pañcadaśī*, ch. i, 34; Vide *Vedāntasāra*, p. 9 (Jivānanda's Edition).

Manastu karmendriyaiḥ sahitaṁ manomaya-koṣo bhavati.

Vide *Tattvānusandhāna*—*Karmendriyaiḥ sahitaṁ mano manomaya-koṣaḥ.*

² *Eleṣu koṣeṣu madhye vijñānamaya—manomaya—*

prāṇamaya-koṣānāṁ kramena jñāna—icchā—

kryāśaktibhedena kartṛkaraṇakriyārūpatvaṁ darśayati.

avidyā which is called the sheath of bliss owing to the predominance of sattva, for this body is composed purely of the sāt̥tvic aspect of avidyā.

(Apart from these two bodies forming the inner covering of the soul there is another element which accompanies the soul to the next birth, his karma, which has not yet attained complete fruition but which, no doubt, is destroyed as soon as it works itself out. But so long one has not attained the knowledge of identity, one cannot get rid of the vehicles of individual existence, viz. the four-fold sheath).

Hiraṇyagarva—Taijas.

When the ātman has the totality of subtle bodies as upādhi it is called hiraṇyagarva (full of splendour and effulgence, one who has the effulgence of knowledge within). It is also sometimes called prāṇa, because it is immanent in everything, and possesses knowledge, will and power. Prāṇa is the dream-consciousness. When consciousness or ātman has the individual subtle body for its upādhi, it is called taijas. Taijas enjoys the subtle desire (so called because of its possessing the beaming antaḥkaraṇa as its upādhi). The former has the knowledge of the entirety of existence because of the expansiveness of its existence. The latter is limited in its vision, for it is possessed of one unit of antaḥkaraṇa and cannot see all things through this finite organ.

Īśvara—Prajñā.

When the ātman has for its upādhi the bliss-body, it is called Īśvara. It is the sleep-consciousness. When it is determined by the individual bliss-body, or the individual ignorance, it is called prajñā. It enjoys bliss.

Behind the bliss-body and as the inmost of all beings exists the Brahman of complete integrity, the spirit of infinite peace and joy. Beyond the golden veil, is the serene light of knowledge. This inmost existence is through mistake or ignorance apparently identified with the sheaths or its outer coverings and appears to us as the seat of knowledge, will and power. The soul within is pure consciousness of existence, but, so long as ignorance lasts, it appears as the energizing conscious principle integrating and organizing the manifold of existence. It knows, it wills, and it acts. The doctrine of koṣas is an old one, and we find it in the Taittiriya śruti. Saṁkara says, 'We have to go behind each of the five koṣas to find out our true self, beyond the physical body, beyond the vital principle, beyond the mind and intellect and beyond our beatific consciousness.'

We can put the above in the following scheme:—

1. Individual gross body-determinant of viśva, the individual waking-consciousness.	1. Sheath of food.	Cosmic gross body determinant of virāt, the cosmic waking-consciousness.
2. Individual subtle body determinant of taijas, the individual dream-consciousness.	2. Sheath of vitality. 3. Sheath of mind. 4. Sheath of intelligence.	Cosmic subtle body determinant of hira-nyagarva, or prāṇa or sūtrātmā—the cosmic dream-consciousness.
3. Individual causal body determinant of prajñā, the individual sleep-consciousness.	5. Sheath of bliss.	Cosmic causal body determinant of Īśvara, the cosmic sleep-consciousness.

The theistic teachers—Rāmānuja, Madhva, Jīva Gosvāmī, Nimvārka—do not accept the transcendence of consciousness and the immanence of will, the creative effort in nature. Theirs is the affirmation of will as the conscious energizing principle, and naturally the creative effort expressed in the prāthamic vikṣaṇa is

interpreted as the expression of a desire of the supreme existence to multiply bliss. The whole creative effort is, therefore, a history of self-expression in bliss. The dynamic view of reality and consciousness affords the possibility of continuous expression and reproduction, for the dynamic effort is necessarily purposeful and the highest purpose of the effort is the revelation of self to self. This revelation is an inherent necessity, for it is the highest delight, a delight, which, the theists would maintain, is inconceivable in the static conception of being. A mere position, without an effort, cannot heighten the delight and moreover, it does not attain the level of self-consciousness.

The dynamic view-point introduces a concreteness of expression in the abstraction of static expanse of being, a concreteness, which at once demands a unity without absorbing differences and admits them in its being. Logically, this is a necessity in the dynamic conception, psychologically these differences are expressions of being and without them being cannot exist, for knowledge and love—the essence of being—both demand an expression, which would be meaningless, if it be not an expression to a recipient subject or a centre. The dynamic vision, therefore, at once demands a triple existence—the locus, the expression, the recipient—in the integrity of Being.

This expression is of two kinds :—

- (1) Revelation in self.
- (2) Revelation through nature.

The former is, strictly, expression of love and knowledge, the latter is strictly no expression of self-in-self, it is the reflection of self-in-other. And inasmuch as this other is in nature different from self, though dependent upon it, we can speak of reflection and no

expression. This reflection energizes prakṛti (or nature) and a course of evolution sets in. The pure transcendence of the puruṣa unit in the Sāṃkhya leaves the cosmic evolution severely alone to prakṛti (inert force). And it must naturally lack the character of a līlā. Anything unconscious has existence, a law of growth or development, but no character. The theistic Vedāntism clearly perceives this, and characterizes the cosmic evolution as the līlā-bibhūti of Īśvara. This characterization brings into the creative evolution a meaning and a purpose, which it acquires in close touch with Īśvara. In this light, the cosmic evolution, though a transformation of māya, has indirectly the character of expression.

Vallabha has not actually this description of the world-process, for, he, unlike Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, etc., accepts the whole order as really the expression of bliss-consciousness, which, under the influence of a divided consciousness, appears as a process of transformation in time.

The theistic account of the creative evolution differs from the account put forward by Saṃkhya and his followers. Though both the schools claim to systematize the teachings of the Vedānta, yet different systems of cosmology have been established on the identical teachings of the Upaniṣads. And we cannot help thinking that Vaiṣṇava scheme has been influenced by the Sāṃkhya and the Pāñcarātra account. Besides, these, the Vaiṣṇava teachers adopt the pañcikaraṇa of Vedānta; but their application widely differs. An intelligent appreciation of their scheme will be comparatively easy if we have before us the Pāñcarātra account. For, it is beyond doubt that the theistic teachers have their inspiration from the Pāñcarātra system, and they agree

in important points, if ever they disagree, it is only in unimportant details.¹

The cast of thought in the Pāñcarātra works does not materially differ, for the problem and the vision are the same. The whole conception is dynamic and the fundamental concept that runs through the Pāñcarātra account is expression and evolution. Though it is customary to speak of creation, higher or pure, secondary or gross, yet, to indicate the main difference of the character of the two, it is more logical and quite in the fitness of things to speak of pure creation as expression and secondary or gross creation as evolution, for, in the inwardness of being an expression is conceivable, but not a creation, for creation presupposes a new beginning or an initial start, whereas the infinite life and its expression must be an ever manifest and never-ceasing continuity. Again, the gross creation is also no creation, it is evolution, the transformation of prakṛti in a regular and methodical form. It has a start but this really is the beginning of a new cycle in the history of an endless series of evolutions. We pass on to the account.

Pure or Higher Creation-Creative Expression.

In the quietness of cosmic absorption in Nārāyaṇa, in the 'motionless ocean' of the absolute, suddenly an independent resolve flushes up which can be best compared to the 'opening of eyes', a resolve to start the process of unfolding. This resolve and unfolding are

¹ The Pāñcarātra Literature is vast. Dr. Schrader in his learned introduction to the *Aihirbudhnya Saṃhitā* confines the number to one hundred and eight. Our immediate purpose hardly requires a careful perusal of all of them, for these books generally dwell on the same topic almost in a similar manner. We shall always refer to the *Saṃhitā* works, and especially to the *Aihirbudhnya Saṃhitā*.

attributed to śakti, but we must not lose sight of the fact that Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa, and the śakti, Lakṣmī, are non-distinct, though in the creative manifestation śakti naturally comes to the fore and demands our attention.

Lakṣmī is the śakti of Viṣṇu. It has different forms corresponding to functions they serve. The kriyā-śakti is called sudarśanā. It represents Viṣṇu's will-to-be, not an unconscious prompting, but a conscious vibrative (spandanātmaka) impulse (prekṣaṇātmā). The bhūti-śakti is but a myriad part of the śakti and 'necessarily infinitely less powerful manifestation than the kriyā-śakti'. And this bhūti-śakti originates the world of dualities, the order of relative values.¹ It is the principle of becoming, kriyā, the principle of regulation and control. The bhūti, inasmuch as it is dependent upon the kriyā, and cannot stir without the sanction of the kriyā-śakti, is the kriyā-śakti working in nature's plane. To put logically it is the *causa materia*, the kriyā as regulating and guiding the bhūti-śakti is the *causa efficiens* of the cosmic evolution.

Lakṣmī is practically the only force, which, as bhūti, originates the world and as kriyā governs and regulates it. The kriyā-śakti energizes, guides the bhūti (bhūti-parivartaka), and makes becoming possible (bhūtim sambhāvayati) 'sets primordial matter to evolving, time, to the work of counting, and soul, to the effort for enjoyment', it preserves all these as long as the world lasts and withdraws them at the time of dissolution. It is the virya, the power, of Hari, the Lord. Lakṣmī is niṣkalā (undivided), kriyā is also niṣkalā, existing as it does beyond space and time. But it is in

¹ Vide *Aihirbudhnya Saṃhitā*, p. 40, ll. 9-10.

Vahubhīrdvandvabhāvaiḥ sū śaktirbhūtamayī sthitā. Śuddhāśuddha-vibhāgena cetyacetanarūpataḥ.

itself an expression, called *sandarśani*, of *Lakṣmī*. The *bhūti* is divided, and represents a part of *Lakṣmī*. It originates the world. It is *abyakta*, *kāla* and *puruṣa*.

In the calmness of the waveless stage of the cosmos with the conscious prompting of *Lakṣmī*, the *guṇas* become vibrative and the *śuddha sṛṣṭi* or pure creation begins. These *guṇas* are *aprākṛta*, not belonging to nature, for nature as yet has no existence, and consequently this phase of creative expression has nothing to do with the three *guṇas* of the creative-evolution. *Suddha sṛṣṭi* can be well described as creative-expression distinguished from the creative-evolution of nature. This *guṇomeṣa* is, therefore, the expression, or the beginning of expression in definite and fixed forms of attributes transcendent, inherent in *Viṣṇu*.¹

The expression is apparently identical with the locus, still as expression it has a manifest difference. To speak of a waveless stage in this continuity of being and expression is, if not to suggest the absolutism of the *Samkarites*, to accept a state of apparent calmness and identity in the dynamic continuity.

These attributes are *jñāna*, *aiśvarya*, *śakti*, *bala*, *vīrya*, *tejas*.

Jñāna is omniscience. It is both the essence and attribute of *Brahman* and also the essence of *Lakṣmī*.

Aiśvarya is lordship centred in independent and unimpeded activity.

¹ Though the *Samhitā* uses the word higher creation, still the accuracy of thought and language demands the term expression, for the *guṇomeṣa*, if *aprākṛta*, cannot be supposed to have a definite beginning. This *guṇomeṣa*, is, therefore, a definite form of expression rather than a creation. And this expression is continuous. A break in the continuity of expression would suppose a fresh start, but reason cannot accept such freaks in infinite Life,

Śakti is potency to originate the cosmos (Jagat Prakṛti bhāva).

Bala is strength, absence of fatigue and capacity to sustain all things (śrama-hānim).

Virya is virility, unaffectedness, changelessness (Vikāra-viraha).

Tejas is the divine aura, the splendour, and self-sufficiency and power to defeat others (sahakāriānāpekṣa, parābhibhāvanā—samarthya).

These guṇas, as connected partly with bhūti-śakti and partly with kriyā-śakti fall into two sets, namely viśrāma bhūmayah (1 to 3) and śrama bhūmayah (4 to 6), stages of rest and stages of effort.

These guṇas form the body of Vāsudeva and his consort Lakṣmī. To put more logically, Vāsudeva is the highest person, always associated with Lakṣmī, which is these attributes.¹

Leaving Vāsudeva and his attributes aside, we are now to trace the emanation-series which issues out of Vāsudeva by the combination of a corresponding guṇas of each set (1 and 4, 2 and 5, 3 and 6), viz. viśrāma bhūmayah and śrama bhūmayah. Emanation in the Saṃhitā has been defined 'as the process which, while bringing a product into existence, leaves the source unchanged.' This also strictly is expression, though the manner of expression is slightly different.

The Pañcarātra gives us a chain of emanations, each emanation, excepting the initial source, originates from an anterior emanation. The first three emanates, together with Vāsudeva, are called vyūhas, i.e. the shaving-asunder of the six guṇas into three pairs.

¹ Vide *Ahīrbudhnyā Saṃhitā*, vol. i, p. 20, *Śloka*s 4, 5, 6. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 25, *Śloka*s 16, 17.

Each vyūha is Viṣṇu himself with six guṇas, of which two only in each case, become manifest. It is Viṣṇu, but Viṣṇu in another form. Kṛṣṇa is Vāsudeva, the Parātman. The vyūhas are saṃkarṣaṇa, pradyumna, and aniruddha; saṃkarṣaṇa represents the unity of jñāna and bala, pradyumna, aiśvarya and vīrya, aniruddha, śakti and tejas.

Each vyūha has two activities, a creative and a moral one, corresponding to the two guṇas. Saṃkarṣaṇa reveals the ekāntin mārṅga, leading to realization of Bhagavān. Pradyumna interprets the śāstra and translates it into action. Aniruddha helps to attain liberation in Hari, the *summum bonum*.¹

The creative activity is illustrated in the emanation series, Vāsudeva divides himself and immediately becomes saṃkarṣaṇa. Saṃkarṣaṇa is the first in the series. The guṇas with which saṃkarṣaṇa performs his cosmic function, are jñāna and bala. Saṃkarṣaṇa is Viṣṇu in its express manifest of jñāna and bala. Then comes out Pradyumna, not in an undivided integrity but in a divided form of puruṣa and its śakti. The śakti is called Pradyumnī. Aniruddha then makes its appearances with its own śakti aniruddha. These are the four vyūhas originating in continuous succession from Vāsudeva. They are eternal.²

¹ In Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahma Sūtra*, ii. 3. 42 Saṃkarṣaṇa is represented to be the individual soul (*Jīvātman*), *pradyumna*, the *manas*, *aniruddha*, the *ahamkāra*. But in the *Samhitā* and in Vaiṣṇava literature the doctrine has no place, for, the emanations are the very being of Vāsudeva and cannot stand for the *prākṛta* evolutes. But it is no doubt true that in many works, e.g. in the *Lakṣmī Tantra*, the *vyūhas* are represented as the presiding deities of the *prākṛti*.

² The *Samhitā* has a classification of the Sub-vyūhas (*Vyūhāntara*). These emanate from the *Vyūhas*. (1) From Vāsudeva descend Keśava, Nārāyaṇa and Mādhava; (2) from Saṃkarṣaṇa, Govinda, Viṣṇu and Madhusūdan; (3) from Pradyumna, Trivikram, Vāmana, and Śrīdhara; and

Besides these vyūhas, vibhāvas also belong to the transcendent order of expression. Vivhāvas are manifestations. The principal vivhāvas are thirty-nine.¹

Avatāra is strictly the descending of Viṣṇu in some particular shape from the transcendent order into the prakṛta order. The main purpose is to establish the order of righteousness and destroy the evil of a partial and distorted life. It initiates generally ends of humanity either of knowledge, love or righteousness and reports to humanity the existence of an order of spirituality by lifting the veil of crude ignorance. Such descent and ingress of the spiritual force into nature's plane indicates the complete control of God upon the world of nature and justifies the description of the cosmic process as līlā-bibhūti. But for such occasional visitations from a living God, the cosmic order would have naturally been interpreted a blind cyclic movement in the inner prakṛti initiated by the karmic seeds. If, at the initial start, God's interference in the creative evolution is indirect in the form of an acquisitive sanction involved in a hasty glance, the intervention in incarnation is direct, inasmuch as it is a free choice

(4) from Aniruddha, Hṛīkeśa, Padmanābha and Dāmodara. These have a place in the creative expression. They are represented in various forms for the purpose of meditation.

¹ 1. Padmanābha, 2. Dhurva, 3. Ananta, 4. Sakhyātman, 5. Madhusūdan, 6. Vidyāhideva, 7. Kapila, 8. Visvarūpa, 9. Vihaṅgama, 10. Krodātman, 11. Badabavaktra, 12. Dharma, 13. Vagīśvara, 14. Eka-ranāvaśayīn, 15. Kāmatheśvara, 16. Varāha, 17. Narasiṃha, 18. Piyūśahara, 19. Śrīpati, 20. Kantātman, 21. Rahujit, 22. Kālanemighna, 23. Pārijāta-hara, 24. Lokanātha, 25. Santātman, 26. Dattātreyā, 27. Nyagrodhaśayīn, 28. Ekaśṛngatanu, 29. Vāmanadaha, 30. Trivikrama, 31. Nara, 32. Nārāyaṇa, 33. Hari, 34. Kṛṣṇa, 35. Paraśurāma, 36. Rāma Dhanurdhara, 37. Vedavid, 38. Kalkin and 39. Pātālasāvana,

and a choice for regulating and maintaining the cosmic order (*viśvakāryārtha*). The conception of *Avatāra* presupposes the imperfect regulation of the *prākṛta* order through the natural laws and the consequent necessity of direct intervention of the Divine Will. This direct intervention is occasional and is not possible until the forces playing in human society are such as to require an in-rush of Divine energy to set the order right. Apart from the cosmic ends, the direct intervention is felt in individual lives where the resignation and the denial of the lower self have been complete, the heart-beat is silent to receive directly and the intellect is quiet to apprehend immediately. In such cases the descent is often for throwing a flood of delight into the anxious soul and for saving it from a difficult impasse.

Incarnation may be of two kinds: Primary (or *mukhya*) and Secondary (or *gauṇa*). The primary *avatāra* represents Viṣṇu himself in a transcendent body. It is the manifestation of Viṣṇu himself on nature's plane, his direct intervention in cosmic function. The secondary *avatāras* are inspired agents. The mental self is pure enough to open itself to the higher influence which fits it for some particular mission or function. The primary *avatāras* should be worshipped by those who seek liberation, while for mundane purpose (e.g. wealth, power and influence) the secondary *avatāras* may be resorted to. Besides these, there is the *Arcca avatāra*, (incarnation for the ordinary purpose of worship) of Viṣṇu. It is an inanimate image of Viṣṇu, which, as soon as it is duly consecrated, according to the *Pāñcarātra* rites, acquires a miraculous power often felt by the worshipper. The idea is that Viṣṇu is capable of descending into such images with his *śakti* and can

reveal himself and accept the devotee's resignation and surrender through the *Arcca*.¹

Finally, there is antaryāmin avatāra. And this is Aniruddha, as the inner ruler of all souls. The antarjāminṭva is the power of controlling from within, sealed in 'the heart-lotus' (Niyantā sarvadehinām).

Attention should be drawn here to the doctrine of incarnation as held by the Śaṅkara School. The possibility is not denied, its actuality has been recognized by Śaṅkara in his introduction to his commentary on the *Gītā*. Īśvara or Hiraṇyagarva—the author of world of concrete effects, the order of nāma and rūpa, for some definite purpose, descends down and directly interferes with cosmic or human affairs. Though Śaṅkara's system has a distinct cosmology and a definite order in the evolution and regulation of the cosmos, still the possibility of jīva's attaining the expansion of Īśvara's being is accepted, and, therefore, avatāra in Śaṅkara's system is not only a descent of Īśvara, but, sometimes, it is an actual transcendence of jīvatva and the attainment of the being of Īśvara.² We do not mean that the jīvatva is completely vanquished, for the original limitation may occasionally assert, especially in moments of self-forgetfulness, a condition which is

¹ We should study here the distinction between *Pratika*-worship and *Arcca*-worship. In the *Pratika*-worship, the symbol is the locus, on which a devotee concentrates his thought, as the medium of worship and projects his attention. But no sooner is the thought centralised, than the locus soon gets out of our vision and no necessity thereof is felt. The devotee passes soon into the inner world of thought, leaving the locus aside. But in *Arcca*-worship, on the other hand, the devotee sees the very presence of Viṣṇu in it. And as such the inanimate image soon acquires a new meaning which it did not previously possess. It becomes to him the idol of love, the very object of heart's hankering and eye's rest. And this idealisation of *Arcca* is made possible through the *śakti* of Viṣṇu.

² Vide *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, ch. iv, 1. 3.

Samśārīṇaḥ samśāritvāpoheneśvarātmatvaṃ pratīpīpādayiṣitāmīti.

natural to the highest characters but that in the jīvatva is potentially involved the Īśvaratva which, under favourable and agreeable conditions, is manifested. Jīva and Īśvara in Vedānta are not unalterably fixed. The moment the jīva has control over his own upādhi, it attains the expanse of Īśvara's being. But this possibility does not end in a democracy of Gods or of a plurality of Īśvaras. In fact, it soon comes to realize the oneness and the singularity of Īśvara; and the sense of a limited consciousness is overpowered in the consciousness of the one expansive self. The will that operates now in jīva is the cosmic will. The creation of a limited consciousness of the secondary avidyā is destroyed. Such an incarnation has a resemblance to the inspired avatāras (śaktyābeśa) of the Vaiṣṇava. But there is this distinction, that in the śaktyābeśa, the adept is temporarily under a higher influence, the influence which is not inherent in him but simply acquired. And therefore, it can possibly be lost.

Moreover, in inspired agents when the spell is broken the jīva-consciousness is left to its atomicity. This cannot be true where jīvatva is only a temporary makeshift, though the impression of a false individuality may now and then assert itself. But this is a passing condition.

Besides these personal manifestations, to the order of expression belongs the great expanse of Vaikuṇṭha, the abode of Bliss. The śuddha sattva is the *causa materia* of the expanse and the material of the delight manifold, the non-natural bodies of God and liberated souls. This śuddha sattva is of the nature of knowledge and bliss, and in so far it is nowhere an obstacle to the spirit and its expression. It is, as it were, the condensed splendour of pure creation. It is distinct from the force that

energizes lower creation. The Saṃhitā further enumerates śaktis of Viṣṇu functioning either in nityabibhūti or in līlā-bibhūti. We may conveniently class them with either Lakṣmī or Bhūti, for, truly they are the vṛttis of either of them personified. A minor distinction is drawn between God as parā Vāsudeva and God as vyūha Vāsudeva. Parā Vāsudeva is the complete person. He divides himself into vyūha Vāsudeva. Lakṣmī is constant associate of the creative expression or higher emanation in the Saṃhitā.

The later works have followed the Saṃhitā in essence and the emanation series does not materially differ. The Pañcarātra has the same order. 1. Vāsudeva, 2. Saṃkarṣaṇa, 3. Pradyumna, 4. Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is the cause of all causes, the self-caused transcendental entity. Vāsudeva is Kāla, the destroyer, he is Mahārudra. He is Mūlāprakṛti. He is the bliss of creation, the charm of the cosmos, the seed of creative evolution. He is Saṃkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha. Aniruddha is the Lord of the manas, Pradyumna, of buddhi.

We have no clear description of the quadruple form in the Pañcarātra. It mentions the names of Saṃkarṣaṇa and Pradyumna in the enumeration of the names of Kṛṣṇa.¹

Here each emanation is presented as possessing a śakti (female energy), Vāsudeva has Lakṣmī; Saṃkarṣaṇa, Sarasvatī; Pradyumna, Prīti; Aniruddha, Rati. Another point of importance in this connection is the conception of Rādhā. Rādhā is the transcendent śakti of Kṛṣṇa. She is the centre of all powers, the supreme hold in dances of Delight, the inward expression of Kṛṣṇa unto itself. In the Nārada Pañcarātra we come across a

¹ Vide *Pañcarātra* (Asiatic Society Edition), pp. 241-242 and in the process of *Nyāsa*, a form of divine hypnosis, ch. 3. 3. ii. *Śloka* 19. 4.

passage which expressly states that the Kapila Pañcarātra gives a fuller account of Rādhā.¹ Rādhā is the chief female energy in these two Pañcarātras.

Rāmānuja and his followers have followed almost the same scheme. Nigmantha Mahādeśika expressly states that their scheme follows closely Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā and Lakṣmī Tantra.² Rāmānuja has it that God through grace and kindness, in the effort of līlā, the self-expression, manifests himself as antarjāmin, sūkṣma vyūha, vibhāva and arccā. Śrīnibāsadāsa, the author of the Yatīndramatadīpikā, makes the same affirmation. Īśvara manifests himself as parā, vyūha, vibhāva, antarjāmin, avatāra. Parā is Nārāyaṇa, sometimes called Vāsudeva, the transcendent holiness, power knowledge, love and purity, the logos with Śrī Bhū and Nīlā. Sūkṣma is Vāsudeva with these powers. Vyūha is the emanation from Vāsudeva. Saṃkarṣaṇa is the unity of power and knowledge, pradyumna, of aiśvarya and vīrya, aniruddha, of śakti and teja. The author of the Yatīndramatadīpikā has a classification of sub-vyūhas within the vyūhas, the emanation series. Vibhāva is an expression on nature's plane for some end. These manifestations may be direct or indirect, may express Īśvara in his completeness or incompleteness of power and being. And besides these, there may be inspired agents. Antarjāmin is the presence and expression of Īśvara in the inmost being of ours, a presence and an expression only occasionally felt in the silence of the heart-beats in communion. The antarjāmin, though it lives in the heart of beings, has a transcendence of its

¹ Ch. 3, ii.

² Vide *Nyāya Siddhāntjanam*, p. 107.

Ahirbudhnyasamhitālakṣmītantrādīṣu ca vistareṇāyamārtho'badhāryaḥ.

own and is not touched by the ills that flesh is heir to.¹

The Bengal School has a slightly different scheme. Śrīkṛṣṇa, the spiritual figurate, the very form and being of bliss and intelligence, is the Lord in His ownself, the soul of Rādhā, the supreme expression of Delight. Kṛṣṇa is the Delight-self, Rādhā, the Expression (prakāśa) Kṛṣṇa is svayaṃrūpa, Lord Himself. Kṛṣṇa is the supreme source and centre of attraction. And he attracts the soul by his transcendent beatitude. He can draw the hearts of men, devotees and saints by the beatitude of a form of exquisite beauty and sweetness (Vigrahamādhurī), the expression of playful activity in bliss (Kṛīḍāmādhurī), the rapturous tune of the delight-flute and the wealth of powers. Every one of them attracts the devotee and feeds him in delight, affording intense satisfaction to the mind, the heart and the senses. The entire being with all its faculties has its full delight and rest tranquil. The wealth of powers affords the eternal security to the devotee from all vicissitudes of life.

Next to svayaṃrūpa is tadekātmarūpa, the manifested self, identical in essence, but different in hypostasis (Svarūpataḥ aikyaṃ ākāra anyadṛsatvam). The former is absolute (savtaḥ siddha), the latter, relative.

This class is sub-divided into: (1) Vilās, the expression of a conscious and bliss form of almost equal power with svayaṃrūpa. Nārāyaṇa is the vilās form of Kṛṣṇa, Vāsudeva, the first vyūha of Nārāyaṇa.

(2) Svāṃsa is the expression, identical in essence but partial in manifestation, e.g., Saṃkarṣaṇa, Anirudha, Bādarāyaṇa.

¹ Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*.

Next comes Avesa ; inspired men and prophets, e.g., Nārada, Sukha, Sanaka.

Besides these manifestations and emanations, there are incarnations or avatāras either direct of God Himself or of any of His forms for cosmic purpose.

These avatāras may be direct or indirect manifestations, God Himself may descend or may work through a medium. Valadeva Vidyābhuṣana has fixed the function and purpose of Avatāra to (a) initiating the cosmic evolution by disturbing its temporary quiescence and equilibrium, (b) increasing the happiness of the devas and men by suppressing the evil forces and their activities, (c) deepening the bliss-consciousness of love of the anxious devotees by self-expression, (d) and preaching the gospel of Love in its transcendent purity.¹

These avatāras are of three kinds : we must bear in mind that avatāra is a necessity, for Bhagavān has no direct relation to the cosmos. In the natural course of events prakṛti is controlled and regulated by a conscious stress or influence. This conscious influencing of prakṛti is attributed to Puruṣa-avatāra, and as such it appears as having a touch with prakṛti, though actually it transcends it.² Valadeva in his commentary on the *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*³ holds that this avatāra intuites the direction and control of the initial start of the prakṛti in the process of formation (Prakṛti-prākṛta vikṣaṇa niyama—pravartanādyanubhavī). This influencing is, therefore, the conscious element in the evolution of prakṛti.

This Puruṣa-avatāra, is again of three kinds. This division corresponds to the functions it performs. Puruṣa-avatāra in his capacity of initiating the cosmic

¹ Vide *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*, p. 13, Valadeva's *īkā* (Calcutta Edition).

² Vide *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, 6. 8. 59.

³ Vide Calcutta Edition, p. 14.

evolution is called the first puruṣa, in its antaṛjāminatva or immanence in the entirety of beings and things, is called the second puruṣa, in its immanence in individuals is the third puruṣa.¹ The first puruṣa is called Mahāviṣṇu or Saṃkaraṣaṇa or more properly Saṃkaraṣaṇāmśa, for it is the personification of the influence which Saṃkaraṣaṇa exerts in the evolution, and the influence reaches the cosmic causal potencies and, therefore, Mahāviṣṇu is figuratively represented as immanent in the ocean of seeds. The second puruṣa is called Pradyumna, more properly prodyumnāmśa, is immanent in the Hiranyagarva, the cosmic consciousness. The third puruṣa is Aniruddha or more properly Aniruddhāmśa, the innerscient of individual beings. These two are really the same conscious principle in its different forms of immanence either in the cosmos or in the individual things or beings. The first puruṣa initiates the evolution, the second enters into it as the cosmic innerscient, the third into the individuals, things and beings.

From the second Puruṣavatāra emanates Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra for the regulation of the cosmos. These are not different from the cosmic consciousness, which, in relation to sattva is Viṣṇu, in relation to rajas is Brahmā, in relation to tamas is Rudra.

Brahmā is, again, either Hiranyagarva or Vairāja. When he enjoys subtle delight of the Brahmaloka, he is Hiranyagarva, when he is engaged in the creative activity, he is called Vairāja. Rudra is to be distin-

¹ Vide a quotation from *Sātvata-tantra* in *Kṛṣṇāmṛtaṇ, Laghubhāga-vatāmṛta*.

*Viṣṇostu trīnirūpāṇi . . . ekamtu mahataḥ srastrī, dvitīyamtvanḍa-
śaṃsītīṇ tritīyaṃ sarvabhūtasthaṇ.*

guished from Sadāśiva. Rudra destroys the cosmic order. Sadāśiva is the vilās of Kṛṣṇa, a form of expression in the transcendent bliss and consciousness. Viṣṇu is Pradyumnāṁśa. Viṣṇu preserves the order. Viṣṇu regulates the sattva. Viṣṇu is identical with Nārāyaṇa.

Then there is the Līlā-avatāra. These are Nara and Nārāyaṇa, Hari and Kṛṣṇa. Also Buddha Kalki and Valarāma.¹

Avatāras are, again classified into āveśa, prabhāva, vaibhāva and parāvasthā. Parāvasthā is the direct expression of svayaṁrūpa in space and time conditions, in the order of prakṛti or māyā. Such expression is possible only on rare occasions. Prabhāva and vaibhāva are expressions similar to svayaṁrūpa, but inferior to parāvasthā in attractiveness, sweetness and power. These, again, differ; vaibhāva exhibits greater power and capacity than prabhāva. Āveśa is possession (already discussed).

Madhva's Scheme.

Madhva's scheme is simpler. Paramātman is the supreme entity, of infinite in glory and attributes, each infinite in strength and magnitude. Lakṣmī is the consort. Paramātman has the bliss-body, the conscious form, a concrete image (Jñānānandakalyānavigrahavan). He can assume many forms, and each of them by itself is complete and full (nānārūpaḥ, sarbānyapyarūpāni pūrṇāṇi).

These are not expressions, they represent the very being of Paramātman. With the expression of one form, the entire being of the infinite is revealed. It

¹ Among the Līlā-avatāras are again reckoned twenty-five *Kalpāvatāras*, twelve *Mānvanterāvatāras* and four *Yugāvatāras*.

should be remembered that these forms are nothing finite, for nothing finite in the infinite exists. The word infinite connotes inexhaustibleness, it does not necessarily convey formlessness—being may have a form, yet be infinite. The difficulty of limitation cannot arise, for Paramātmā supports the whole creation, energizes it and is immanent in it. The form-conception may not be reconciled to static expanse of Being but it does agreeably conform to the dynamic theory wherein capacity and energy, instead of expanse, is thought of as the true mark of infinitude. And it is infinite because it vivifies all, energizes all and controls and regulates all. Nothing escapes its influence. And the wonder is that the infinite can have formless expressions as well as form-expressions. Therein lies the mysteriousness of his Being and Power. And formlessness does not mean the denial and absence of all forms, but strictly it denotes the infinite forms, for any expression, however subtle, has a concrete form. It escapes our vision, because of its being subtle. These forms are Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Kṛṣṇa, etc. It includes the emanation-series, as well as all avatāras.

Nimvarka's Scheme.

The Nimvārka School has almost the same account. Kṛṣṇa is the supreme bliss entity, the source of righteousness and power. The vyūhas are centred in it. They are four, Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha. Parambrahma can, whenever he wills, descend into nature's plane. The avowed purpose is to establish a righteous order, to destroy unrighteousness, and to fulfil the desire of the resigned and to grant them redemption. Avatāras are Guṇāvatāra, Puruṣāvatāra and Līlāvatāra.

The account is the same as given above.¹ Līlavatāra is (1) āveśa and (2) svarūpa. Āveśa is, again, of two kinds : (a) saṁśa (b) śaktyaṁśa. Svarūpavatāra is the appearance of Īśvara under nature's conditions. Here, again, the expression of his being in full or in part is conceivable. Saṁśa-āveśa is the possession of saṁśa (*vide* the definition of saṁśa given above). Sakti-saṁśa āveśa is the possession of śakti. This, again, is prabhāva and vibhāva.²

Creative Evolution.

The designation 'Creative Evolution' at once distinguishes it from 'Creative Expression' in its import and significance. In evolution the idea of transformation is potent, a conception which does not agree with expression. Expression is the essence of Being, which, as infinite, can reveal itself in infinite ways, but these revelations form the very integrity of its nature. It can have manifold forms, but it cannot undergo transformation, which would introduce a change and a transitoriness in being and consciousness. Consciousness can have expression or expressive being, but no evolutionary gradation, for it can express itself without change. The conception of growth or development is conformable to finite processes and is relative to decay and decadence, but cannot be extended to infinite fullness and perfection. The infinite is a life of integral expression, but not of evolution or successive growth.

The word 'Creative' requires an explanation. Creativeness ordinarily suggests an effort and production or a productive effort. But it does not necessarily convey the idea of a thing originating out of a blank

¹ *Vide* the Account of the Bengal School.

² *Vide Vedāntaratna Mañjuśā*, pp. 47-49.

negation. We do not use the term in that sense. Now in the expression of infinite life the creativeness is evident in the unceasing dynamic stress and effort of revealing itself in infinite ways. Though these expressions are nothing new to the infinite self, still the idea of effort leads us to a humanistic description of the revelation of the infinite as creative expression, to distinguish it from the infinite in our differentiating consciousness. If this is objected to, we are ready to accept the word expression; but be it noted that the emanation-series in Vaiṣṇava philosophers has a place in the infinite, for it imbibes in it infinite life if not in its fullness, but only in its part, and as such the series has a distinction from the inner expression. And this entitles us to extend the conception of creativeness to the emanation-series. And yet creativeness has an additional significance. It imports conscious or spiritual intervention in the creative order and at once distinguishes the process from spontaneous development, though this intervention is more or less indirect and external in Rāmānuja and Jīva Gosvāmī, direct or internal in Vallabha, expressly indirect in Madhva.

This conscious intervention has been borne out by the Saṃhitā account of an intermediate creation—the first stage in creative evolution. This intermediate creation is manifestation of the bhūti śakti: it is partly pure and partly impure inasmuch as it is the evolution of māyā energized by kutastha puruṣa. The kutastha puruṣa is defined as an aggregate of souls, the pure-impure condition of bhūti. The kutastha puruṣa is the totality of souls, disembodied but bound up in karmic ties, kutastha puruṣa itself is pure, but the stain of impurity is left in it, because of the touch

of karmic seeds which it carried from the previous cycle.

The kutastha puruṣa and the māyā śakti take their rise from Pradyumna, the third vyūha. The māyā śakti, also called the mūlā prakṛti is the non-spiritual energy, the primitive matter. The māyā śakti is to be distinguished from the mūlā prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya system. The mūlā prakṛti is only a phase of the māyā śakti, the guṇa-body; the other phases being kāla and niyati. These three control the cosmic evolution. The guṇas and the mūlā prakṛti are the *causa materia*, time and niyati, *causa formative*. But this distinction of the material and formative causes is not distinctly drawn in the Saṃhitā. On the other hand, we come across an account of evolution of them. Pradyumna transfers both the kutastha puruṣa and māyā for further development to Aniruddha. And from Aniruddha directly comes out śakti, from śakti, niyati, from niyati, kāla, from kāla, the sattva, from the sattva, the rajas, from the rajas, the tamas.

The evolution-chain of these elements resolves itself ultimately into one fundamental principle, but though generally this account cannot be objected to in a scheme of evolution, still logical thought demands a distinction between the causes, *materia* and *efficiens* in evolution, especially where the operative forces are more or less blind.

Niyati is the subtle force that regulates as karmic necessity the intellectual capacity, inclinations and practical ability of everything. In a scientific sense we shall be more correct to say that niyati regulates and restricts evolution, a process in time, which has its basic stuff in guṇa-body—sattva, rajas, tamas. Kāla is the principle which pursues everything to maturation.

It is time in objective sense; it is undivided and unchanging. In Saṃhitā, three kinds of time are recognized: (1) effected or gross time (kārya kāla) which becomes operative after the creation of the tattvas, (2) causal or subtle time, (akhaṇḍa kāla) or relatively eternal time is created by Aniruddha, (3) Absolutely eternal time exists in pure creation. The time that emanates from niyati is the subtle or relatively eternal time.

The guṇa-body, in its constituent sattva, rajas and tamas, is under the influence of Aniruddha, the conscious impetus in the creative order. Aniruddha as Viṣṇu regulates sattva, as Brahmā, rajas, as Rudra, tamas. The qualities, which the guṇas respectively manifest are according to the Saṃhitā (1) lightness, brightness, and healthiness; (2) motion, pain, passion, restlessness; (3) heaviness, obstruction, inertia, stupefaction and dullness. Though it is customary to attribute these and similar qualities to the guṇas, still it would be more scientific, if we enumerate these qualities among its effects; for these guṇas are strictly the causes which produce such effects; they themselves remain far removed from our experience. Tamas is not inertia, it is such a thing as can produce it. Sattva is not knowledge or lightness, it is the element (*causa materia*) that has these effects. The cause and effect category here is more philosophically consistent than the substance and attribute category. Prakṛti in kāla (time) under the influence of the supreme soul evolves the entire existence. Evolution begins with the breaking of the temporary cosmic quiescence and the unstable equilibrium of prakṛti. The equilibrium is set up by the even balance holding in the three guṇas. But this equilibrium cannot continue long. In the fitness of time, the forces tending

to disturb the equilibrium become operative, and the evolution starts. The start in evolution synchronizes with the definite integration of the elements in proportionate quantities. Vaiṣṇavas accept the continuous evolution of a heterogeneity from the homogeneity of prakṛti. The atomic hypothesis of the Nyāya School has been rejected. Śaṅkarites also accept some form of evolution, but their scheme, as noticed above, is completely different. The Vaiṣṇavas follow the Sāṃkhya scheme in cosmic evolution, with minor differences. They are, like the followers of Kapila, evolutionists.

Mahat is the unconscious basic principle of intelligence, vitality and time. Mahat directly emerges from the prakṛti. The Saṃhitā has many synonyms for it; vidyā, brahmi, vahu, vṛddhi, mati, madhu, Īśvara and prajñā, go, avani, akhyāti. Mahat is three-fold in conformity with three guṇas. In its tāmasic aspect, it appears as kāla, in its rājasic aspect, it is prāṇa, in its sattva element, it is buddhi. Mahat is the unconscious basic principle of intelligence, vitality and time. Kāla is defined here as consisting of moments and is to be distinguished from the akhaṇḍa (relatively eternal time) and the absolutely eternal time. It is the kārya—effected or gross time. Mahat in its sattva gives rise to dharma (discipline) jñāna (knowledge), vairāgya (indifference to and abstinence from secular things), aiśvarya (mystic powers). From the tāmasic mahat follows a group of contradictory attributes. Both these are ascribed to mahat, the former in its sātत्वic, the latter in its tāmasic aspect. This is an apparent contradiction. The attributes of jñāna, vairāgya, aiśvarya, are really attributes of buddhi when it feeds on the sattva, and the negative attributes originate when buddhi feeds on

tāmas. It must not be forgotten that in the evolutes the elements, sattva, rajas, and tamas are equally present though in different proportions.

From mahat originates the ahaṁkāra. Ahaṁkāra is a cosmic element. It has various synonyms—abhimāna, abhimantri, ahaṁkṛti, prajāpati, buddhi. The first three connote its individuating function, the fourth, its creative function (Prajāpati implies Lord of creatures), the fifth, the epistemological function. It again, has three forms, sāttvic, rājasic, tāmasic, respectively called vaikārika, taijasa and bhūtādi. It manifests itself as kāma, krodha (anger) and lobha (avarice). Manas, abamati and triṣā. Manas is the direct product of vaikārika ahaṁkārika from bhūtādi, taijas participates equally in the production of the both.¹ Manas is the organ of reflection and resolution. It reflects, then resolves.

From ahaṁkāra originates the elements and the senses. Bhūtādi, assisted by taijasa, originates sound-tanmātra, sound in *quint essence*. Sound-tanmātra is the immediate cause of ākāśa. Ākāśa admits of expansion (avakāśa pradāyi) and has its attributes śabda (sound). Corresponding to this, the vaikārika, with the co-operation of taijasa, produces hearing (śrotra) and vāk (speech). After this is produced the sparśa-tanmātra, which is the immediate cause of vāyu. Vaikārika, again, with taijasa originates tvaca and pāni, the organ of handling. Next comes the rupatanmātra, light and colour-essence, the objective cause of tejas. Vaikārika, here again, originates cakṣu and pāda, the organs of vision and movement (of the body). Then originates rasa, with its immediate effect ap:

¹ Vide *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.

this corresponding, we have rasanā and upastha, the organs of taste and generation. Then comes gandha, the smell-essence with its immediate effect Pṛthivī; corresponding to this we have from vaikārika, the organs of smell and evacuation. The organs, corresponding to tanmātras and bhūtas, are organs of knowledge and activity.

The Saṃhitā in its account of evolution traces tanmātra direct from bhūtādi and simultaneously each pair of indriyas directly from vaikārika without the co-operation of taijasa. But in Chapter IV, in the process of cosmic involution each pair of indriyas together with particular bhūta dissolves in the corresponding tanmātra, which, again, in the ascending order dissolves in the next higher tanmātra. This establishes that in evolution or involution in the descending or ascending series the continuity is not broken. Each tanmātra, therefore, has its immediate cause in the one preceding it, it has its mediate and the basic cause in bhūtādi. And, bhūtādi and vaikārika are without the co-operation of taijasa, inactive and non-originate, for taijasa represents the energy of rajas which transforms the tamas bhūtādi into tanmātras and sattva-vaikārika into indriyas.

The scientific account of evolution has a touch of Mysticism, in this that elements beginning with mahat have presiding manus. The manus are, perhaps, the conscious agents in elements; each furnished with the respective faculties corresponding to the elements. Thus it is said with regard to buddhi that to the eight manus while dwelling in the womb of vidyā there originates that natural organ called bodhana, by which they can ascertain the nature of things, discriminating between the real and the unreal. Again, from ahaṁkāra

the manus receive the ten Indriyas. The manus from the five elements receive one sensory and one motor faculty. They came to possess the five knowledge-senses and the five action-senses. The manus, thus, at last, are furnished with all the faculties, organs and senses in the course of evolution and divide themselves into couples. These couples place themselves under the protection of aniruddha, and by his command, begin to multiply and generate mānavas. These mānavas had a full due to jñāna-vraṃsa (destruction of knowledge) and a consequent travelling of births from which they are saved by the regaining of the lost consciousness of kainkarya.

Lokācārya in his *Tattvatrayam*, has almost an identical account of evolution. Sattva originates jñāna (knowledge), and sukha (felicity), promotes intense love for them and binds us to them.¹ Rajas creates desires, hankering, attachment and a willingness and love for activity. Tamas produces ignorance, inattention, indolence and sleep. These guṇas in the equilibrium of equal proportion are inactive and do not manifest their individualities, but they begin to manifest themselves in the evolutionary effort in disproportionate quantity. The first evolute is mahat. This mahān, again, in reference to the predominating constituent element—sattva, rajas and tamas—gives rise to perfect or imperfect knowledge and creates inversions of contradictory or opposite concepts. From the mahān originates the three-fold ahaṁkāra, vaikārika, taijasa, and bhūtādi. Ahaṁkāra creates the sense of individuality. The evolution-account of tanmātras, bhūtas, jñānendriyas and karmendriyas does not differ a whit from the *Samhitā*

¹ Vide *Tattvatrayam*, p. 52, Notes II. 1-2.

account, excepting the origin of *manas* from *vaikārika-ahamkāra* as the eleventh sense. The origin of *tanmātras* in an unbroken continuity is a distinct improvement upon the *Samhitā* account, though it is also there in an implicate form. *Lokācārya* rejects the alternative hypothesis advanced by the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* that the four *tanmātras*, except the first, originate respectively from the immediately preceding *bhūtas*, as it goes against the weight of the majority of authorities which put down the number of *prakṛtis* to eight, the *vikṛtis* to sixteen. The eight *prakṛtis* are *prakṛti*, *maḥat*, *ahamkāra* and the five *tanmātras*, the five elements, *manas*, the five sense-organs, and the five action-organs are the sixteen evolutes. *Prakṛtis* are originative evolutes, *vikṛtis* are non-originative evolutes. The author also noticed another view which accepts the origination of a *tanmātra* not directly from the preceding *tanmātra* itself, but in collaboration with the preceding *bhūta*, e.g. the *bhūtādi* originates *śabda*, *śabda* dislodges from view the *bhūtādi* and originates *ākāśa*. *Sparśa* originates from *śabda* and screens it; *vāyu* originates from *sparśa* and *ākāśa* (as dominated by *śabda*); *rūpa* originates from *sparśa* and screens it; *teja* originates from *rūpa* and *vāyu* (as dominated by *sparśa*) and so on. The *tanmātras* are *bhūtas* in their essence—the potencies of the *bhūtas*. The *sāttvic* and the *tamas ahamkāra* by themselves are inoperative and unproductive, they became active with the instrumentality of the *taijasa* and originates *tanmātras*, *bhūtas*, *jñānendriyas*, *karmendriyas*. But the author thinks that *manas* originates from *sāttvic ahamkāra* itself. *Śrīnivāsa* in his *Yatīndramatadīpikā* has a different account. He has *sāttvic ahamkāra* as the material cause of all the *indriyas*, the organs of sense and the organs of activity. The

organs of knowledge are six including manas. The manas has different designation—buddhi, citta and ahaṁkāra. It is located in heart and functions therefrom. The tanmātras with bhūtas have their origin from bhūtādi under the influence of rājasic ahaṁkāra. Here is no change. It can produce sound. It acquires blueness. Srīnivāsa affirms that sparśa-tanmātra originates from ākāśa (the original bhūta), vāyu from sparśa-tanmātra. It can produce sound and touch-sensation. Rūpa originates from vāyu. Teja originates from rūpa. It can produce heat and light. Rasa originates from teja, ap from rasa. It can effect taste and touch and produce cold-sensation. Gandha originates from rasa, pṛthivī from gandha. It can effect the organs of touch, taste and smell. The author of the Tattvatrayam has reproduced in his book a different account of the same author. He thinks that vāyu has sparśa, it acquires śabda from ākāśa, for it originates not purely from sparśa-tanmātra, but from sparśa and śabda-tanmātra. Teja in a similar way has śabda, sparśa and rūpa, as it originates from rūpa-tanmātra in combination with śabda and sparśa-tanmātras. And so on.

These bhūtas under the process of quintiplication originate the effectual bhūtas or mahābhūtas. The mahābhūtas have the respective quality and property of the predominating element besides what they acquire in the process of quintiplication. For example, Ākāśa acquires blueness, originally an effect of teja, vāyu has sound, the original effect of ākāśa and so on. The process of quintiplication has been explained above.¹ Srīnivāsācārya also thinks of the possibility of seven-fold combina-

¹ Vide *Tattvatrayam*, p. 73.

Evam pañcīkaraṇeṇa sarveṣāṃ bhūtānāṃ paraśparaṃ misṛitatvācchab-dādiguṇa pañcakamāpi sarveṣu bhūteṣu vidyate.

tion of bhūtas with mahat and ahaṁkāra. Mahat and ahaṁkāra must be thought of undergoing division and consequent combination with the product of quintiplication to form the upādhi of an individual entity, for each entity has its buddhi, ahaṁkāra and indriyas with its physical frame. The five elements in the process originate the cosmos, generally represented in its causal state in the form of an egg. The creative effort has two designations in reference to the priority and posteriority of time. The effort immediately before the formation of cosmic egg is called samaṣṭi-sṛṣṭi, and that immediately after it, is vyaṣṭi-sṛṣṭi. The vyaṣṭi-sṛṣṭi is the beginning of heterization and individuation. In the process of heterization evolve the upper, the middle and the lower planes of existence.

Vedānta Deśika, the author of the Nyāya Siddhānta, denies knowledge to buddhi and attributes it to ātman, for consciousness or knowledge is eternally inherent in it. He denies all virtues also to buddhi. He defines it as a state which evolution reaches just immediately before ahaṁkāra and after avyākta. It is also called mahān. This, again, is sāttvic, rājasic and tāmasic due to the predominance of the constituent qualities, either of sattva, rajas and tamas. Ahaṁkāra is a state reached immediately before the indriyas. It is not the sense of an individual active agent (as often maintained). It originates the confusion between the body and the self. It lies at the root of all conceit and pride, originate as they do from the sense of undue importance of a false individuality and want of clear knowledge and discrimination. This, again, is sāttvic, rājasic and tāmasic. Indriyas originate from the sāttvic-ahaṁkāra, tanmātras from the tāmasic. The rājasic ahaṁkāra puts sattva and tamas to evolution.

The author does not differ from the account already given of the origin of the indriyas, the organs of sense and organs of action. But he fights out the view that *manas* is both an organ of knowledge and activity and holds it to be an organ of knowledge, for, even if *manas* regulates the organs of activity, it can do so not spontaneously, but with full-consciousness. And this trait it is never devoid of. It is associated with every sense, and in itself the faculty of retention. It is located in heart. The word 'manas' is also used in the sense of a mental stuff, the aggregate of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *citta* with its corresponding psychoses. *Citta* is the faculty of reflection and judgment (*cintāvṛtti*). *Samkalpa*, the volitional functioning, has also a place in the collective psychoses and is attributed to the collective mental consciousness called *antaḥkaraṇa* or *manas*. This puts aside the Sāṁkhya scheme of *antaḥkaraṇa* as an aggregate of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *manas*.¹ Vedānta Deśikācārya does not countenance the view that *tanmātras* evolve directly from *bhūtādi*, and that all *tanmātras*, except *ākāśa*, originate the *bhūtas* in continuous succession, with the help of preceding *tanmātras*. He, on the other hand, maintains, that *śabda* originates *ākāśa*, each succeeding *tanmātra* is a state in evolution between the two *bhūtas*, the originated and the to-be-originated one.² This is in conformity with Śruti texts (*Taittiriya*) where it is expressly laid down that *vāyu* originates from *ākāśa*, Vedānta Deśika has *vāyu* from *sparśa-tanmātra*, and *sparśa-tanmātra* from *ākāśa*. This, again, has a scientific interest and advantage over the Sāṁkhya and the *Samhitā* schemes that it preserves the continuity of evolution intact. Nigamanta Deśika also accepts

¹ Vide *Nyāya Siddhāntjanam*, p. 17 (bottom).

² *Ibid.*, p. 25, ll. 21-22.

the quintuplication process to account for the origin of the cosmic system out of the basic elements, and the qualities of the originated bhūtas. He does not accept niyati as eternal, creative and regulative factor, besides the sum total of adrṣta, formed in the course of evolution. If any objective meaning is to be extended to niyati, it is the initial desire of a creative effort and expression. It also means the functional fitness of each creative potency. But in any case it is not to be supposed as an independent category of existence.¹ Deśikācārya accepts kāla as a category of existence, the principle which influences changes in the order of prakṛti, but is fruitless in the order of spirits; though it, in its supra-natural form, has an existence therein.

Rāmānuja and his followers have a list of subordinate categories, called adravyas. The thing-hood constitutes dravya, its negation adravyas. The adravyas are attributes and relations. Under the attributes we have sattva, rajas, tamas, śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha and the śakti; under relation, saṃyoga, union. Sattva is, again, pure or mixed. The pure sattva is śuddha sattva. Śuddha sattva is dravya, for in itself it is a reality. This division of categories or existence reduces the seven categories of the Naiyāyikas to two only.

Sabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha are perceptible to the five senses. These are the products of quintuplication and not the original tanmātras.² These manifest different kinds and forms.

Saṃyoga or union is of two kinds, inasmuch as it is effected among the categories or their products, e.g. the union of Īśvara and kāla illustrates the former

¹ Vide *Nyāya Siddhāntjanam*, p. 40, ll. 1-8.

² Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, p. 94.

The application of saṃyoga to explain the relation of two eternal and ultimate existences is not happy, for this lends a certain amount of independence of, and externality to, kâla. Logic would demand the inclusion of kâla in the integrity of the Absolute. The Śaṃkarites identify it with mâyā.

Sakti is energy, the moving power. Each thing has an inherent śakti which causes transformation, change and evolution. The Rāmānujists have adravyas instead of twenty-four guṇas of Naiyāyikas.

Madhva's Scheme.

In the Madhva system under the category of substances are included, besides jīva, Īśvara or parātmā and its Śakti-Lakṣmī, abyākṛta ākāśa, the non-originated ethereal expanse, prakṛti, sattva, rajas, tamas, mahat, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas, the indriyas, tanmātra and kâla. The author of the Madhva Siddhāntasāra affirms that sattva directly emerges from prakṛti, rajas from sattva and tamas, and tamas from sattva and rajas. Sattva in its original state is pure and unmixed. It should be noticed here that śuddha sattva in Rāmānuja's system is by itself a different thing and has not been confused and identified with a prakṛti-evolute. This difference is important. Rajas is creative, sattva in rajas is preservative, tamas is destructive. Each of these elements has a presiding conscious deity. Lakṣmī presides over avyākṛta ākāśa, Rāmā over prakṛti, Sṛī over sattva, Bhū over rajas, Durgā over tamas. Mahat directly evolves from the three guṇas. Brahmavāyu is the presiding deity of mahān. Ahaṃkāra with its three forms comes after and from mahān in its tamas. Buddhi or vijñāna originates from mahat. It is an

element. It appears that both buddhi and ahaṁkāra originate directly from mahān. Buddhi is influenced by ahaṁkāra in its rājasic aspect. It energizes buddhi. Manas comes next. Vaikārika ahaṁkāra evolves manas. It has four functions, when it deliberates and desires, it is manas, when it rightly apprehends and justly reflects, it is buddhi, when it retains images and revives them, it is citta. Madhva's system has a departure here from the traditional Sāṁkhya, the Saṁhitā and the Rāmānujist scheme. It is more akin to Sāṁkarites' division of antaḥkaraṇa into its four vṛttis. The manas of Madhva does not in the least differ from the antaḥkaraṇa of Śāṁkarites. The author draws a distinction between buddhi and ahaṁkāra as tattvas (evolutes) and buddhi and ahaṁkāra as functions on vṛttis of the mental consciousness. The indriyas, organs of knowledge and activity, originate from taijasa-ahaṁkāra, the tanmātras, from tamasa-ahaṁkāra, the bhūtas directly from tanmātras, indirectly from ahaṁkāra. Such is Madhva's scheme. It does not materially differ from the other schemes except in a few details.¹

Nimvārka's Scheme.

We have almost a similar account in the Nimvārka School. Prakṛti and kāla are inherent. Kāla is a separate element, eternal, expansive and continuous. Prakṛti is under the influence of kāla, kāla is under the control of Īśvara. It is the condition of all changes and involution.²

The evolution of prakṛti has almost the same account everywhere for it follows chiefly the Sāṁkhya scheme. The homogeneity of the equable state soon

¹ Vide *Madhva Siddhāntasāra*.

² Vide *Vedāntaratna Mañjuṣā*, p. 38.

passes off, and evolution begins. This initial start and the continuity are due to the potencies of karma of the previous cycle and the vikṣaṇa of Īśvara. As soon as karma is ripe for fruition, the process starts. Mahat is the first evolute. Ahaṁkāra comes next. Ahaṁkāra causes confusion of body with self. Manas has a unique sense in the Manjuṣā. It has a diverse implication. It is manas, when it wills. It is ahaṁkāra when it superimposes the sense of I upon the body. It is citta, when it reflects. This organ and its functions originate from sāttvic-ahaṁkāra. Taijasa-ahaṁkāra evolves the ten indriyas, the senses. The tanmātras and the mahā-bhūtas originate from bhūtādi (tāmas-ahaṁkāra), śabda comes from bhūtādi, ākāśa from śabda. Sparśa-tanmātra comes from ākāśa, vāyu from sparśa-tanmātra, and so on. These bhūtas evolve guṇas, ākāśa evolves sound; vāyu, sound and sparsa; teja, sound, touch and heat, ap, sound, touch, heat and rasa (capacity of effecting taste); pṛthivī, the above four qualities and the capacity of effecting smell and originating scent. Here authorities differ. Some trace the direct origin of the element and through them the bhūtas.¹

Vallabha's Scheme.

The story of evolution is the same in Vallabha. But the bent of Vallabha's philosophy has lent to evolution a more direct relation with Īśvara, and therefore, an inwardness wanting in the previous schemes. The effect, the evolution, is non-different from the cause, and as such the whole process in the clear light of Avikṛta-Parināma-vāda is non-distinct from Brahman, which is both *causa materia* and *efficiens* of the creative order. Hence, the creative

¹ *Vide* the account given by Lokācārya.

order is more an expression of Being than a transformation. But it is not non-real. The scheme of expression in evolution has a significance for the gross intellect, which understands the order of things by causal nexus and has not the intuitive effort to feel the truth, the transcendent unity of Being and its expression. Vallabhācārya in his commentary on the *Srīmatbhāgavata* holds that every element in the creative order has its origin from Brahman. In the inward expression of Being Brahman is determinate conscious bliss, a determinateness possible through the differentiating predicates. Brahman has in it a dynamic necessity to express to itself in heterization, a beatific consciousness with its attributes of knowledge, bliss and activity.¹ *Puruṣottama* goes far to say that Brahman appears as a Bliss-figurate.²

In the outward expression Brahman with *māyā* evolves the world-system including the basic elements of the creative order, viz. :—*dravya*, *karma*, *kāla* *svabhāva*, and *jīva*. And this *māyā* is the creative principle, and not the principle of causing confusion. And these elements are to be thought as non-distinguished from it, for in the creative order, they are its emanations. Vallabha in his *Subhodhinī* has it that these elements, though manifold, are in essence identical, for nothing metaphysically real, except Brahman, exists. For empirical consciousness they have a value and existence, for spiritual consciousness they immerse in Being and its expression.³ *Dravya* is the *causa materia*

¹ Vide *Prasthānavatnākara* by *Puruṣottamācārya*, ch. ii, p. 160, ll. 6-10.

² Vide also *Bhāgavata*, ch. ii, 5, 17.

³ See *Bhāgavata*, commentary on ch. ii, 5, 13-14.

Teṣāṃ pañcānāṃ yadi bhagavāneva tattvam tadā tatkāryānāṃ sūtārāmeva ladevatattvaṃ bhavati.

of the evolution. Karma is the destiny. Kāla is the principle, which causes vibration (vikṣobha), svabhāva, the principle of transformation, and jīva, the enjoyer. Dravya is the matter, which kāla under destiny energizes and vibrates, and the inherent tendency or svabhāva of the dravya starts the process of transformation, yielding to jīva, the fruits of its karma.¹ Karma and svabhāva are embodied in kāla (Kālasam-sabhūtaṃ karmasvabhāvaṃ). Kāla imbibes in it sattva and is the śāttvic manifestation of Īśvara. It has three forms :—(1) ādhidaivika, (2) ādhibhoutika, (3) ādhyātmika. Ādhidaivika kāla is time undivided and eternal. Īśvara is this kāla. Kāla viewed as and determined by succession of events, especially of outer nature, is ādhibhautika kāla, and when viewed as having magnitude equal to that of ātmā is ādhyātmika. Karma has an objective import, and it implies the sum-total forces or tendencies. It is not inherent in ātman, though it determines the individuality and its progress and possibilities. The evolution of mahat, ahaṁkāra and the tattvas follows the traditional account. The three-fold ahaṁkāra is attributed to the three śāktis, the sattva with jñāna śakti, the rajas with kriyāśakti, tamas with dravya śakti. The first originates knowledge, the second, energy, the third, the elements. The tanmātras are objects of yogic perception. Indriyas originate from rajas, manas from sattva element² the tanmātras from tamas-ahaṁkāra.

Rasa is the tanmātra of āpa. This rasa has no

¹ Vide *Bhāgavata*.

Dravyaṃ adhibhūtaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ mahābhūtāṃ karma yogato janmanimittāṃ sādharāṇaṃ cakārātibhūtasamskāra-rūpaṃ cakāloguṇa kṣobhakah . . . Svabhāvaḥ parināmahetuḥ.

² Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 188.

colour but has unspeakable sweetness. In its effectual form, i.e. as āpa it gives various tastes, e.g. sweetness, bitterness, pungent, sour and various shades of combination of them. It originates after rūpa, and in combination with it it originates gandha.

Gandha is the essence of prthivī. It has an unmanifested and a manifested form, a causal and an effectual form. It originates after rasa and in combination with it.

Rūpa is the tanmātra of tejas. It originates after vāyu and in combination with it. It originates rasa. It has a causal and an effectual form. In effectual form it manifests various colours.

Sparsā is the tanmātra of vāyu. It originates after śabda, and in combination with ākāśa. It evolves rūpa. And so on.

The five Mahābhūtas originate from the tanmātras.

CHAPTER VI

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

The validity of knowledge—Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda, Parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda—The Mīmāṃsakas', the Vedāntists' and the Naiyāyikas' position considered—The definite sources of knowledge—Perception—Advaita theory, Rāmānujists' theory, Madh-vites' theory, Vallabhites' theory—The meaning of vṛtti—Mean-ing of perception—The object of perception in Advaitism and Vaiṣṇavism—Inference—Advaita theory—Rāmānujists', Madh-vites' and Vallabhites' theories of Inference—Forms of Inference—Upamāna—Arthāpatti—Anupalabdhi—Āgama.

In speaking of the sources of knowledge, the problem which demands our attention in the beginning is what constitutes the validity of knowledge. Knowledge has its sources in perception, inference, authority, etc., but in every case the validity is what constitutes the chief problem.

There are chiefly two issues :—

(i) The validity of knowledge is instituted in know-ledge itself. The truth of knowledge is self-evident and self-constituted.

(ii) The validity of knowledge is imported from without and imposed upon it. Knowledge has by itself no character (nisvarūpa).

The former asserts that knowledge carries with it its own conviction and proof; the latter affirms that know-ledge itself has no character, its conviction and proof mainly rest with the guṇa or property of acquainting us with truth, a property, which is not its own, but imposed from without. The former is technically called Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda, the latter is called Parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda.

Upon this problem the teachers of philosophy are divided :—¹

(1) The teachers of the Sāṃkhya school maintain that the proof and the disproof are equally self-constituted and self-dependent (svataḥ).

(2) The Naiyāyikas make them dependent upon extraneous causes (parataḥ).

(3) The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the proof is self-constituted, the disproof depends on external conditions.

The first apparently maintains that since knowledge is its own cause and proof, it can establish or disestablish itself, and this capacity is inherent in its nature. Such an affirmation is apparently self-contradictory. Knowledge cannot affirm its own proof and disproof. The truth of knowledge consists in recording things as they are; and the same knowledge cannot inform conformity or non-conformity and as such be both the source of proof and disproof or falsity.

But it may be contended that the proof and the disproof do not refer to identical cognitions, but to individual specific cognitions, so that an individual cognition is self-proved, another disproved by itself. We can have thus the validity and invalidity of knowledge constituted in itself.

Such a position commits us to an absurdity. Since there is nothing to indicate what constitutes proof and disproof besides knowledge, we cannot distinguish between truth and falsity of cognitions. If knowledge originates its own truth and falsity without reference to anything else, the hypothesis of specific differences of individual cognitions cannot be much helpful in avoiding

¹ Vide *Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha*, Jaimini Darśana.

the apparent contradiction of the position which makes the proof and the disproof of knowledge self-constituted.

The Mīmāṃsakas hold the self-constituted truth of knowledge. Truth of knowledge is inherent in knowledge, it is not imposed from without, for, as Kumārila in his Śloka Vārtika beautifully puts it 'aśakti' or a virtue which is not existent by itself cannot be created otherwise.¹ If knowledge cannot exactly determine its proof or truth by itself, nothing can, and experience becomes impossible. When knowledge is clear, distinct and free from defects due to internal or external conditions, knowledge constitutes its own proof. Even in false perceptions, knowledge is not false, the falsity lies in the non-discrimination of a presentation from a representation. The presentation and the representation are true, the falsity arises from a confusion of their distinctive characters.

The definite consciousness of the presentation is its own proof, and for this no reference is made to anything besides what constitutes the presentation. The presentation in perception, inference and śabda has a definiteness attached to each, and this definiteness is due to different causes. In perception it is due to sense-touch, in inference, it is due to invariable concomitance between the hetu and the sādhyā, in śabda it is due to right syntactical combination.

Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda in its emphasis upon the self-constitution of knowledge makes knowledge impersonal and objective : impersonal, because knowledge owes its origin to itself, objective, because its validity is not due to anything besides itself. In this way all forms of

¹ Vide Śloka-vārtika, Codanāsūtram, 47.

*Svataḥ sarva-pramāṇāṇaṃ prāmāṇyamiti gamyatām.
Na hi svato'satī śaktiḥ karttvyamanyena śakyate.*

knowledge, perceptual, inferential, or śābda (authority) become independent of all subjective influences and acquire the impress of impersonal truth. The fixing of meanings to words, their combination and syntactical connexion become independent of all personal influence.

The Vedāntin agrees with the Mimāṃsākas. Cit-sukhācāryya defines svatatva as what is 'originated in knowledge, and not originated in anything besides knowledge.'¹

It is not only true of transcendental knowledge, it is equally true of empirical knowledge. In experience the truth of knowledge is not dependent upon any other cause besides what produces it. In transcendent intuition the truth cannot be created by anything else besides intuition, for no such thing exists; self-evidence and self-intuition prove the truth. It has another mark in a negative way, the inconceivability of its non-existence. The thought of its non-existence proves its truth. Intuition is then its own proof.

Empiric intuition has an undeniable reference to sense-contact in perception, to mental consciousness with samaskāras in dream, and to the subtle vibration of avidyā in dreamless sleep. Even in these cases the self-constituted proof of empiric intuitions cannot be questioned, for, though the specific intuitions are caused by specific causes, still the truth or the proof of these intuitions is not dependent upon anything besides what constitutes the specific knowledge. With the specific conditions present knowledge carries with it a conviction, and to this end it does not require a confirmation from any other source.

¹ Vide *Citsukhī*, ch. i, *Svatastvanirukti*, p. 122.

Vijñānasāmagrījanyatve sati tadatiriklahetvajanyatvaṃ pramāṇyāḥ svatastvaṃ nāma.

In Advaita Vedānta the false perception in knowledge, for the moment, is not false. It is true in the particular universe in which it is formed. The different forms of existence possess some amount of being, and as such the illusory perception is illusory when it is sublated, and not till then, it has a being. In this sense empiric intuitions are all true, and their truth and proof are self-developed and self-formed. When the empiric intuition in one form is sublated, it is undoubtedly sublated by a higher form under a different condition. The sublated form appears false, because the conditions giving rise to it are not absolutely true, but relatively so. Even in false knowledge the knowledge of an existence is true, though the special character is false.

Parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda makes knowledge dependent upon an outward reference, i.e. it requires a reference to an element not involved in its own origination. It also demands a certain character of this reference, its being free from all defects. Knowledge, to be true, must refer to this mark, it has no self-constituted character of its own. It is, in the words of the *Sāstra-Dīpikā*, *nisva-bhāva*. Its truth as well as its falsity are equally dependent upon a reference besides its own self and being.

The difficulty of this position is apparent. It leads on to an infinite regress. If knowledge by itself is incapable of giving its own proof, none can establish its truth or validity. The demand for a reference is unceasing, as one reference will require the proof of another. No rest can we have in the process. And the problem remains eternally the same.¹

¹ Vide *Sāstra Dīpikā*, p. 78. (Beneras Edition.)

In the Nyāya School this reference is invariably held to be an inference. Doubt precedes knowledge and its proof. The question of proof, the school thinks, alone arises when there is an active demand for it. And this demand is furnished by doubt. In Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda the demand has no place, as all knowledge therein is its own proof. Doubt is impossible, and the demand of proof is absent. To put it in the words of the Siddhānta Muktvāli, 'If knowledge is already known, then its proof is also known,' how then is the doubt possible? If knowledge is not known, then doubt cannot arise. In this way doubt cannot arise and search for proof cannot begin. Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda has no sufficient ground of starting the problem.¹

The necessity of proof arises with the origination of doubt. Doubt denies the self-constituted character of knowledge and requires sufficient proof before it can yield to belief. And this demand of proof is satisfied by inference: 'This knowledge is correct, as it originates a definite desire for a thing which truly exists.' The Naiyāyikas thus make the truth of all knowledge dependent upon inference. Inference is the supreme test of the truth or falsity of knowledge.

The above affirmation is not tenable. It pushes the problem to further complexities. If knowledge has in itself no ground of its validity, how can inference establish this validity? And what ground is there to suppose that inference itself is valid? We may require another inference to prove validity. This leads on to an infinite regress. The process of determining

¹ Vide Nyāya Siddhānta Muktvāli.

Pramātvam na svato grāhyaṃ samśayānupapattitaḥ—tatra hi yadi jñānaṃ jñātaṃ, tadā tvanmate pramāṇyaṃ jñātameveti katham samśayaḥ.

the validity of knowledge must have a finality. And what necessity is there to refer this finality to something, besides knowledge and its own causes?

Moreover, to make doubt the invariable condition of the proof and the truth of knowledge is to ignore facts. The precedence of doubt before knowledge and the consequent demand of proof is not a psychological fact. Psychologically, doubt arises when the connative adaptation has a sudden check, the reflex conscious current turns upon itself and assumes a reflective and critical attitude. In such cases critical reflection and inference have incalculable value and give inestimable service. They set the doubt at rest. But in cases where no such necessity arises, there is no demand for appealing to a reference outward. The ideas have an even flow and the connative adaptation is continuous. Unless the ideas carry with them their own validity, every case of connative effort would demand an external test of its validity, and life and adaptation would be impossible.

The Naiyāyikas make the logical attitude more prominent in the demand of a proof in knowledge, the Mimāṃsakas on psychological instinct cannot but accept the convincing force of ideas and cognitions.

Vedāntism has gone to the limit of accepting the creativeness of *idee-forces*. Even in false creation, the knowledge is not false, the falsity is due to external causes, which obstruct clear discrimination, but the construction is not false. It holds on even temporarily. Knowledge in positing the locus gives us correct information and is thus far true. The falsity is created not by knowledge but by extraneous causes. We conclude then: the proof of knowledge is self-constituted, the falsity is created by extraneous causes.

The distinction of formal and material test of truth does not bear exact correspondence between svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda and parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda. Self-consistency and self-constitution are the demands of the svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda and this element of self-constitution introduces a reference which is not implied in self-consistency. This reference is a necessity as it keeps in view the way in which knowledge originates. Such proof extends to perception, inference, authority, etc. Parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda makes knowledge dependent upon an outward reference, inasmuch as it refers the truth and falsity of knowledge to something besides knowledge. Parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda has a close resemblance to the material test of truth, for it ascribes no character to knowledge, its truth or falsity has an invariable reference to exact or inexact resemblance with an outward thing or object.

We may now pass on to the sources of knowledge.

Advaitists' Theory of Perception.

Perception has different implications in Advaita Vedāntism. It is immediate consciousness, the absolute cognition, the psychological minimum of indeterminate consciousness. It is transcendent apperception. Perception as a psychological process is a determinate consciousness of an object or of the self knowing the object.

It is internal and external.

External perception implies the identity of the percipient-consciousness with the object-consciousness. The object-consciousness is the locus of the object and directly reveals it. The immediate knowledge of the object to the subject supposes that the percipient-consciousness must acquire an identity with the object-consciousness.

This identity is established by the mental consciousness (the *manas*) flowing out through the sense channels (orifices) and by its modification into the object form. This intermediate process establishes the identity and the object is immediately seen and perceived. Perception implies the destruction of the concrete ignorance by the *vṛtti*-consciousness and the expression of the object by the percipient consciousness.

The external perception is marked by the *antaḥkaraṇa* going out through the senses. The out-going *antaḥkaraṇa* soon gets the form of the object. The transformation is called *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti* is a psychosis which acquires a definiteness due to the functioning of mental consciousness according to a mould and form. Consciousness in that determinate form removes the ignorance and establishes the identity of the percipient and object-consciousness.

It has been customary to hold that the perception of an object requires the coincidence of *vṛtti*-*caitanya* and *viṣaya*-*caitanya*. But the perception of the subject as knowing the object requires the coincidence and identity of triple consciousness—*pramātri*, *viṣaya* and *vṛtti*-*caitanya*. It gives us a clear perception of the self. This distinction is not maintained by Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī. Perception is the expression of an object by the *sākṣī* or the percipient consciousness. *Sākṣī* gives the illumination by the virtue of its being the witness-consciousness. It has the capacity of revealing all things, including the subject and the object.¹ In the perception of objects or facts, the object through the perceptual process is put before the witness-consciousness and is revealed. The element 'subject-conscious-

¹ Vide *Siddhānta Siddhāntjanam*, Part I, p. 139, para 2.

ness, is there, yet it does not come up in prominence before the *sākṣī*. In the perception of the self as knowing the fact, the two elements are brought in clear perspective of the *sākṣī*. The coincidence of the *viṣaya-caitanya* and the *vr̥tti-caitanya* can hardly explain the perception of the object, for perception has a reference to the subject. The *pramātri-caitanya* accompanies *vr̥tti-caitanya*, though it may not be fully cognized. *Sākṣī* causes all revelation, be it of the logical subject or the object. And perception indicates the way in which both of them are focussed in the percipient-consciousness. *Pramātri-caitanya* does not go out, it sits upon the functions (*vr̥ttis*) of consciousness. Advaitism recognizes three aspects of consciousness in perception. *Sākṣī* is the transcendent though expressive consciousness, *Pramātri-caitanya* is the logical subject-consciousness, *viṣaya-caitanya* is the object-consciousness and *vr̥tti-caitanya* is the consciousness immanent in the psychological process.

The psychological object of perception is the concrete thing, the metaphysical object is the consciousness immanent in the thing, for knowledge has for its object what is covered by ignorance.

Vr̥tti is the transformation of the mental consciousness in the form of an object. The *antaḥkaraṇa* is a dynamic entity and is unceasingly active in receiving the forms of objects. It goes out through the sense channels and is engrafted on a thing. It takes on it its mould. It takes the impression of the object.

The function of *vr̥tti* is two-fold :—

(1) To establish relation between the subject and the object.

(2) To remove ignorance.

The former suits the realistic account of the Vedāntic

theory of perception, the latter the idealistic account which accepts nothing external to the self. Vṛtti only gives expression to what is hidden, or we can go so far as to say that vṛtti is creative, for in this account percipii is esse.

Rāmānujists, Theory of Perception.

Knowledge, to be true, must acquaint us with the thing just as it is and just as it behaves. Such knowledge is called Pramā. Viparjyaya is false knowledge and opposed to Pramā. Perception, to be true, must give us knowledge in the above sense.¹

Perception is the immediate consciousness of an object. This immediateness may be unconditioned or conditioned. God alone possesses the former. In finite beings unconditioned knowledge is not generally possible. They can occasionally get over the limitation of the senses and acquire a fitness for mystic vision. Consciousness, according to Rāmānuja, is all-expressive. Avidyā and the senses create a bar to all-expressiveness and so long as these are operative in man, he cannot expect to possess the intellectual intuition of God. But with the limitation removed, the finite beings acquire the all-knowingness of God.

Save and except the intuitive yogic consciousness, the immediate knowledge in perception is conditioned by the senses.

Sense-perception is always external. There is no internal or manas-perception. The self with its attributes is expressive, and as such a definite process in the form of internal perception is not thought necessary.²

¹ Vide *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Mānasapratyakṣamaipyasmādādināṃ nastyeveti vṛddhasaṃpradāyaḥ, ātmasvarūpasya tadharmabhūtajñānasya ca svayaṃ prakāśatvāt,

Perception is, again, determinate and indeterminate. Determinate perception gives a concrete cognitive and recognitive unity. Perception is indeterminate when the notion is not fully developed in its concreteness.¹ Though the relational concreteness through recognition is not developed, still the specific character of apprehension as apprehension makes the knowledge somewhat concrete and determinate.

External perception is immediate consciousness of objects conditioned by the senses. Here we have

- (i) the contact of the senses with the object ;
- (ii) and through the object, its qualities and forms are brought in touch with the senses. The former is called *Samyoga*, the latter *Samjuktāśrayana*.²

Madhvaites' Theory of Perception.

Jayatirtha draws a distinction between *kevala* and *anupramāṇa*. True knowledge is *kevala pramāṇa*, and that which gives us such knowledge is *anupramāṇa*. *Anupramāṇa* is perception, inference and *āgama*. *Anupramāṇa* is the process and *kevala pramāṇa* is the knowledge acquired.

When the Madhvaites speak of perception as a knowledge of things through the contact with the senses, they add a qualification that this contact must be free from all defects, otherwise perception would be faulty. Perception therefore implies :—

- (1) The sense must be free from all defects.
- (2) The object must be capable of being perceived.
- (3) A contact of the senses with such objects.

¹ Vide, *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*, pp. 43, 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

Viśayendriya samvandhaśca dravyeṣu saṃyogaḥ, dravyāśriteṣu rūpādīṣu tu samyuktāśrayaṇaḥ.

The senses must be capable of receiving the impressions. To this end, it is necessary that the object should not be too near or too far off, unexpressed or similar. Some make perception impossible, others give false knowledge or create confusion.

The Naiyāyikas accept the following forms of contact of the senses with objects :—

(1) *Saṃyoga*.—The union of the senses with the object, e.g. the contact of the organs of vision with the pot.

(2) *Saṃyukta-samavāya*.—The contact of the organs of vision with the *guṇas* inherent in the object involved in the perception of redness of the pot.

Two relations are indicated here :—

(i) the relation of *saṃyoga* (union) between the senses and the objects ;

(ii) the relation of co-inherence between the object and its *guṇas*.

The resultant relational consciousness is the combination of both.

(3) We may go further to indicate a still finer relation between the senses, the object, its specific *guṇas* and the generic attribute inherent in the *guṇas*—this relational consciousness is called *saṃyukta samaveta samavāya*.

These three forms come under *saṃyoga*.

(4) Next comes *samavāya* : It is co-inherence (eternal) of either attribute or action in substance. The *śabda* is perceived by co-inherence, e.g. co-inherence exists between the expanse in the auditory end-organs and sound (*śabda*). This contact between the auditory organ and sound is *samavāya*.

(5) Where the generic quality of sound is inherent in specific sounds we have a contact with the generic

quality through samaveta samavāya (coinherence in the co-inherent).

These two forms come under samavāya.

(6) Next comes svarūpa relation : which presents the adjectival theory of relational consciousness. Such a relation exists between (1) dravya and samavāya, thing and co-inherence, between samavāya and guṇa, co-inherence and attribute, (2) abhāva and its locus, i.e. where abhāva is perceived as a qualification of the locus, e.g. the absence of the pot in the flow. The svarūpa relation is necessary to bring out more fully the being of samavāya and abhāva.

Janārdan Bhatta (a Madhvite) refutes all forms of relational contact except union in perception. The senses can directly (by their projective force) express objects, and for such an expression an additional hypothesis of a relation between the senses and the object is deemed unnecessary. But contact implies union.

The guṇa is identical with the guṇī, and no relation can be conceived among them. Samavāya is refuted as involving an infinite regress and with the refutation of samavāya, the forms of samavāya can have no hold. Abhāva is directly perceived, and we require no conception of relation.¹

Perception, as knowledge through the senses, does not merely imply external perception. The word 'senses' has a double implication.² It denotes the subject-consciousness as well as the natural organs of senses. With this meaning, perception through the senses becomes at once a source of knowledge of things, internal

¹ Vide *Pramāṇapaddhati*, Perception, pp. 26-27.

² Vide *Pramāṇapaddhati*, p. 21.

Indriyaśabdeṇa jñānendriyaṃgrhyate tadvividhaṃ, pramāṇysvarūpaṃ prākṛtaṃ ceti, tatrasvarūpendriyaṃ sāksītyucyate.

and external. The subject-consciousness is called *sākṣī*. The *sākṣī* reveals the self and its attributes, *avidyā*, mind and its functions, the organs of sense, time and the unmodified *ākāśa*.

Madhvites speak of the *sākṣī* as *svarūpendriya*. This *svarūpendriya* (inner sense) is neither mind nor *ātman*. It reveals the self. From the function the *svarūpendriya* performs, we can regard it as the inner sense different from all other senses including mind but inherent in our essential being. It is the faculty of transcendental knowledge.¹ *Īśvara* possesses it, yogis develop it and make it active in them. It is not developed in ordinary mortals. It is, strictly speaking, the faculty of spiritual intuition. We should note here that *Vaiṣṇavas* accept spiritual bodies attached to every soul endowed with special faculties of spiritual functions (generally called *aprākṛta indriyas*). The demand of a contact of objects with the senses is also carried in intuitive perception of *ātman* and its attributes.

The Madhvites seem to have been influenced by the *Naiyāyika* supposition that even in internal perception a contact with the sense (*manas*) is necessary and therefore, have instituted a theory of *Svarūpendriyas*.² *Rāmānuja* has no such conception. Internal perception is according to him a self-expression. It is not strictly perception, as the word 'perception' by its traditional import implies a reference to the senses.

The organs of sense are smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing and mind. Mind is the inner organ which directs and controls the organs of sense. Mind, in itself, is a retentive and reproductive faculty.

¹ Vide *Pramāṇapaddhati*, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Svarūpendriyasātmataddharmair viśeṣaśaktiḥ sannikarṣorstaiva.

Perception is determinate and indeterminate. Indeterminate perception gives us the abstract apprehension of the thing without reference to time, place or thing-hood. Determinate perception gives us the concrete apprehension of the thing. This concreteness, according to the Naiyāyikas, is due to many causes and has many forms. It may be due to an attribute (*guṇa*), a definite action (*kriyā*), a substance (*dravya*), a class idea (*jāti*), a specific quality (*viśeṣa*), co-inherence (*samavāya*), name (*nāma*) and negation (*abhāva*).¹

Janārdan Bhatta (a madhvite) does not accept the two forms of determinate cognition, *samavāya* and *viśeṣa*. *Samavāya* is an unnecessary additional hypothesis to establish a relation where there is no demand for a relation. *Viśeṣa*, as convinced by the Naiyāyikas as the differentia of atoms, has been ignored in this form, for the Vedāntists do not accept the atomicity of matter, though *viśeṣa* has been retained as a differentiating mark. Janārdan Bhatta does not accept intermediate perception like the Naiyāyikas, for he thinks that the thing and the qualification are presented simultaneously and since they qualify each other, knowledge becomes in its inception determinate.² But a contention may arise that the determinateness due to *nāma* and *abhāva* is not possible in the initial act of perception, for *nāma* is not presented, but subsequently remembered, and the necessary reference of *abhāva* (negation) to its *pratiyogi* (the object) is not also presented with the perception of locus. And, therefore, these perceptions are indeterminate.

This apprehension is groundless. Name is one of the many qualifications of a thing. True it is not presented,

¹ Vide *Pramāṇapaddhati*, *Pratyakṣa Prakaraṇa*, pp. 26, 27.

² Vide *Prāmāṇapaddhati*, p. 27.

but subsequently represented, still knowledge may have other forms of characterization and be determinate.

The perception of abhāva is necessarily determinate, for abhāva apart from a reference to the object has no meaning, nor can we conceive indeterminate negation. An indeterminate negation is one that negates nothing and is a contradiction in terms. The perception of abhāva implies the knowledge of the locus and the non-apprehension of the pratiyogi, the object. This non-apprehension characterizes the locus as the locus of a negation. This characterization marks out the specialized form of the perception of negation.

Vallabhites' Theory of Perception.

Puruṣottamaji, the author of the Prasthāna Ratnākara, does not accept the distinction of indeterminate and determinate perception. He holds that knowledge is always determinate. Perceptual consciousness is relational consciousness. A relational consciousness does not necessarily presuppose indeterminate cognitions, otherwise any definite consciousness, e.g., a person with a trident, would imply an indeterminate cognition of the trident. But before the cognition of trident can be used as a term in relational synthesis, its knowledge must be definite and not indefinite. The distinction of two forms of relational consciousness, kevala viśiṣṭabuddhi and viśiṣṭāvaiśiṣṭabuddhi, a non-qualified relational consciousness and a qualified relational consciousness, one implying the predication of an attribute to the subject, the other implying predication of the predicate (with all the connotations of the subject term) to retain the form of intermediate cognition, is an unnecessary hypothesis. Relational consciousness always demands a definite knowledge of the terms of relation, and definiteness

implies determinateness. Indeterminate knowledge is then not a possibility. Knowledge is definiteness and definiteness involves predication.¹

The qualified relational consciousness (*vaiśiṣṭāviśiṣṭa-buddhi*) does not deny the ordinary theory of predication—all determinateness in cognition implies a subject and a predicate. It only makes the determinateness still more determinate by the express demand of the full meaning of each term of the relation. Each term gives a predicative judgment, these judgments are synthesised in a definite concrete whole.

The author draws a distinction between two kinds of determinate consciousness in perception (1) *viśiṣṭabuddhi*, (2) *samūha-ālamvana*.² The former is a predicative judgment, where the subject is always seen in relation to its predicate, the latter is also a judgment where other forms of relations come to the fore besides the predicate. But in no case knowledge is indeterminate.

This determinate consciousness may take five forms :—

- (1) *Samśaya*.
- (2) *Viparyaya*.
- (3) *Niścaya*.
- (4) *Smṛiti*.
- (5) *Svapna*.

Samśaya and *viparyaya* originate from ignorance. *Samśaya* is doubt between two possibilities. *Viparyaya* is false or illusory perception.

¹ Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 9.

Viśiṣṭajñānaṃ prati yadvaiśeṣanajñānasya kāraṇatvaṃ niyamaṃ tadindriyaṇa grihyamānsyaiva tasya. Anyathā daṇḍanīrvikalpakānanāntaram daṇḍīti buddhiḥ syāt. Na ca viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭabuddhiṃ pratigrihyamāna viśeṣanajñānatvenakāraṇatā, kevala viśiṣṭabuddhiṃ prati tva 'grihyamānenāpi tena seti vācyam, dṛṣṭāntabhāvenatādriṇīyame pramāṇābhāvāt.

² Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 2.

This theory is called anyakhyāti i.e. the intellect under the influence of a strong idea sees the outward thing different from what it is.¹

Perception is the knowledge acquired through the contact of object with the senses (tatra indriyārtha satsamprayoga janyam jñānam pratyakṣam). Manas is regarded as the sixth sense. The senses are atomic, not observable by themselves and capable of receiving objects which are fit to be received by them.

Puruṣottamācāryya (a Vallabhite) conceives five forms of contact of the senses with their objects :—

(a) Saṃyoga—The union of the senses with their objects, e.g., the contact of the organs of vision with the pot.

(b) Saṃyukta-tādātmya—The contact of the organs of vision with the attributes or guṇas inherent in the object involving a two-fold union between the organs of vision and their objects and the identity between the object and its attributes. The attributes are perceived by that form of contact known as saṃyukta-tādātmya.

(c) Tādātmya—In the internal perception the mind receives the expressions of consciousness and bliss in tādātmya-relation, the relation of identity.

(d) Saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇatā—The contact of the organs of vision with the locus of a negation or tiro-bhava. The locus is perceived by contact, saṃyoga, the negation as a predicate of the locus. The resultant relation in consciousness becomes saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇatā.

(e) Svarūpa—the functions of minds are perceived

¹ Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 17.

*Tatpūrvotpannasyānuvabhāvasya saṃskārātmanā sthitasyodbodhakair
prāvalye mayikārthākāraṇatā buddhivṛttirmāyayā bahiḥ kṣīpyate. Tadā sā
pūrovarttinūṃ sarvatoṃ'śato vā' vṛtīya bahiravabhasata iti māyikasyā-
nyasyaiva khyānādanyakhyātiritratra vyavahṛyate.*

in themselves without implying any relation to anything besides themselves.¹

Of these relations svarūpa is not strictly a relation. Svarūpa is identity. Tādātmya is not a relation, for it implies a distinction without a difference. But it is no identity. To distinguish it from saṃyoga, we call it identity, in fact it is an identity admitting of distinctions, but negating of difference. Saṃyoga is union, but not unity.

The five organs of knowledge—the organs of vision, taste, hearing, touch and smell—are capable of giving us knowledge of the rūpa, the rasa, the śabda, the sparśa, the gandha, respectively when they assume a manifest form fit to be received (udbhuta rūpa). These forms of perception reveal the objects underlying these qualities and the relations of the qualities to the immanent objects. The five senses can perceive pṛthvī with its five qualities. The four senses, save the smell can perceive āpa with four qualities. The three senses save the smell and the taste, can perceive teja, the two senses of the tvaca and the hearing, can perceive vāyu, the eye can alone perceive ākāśa. Dik and kāla (direction and time) cannot be directly perceived but only indirectly as qualifications of the perceived thing. The internal desires and passions are perceived by the manas. The self and its inherent attributes are not objects of ordinary perception. The sense of I is associated with ahaṃkāra, and through that is supposed to be cognized, but actually is not so cognized.

We cannot close the account of perception without clearing up the meaning of the word vṛtti. It has a

¹ Vide *Prasāhānaratnākara*, *Pramāṇa Pariccheda*, p. 117.

Loukikastu pañcavidhaḥ saṃyogaḥ, tādātmyaṃ, saṃyukta-tādātmyaṃ, saṃyukta viśeṣaṇatā, tādātmyaṃ, svarūpaṃ ceti bhedāt.

frequent use in Advaita and Suddha-Advaita theory of perception. We must here stick to its psychological meaning.

Vṛtti, in the Advaita Vedānta, is the modification of mental-consciousness helping the acquisition of knowledge by the removal of ignorance. This modification may be an internal psychosis, e.g., the affective or connative state. In this sense vṛtti is a mental functioning. In external perception it is a mental modification in the form of an object. In any case it does not lose its character of a mental modification. The Advaitins insist that in all forms of perception, internal or external, the mental-consciousness has a functioning and a definite modification. Such modification is called vṛtti.

The Suddha-advaitin, e.g., the author of the Prasthāna-ratnākara ascribes determinate-consciousness (whatever the form may be) to vṛtti or functioning in buddhi. Vṛtti is the form grafted upon the eyes and the mental-consciousness by the object. When the object is withdrawn, the form still persists. The form is mental and is not inherent in the object. Had it been so, it would have been removed with the disappearance of the object.

The Suddha-advaitins have followed the Sāṃkhyas. The Sāṃkhyas conceive a vṛtti to establish a relation between the senses and their distant objects. In such cases perception through a contact is not possible, and since the senses cannot move something must be conceived to establish a relation between the senses and their objects. And this is vṛtti. Vṛtti is a vibrative influence which issues from ahaṁkāra and through the senses goes out to the objects and reveals them. It is a form of ahaṁkāra. It should be remembered here that the sense-organs are evolutes of ahaṁkāra. Vṛtti

is an influence that goes out of ahaṁkāra and takes the form of the object. Ultimately its function comes to catch the form of the object and graft it upon buddhi.¹

The author of the Prasthāna-ratnākara accepts this conclusion and opines that vṛtti is not a separate evolute nor a separate faculty of mental-consciousness, but a temporary functioning of buddhi due to the timely agitation of sattva and rajas.²

It will be evident from what has gone before that Advaitism has three different positions in perception :—

(1) Transcendental in the sense that intuition is the absolute percipience, the immediate consciousness.

(2) Idealistic in the sense that to be perceived is to be directly connected with sākṣī, esse is percipii.³ The psychological object in this sense have no existence independent of the subject.

It has two forms inasmuch as the object is conceived different or not different from the percipii, both forms belong to Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi vāda.

(3) Realistic in the sense that the perceived object has an existence independent of the percipient-consciousness. Śaṁkara in the refutation of the Vijñānavāda has laid emphasis upon the reality of subject and object in perception. There he appears quite realistic.

The Ekajīvavādis accept the second position, the Vahujīvavādis, the third position. The second one naturally maintains the immediacy in perception, for the object here is in direct cognizance of the witness-intelligence.

¹ Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*

Kintu buddhitattvasya kālakṣubdha sattvādiguṇakṛto'vasthāviśeṣa eva.

³ Vide Kṛṣṇānanda's definition of perception—*Sākṣī vedyatvaṁ pralaksyatvam.*

The third theory also comes to the same conclusion, because in Vedāntism we do not draw a distinction between the perception of a thing immediately and the perception of a thing mediately through its reflection upon the mind. In each case perception is the immediate consciousness of the object.

The Vaiṣṇava teachers agree among themselves on the theory and the object of perception. They have the realistic position in perception. For them the object of perception is neither illusory, nor a mere psychosis. It is a thing existing external to the subject. They maintain that this thing is perceived as it is and in itself with all its qualities, but this perception is not an immediate cognition nor transcendental intuition of the yogis, but it is a process through the senses, but not necessarily mediate, if we do not exclusively confine immediacy to intuition. Here we have the sense-immediacy, though not the intuition-immediacy.

Theory of Inference.

Inference gives us the knowledge of a thing through a mark the thing possesses, when we cannot directly perceive it. It gives us a conclusion through the invariable concomitance between the thing and the mark, the relation between the major and the middle terms. The undeniable relation between the middle and the major terms leads on to another relation. Inference then is a system of relations in which we get a new position out of established relations.

Inference generally is composed of five members when it is an art of establishing a conclusion to others, e.g. :—

- (1) The mountain has fire,
- (2) because of the smoke,

- (3) wherever there is fire, there is smoke,
- (4) this mountain has smoke,
- (5) therefore it has fire.

The first one is the conclusion. The second gives the *hetu*, or the reason, the third gives us the major premise and a concrete illustration of the concomitance of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, the fourth gives us the concomitance of the middle and the minor terms, the fifth is the conclusion. The Vedāntists hold that the first three or the last three members of the above are enough to give us a conclusion. We do not require the full five members. The third is essentially necessary. Nigamantha Mahādeśika (Rāmānujist) says that there is no law about the constituent members of inference, it may be three or five, or it may require one *vyāpti* or two *vyāptis*, as the occasion demands it. *Vyāpti* is the sole ground of inference. How then is *vyāpti* established?

According to the Advaita Vedānta *vyāpti* is not an inference. It is only a *saṃskāra* generated by the observation of concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*: it is a permanent trace left upon consciousness and not an inference consciously drawn by the examination of the positive and the negative instances. The positive instances alone are thought sufficient to produce the belief of invariable concomitance and to leave an impression of this concomitance upon mind. The negative instances furnish a justification to it. We read in the *Paribhāṣā* 'The *vyāpti* is established by the observation of concomitance as supported by the non-observation of non-concomitance.' The non-observation of non-concomitance proves the rule by the exclusion of contradictory instances but not by the observation of the agreement of the absence of *hetu* and *sādhya*.

Advaita Vedānta further holds that the number of

instances is not essential or absolutely necessary to the *vyāpti*. The only thing that counts is the observation of invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, it matters not if we observe the concomitance once or many times.¹ Vedānta in laying no stress on the number of instances differs from the empirical view of the general proposition that the value of the major promises will be greatly increased if the range of experience is wide and the number of instances actually observed is numerous. The major premise sets forth the objective connexion between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. The Advaita Vedāntin seems to think that the multiplication of the instances are quite immaterial for the purpose. Psychologically the enumeration of instances increases our belief in the proposition, but logically the objective connexion is all that is needed to lend a support to conclusion. The ground and origin of our belief in this connexion is more a psychological than a logical question. The Vedāntists are more careful about the impression of the concomitance than about the ground of the belief in it. The particular instances observed do not work separately in the mind, they leave a cumulative impression, a general tendency to think the *hetu* and the *sādhya* in invariable concomitance, and this becomes the ground of inference.

Nigamantha Mahādeśika (a Rāmānujist) defines *vyāpti* to be an invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*, a relation not vitiated by *upādhi*. An *upādhi* is that which covers the major term, but not the middle term. When such an *upādhi* is present, it makes inference impossible. The *vyāpti* must not be

¹ *Tacca sahaçāra darśanam bhūyodarśanam sakṛddarśanam veti viśeṣo nādarāṇiyah, sahaçāyodarśanaiva prayojaktatvāt.*

vitiated this wise, and the invariable concomitance when it is not thus vitiated is the true foundation of vyāpti.

This invariable concomitance is established, according to Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, by the observation of a number of instances. The author of the Tatvaratnākara thinks that an observation of a single instance of concomitance is enough. Nigamantha Mahādeśika opines that the multiplication of instances is useful inasmuch as it leaves a cumulative impression which by counteracting the possibility of upādhi establishes the truth of the invariable concomitance without the least trace of doubt.¹ In thus laying an emphasis upon a cumulative impression the Rāmānujists accentuate the importance of the psychological basis of the vyāpti. The cumulative effect produces conviction, a conviction which is not obtainable by an observation of a single instance. The observation of a single instance may give us the objective connexion between the hetu and the sādhyā, but the multiplication of instances can produce unfailing conviction and removes all doubt.

Herein Nigamantha Mahādeśika differs from the Advaita Vedāntists who lay stress upon the observation of concomitance; the consideration of the number of instances bring to the fore the origin of our belief in the concomitance, and the observation of a large number of instances produces a habit and an expectation in mind. But both agree in thinking that the objective connexion between the hetu and the sādhyā is not established upon anything besides invariable concomitance.

Janārdana Bhatta (a Madhvite) defines vyāpti to be

¹ Vide *Nyāya pariśuddhi*, p. 54.

Tatrāpi bhuyodarśanajanītasamskārasamudayādhinavimarśa viśeṣeṇopādhisambhāvanāmucchinatā niḥśaṅkasaṃbandanīyamasiddhiritica siddham.

invariable concomitance. But he conceives the invariable concomitance in a negative way. It is not the co-existence of the middle and the major terms in the same locus just as Naiyāyikas conceive. They define this concomitance in negative terms. Vyāpti is a negative concomitance. Wherever the major term is absent, the middle term is also absent. Such a negative concomitance between the absence of hetu and the absence of sādhyā is vyāpti. It is based upon the agreement of non-concomitance. The invariable concomitance of the hetu and the sādhyā, generally called sāhacārya, is, according to the Madhva school of logicians, this negative form of invariable concomitance. Madhvites argue that vyāpti is not established by the co-existence of the hetu and the sādhyā. Experience shows that hetu and the sādhyā might have different loci, e.g., when we infer rain in the hills from the swelling of the rivers below. To cover all cases of inference, the Madhvites define vyāpti in this negative way.¹

Janārdana Bhatta speaks of different forms of concomitance in his Prasthānapaddhati.

(1) Concomitance of the hetu and sādhyā in the same time and space.

(2) Concomitance in time but not in space.

(3) Concomitance in different space and time.

(4) Concomitance in all time but momentarily in space.

(5) Concomitance in space but momentarily in time.

(6) Concomitance of a limited with a wider category.

¹ Vide *Anumānaprakaraṇa*, *Pramāṇapaddhati*, p. 29.

Iyameva vyāptiḥ sādhyenavināsādhanasyābhāvo' nupapattiritibhāvenā vinābhāva itī sāhacaryānyamaitīcocyate.

(7) Concomitance of a wider with a limited category.

(8) Concomitance of the constituents of the whole.¹
To cover all these cases the vyāpti has been conceived as the concomitance between the absence of the sādhyā and the absence of the hetu.

The author also enumerates certain relations which determine the invariable concomitance. These are co-relations between the different dharmas. These co-relations are four in all, of which two are relations of compatibility and two are relations of incompatibility.²

(1) Samavyāpti,—wherever the dharma, (a), exists, there the dharma, (b), also exists, the two attributes are co-extensive.

(2) Visamavyāpti—where the terms are of wider or less denotation, so that in all cases of (a), (b) is, but in all cases of (b), (a) is not.

(3) Parasparaparihāratvenaivavṛtti — where the dharmas are mutually exclusive, e.g. (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive.

(4) Kēcitkvacitsamāvista'api kvacitparasparaparihāreṇaivavartante—where the dharmas are neither completely exclusive nor completely identical. In some cases they meet, in some cases they do not.

These four forms of relations represent the relations presented in the four propositions U.A.E.I.

Vallabhite's Theory of Inference: Prasthānaratnākara

The author of the Prasthānaratnākara defines the vyāpti as the invariable co-existence of the hetu (the middle term) and the sādhyā (the major term) in the same locus (pakṣa). Invariability implies an agreement

¹ Vide *Pramāṇapaddhati*, p. 31.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

in presence and absence of the hetu and the sādhyā and *vice versa*, i.e., wherever the hetu is, the sādhyā is; wherever the sādhyā is not, the hetu is not.¹

This invariable concomitance is a matter of direct experience. The enumeration of instances is not a pressing requirement to generate our belief in it. Experience leaves behind a permanent impression or saṃskāra. The saṃskāra works out through memory and whenever the middle term is presented, memory calls up the invariable concomitance and infers the major term.²

Forms of Inference.

Advaita Vedānta does not accept the three divisions of inference of Nyāya school, viz., Anvaya vyātireki, Kevala-anvayī, Kevala-vyātireki. All inference is of the kind, viz. Anvayī, i.e., the inference on the ground of agreement in presence, i.e., positive concomitance. The Kevala-anvayī form of inference rests upon invariable and undeniable concomitance of hetu and sādhyā—a concomitance, the negation of which cannot be conceived,³ e.g., the pot is knowable, because it is nameable. We get here an Anvaya-vyāpti, whatever is nameable is knowable, but we can have no Vyātireki-vyāpti—whatever is not knowable, is not nameable, for there is no concrete illustration to the point. Vedānta rejects this form of inference, for, according to it, nothing is eternal except Brahman. The negation of all things is thought possible and actually sought. According to the Nyāya system there

¹ Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 139.

Tathāca uktarūpavyabhicāraviśiṣṭaṃ hetuniṣṭhaṃ sādhyādhikaraṇa vyāptiṃ vyāptiḥ.

² Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 143.

³ Vide *Tattvacintāmaṇi—Anumānakhaṇḍam*.

are completely positive concepts. Their corresponding negative forms are non-existent. From the Vedāntic standpoint there is nothing fully positive, except Brahman, and therefore, everything in the immanent order including the most positive of concepts is actually denied, so that there can be no fixed, unalterable and indestructive relation in the phenomenal order.

Kevala-vyātireki (negative form of inference) is inference founded upon negative non-concomitance, e.g., the earth differs from others because of smell. The argument analysed be put thus: if the earth is not different from others, then it is not possessed of smell. But it is possessed of smell. It is, therefore, different from others. This form of inference corresponds to a destructive hypothetical-categorical syllogism where we infer the negation of the hetu, from the negation of sādhyā, the negation of the cause, from the negation of the effect. Such an inference is treated by the Vedāntin under Arthāpatti where we infer from the effect to the cause.¹

Now, that the Advaitists reject both the forms of inference Kevala-anvayī and Kevala-vyātireki—they cannot accept the third one which is inference based upon agreement of concomitance and agreement of non-concomitance, e.g., where is smoke, there is fire; (this is positive concomitance), where is no fire, there is no smoke (this is negative concomitance). One who cannot conceive a mark in complete agreement with anything in presence and absence must refuse to accept any form of inference based upon them. Hence the Vedāntin accepts the inference known as anvayī, agreement on concomitance, invariable, but not undeniable.

¹ Vide *Advaitacandrikā*, p. 26.

Nigamantha Mahādeśika (a Rāmānujist) accepts the two forms in inference :—

(1) Anvaya-vyātireki, (2) Kevala-anvayī.

The former is an inference in which the vyāpti or invariable concomitance is an agreement in presence and absence between the hetu and the sādhyā.

(1) e.g., Where is smoke, there is fire.

This mountain has smoke.

∴ This mountain has fire.

A concrete instance is cited. This is agreement in presence.

(2) Where is no fire, there is no smoke,

This mountain has no fire.

∴ This mountain has no smoke.

A concrete instance is cited, e.g., a lake. Such an inference requires two forms of invariable concomitance. The negative concomitance establishes the conclusion reached by positive concomitance.

Nigamantha Mahādeśika denies Kevala-vyatireka forms of inference. He follows Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja has it that Kevala-vyātireka cannot be established.

They argue thus: Kevala-vyātireki is based upon the negative form of vyāpti, i.e., the concomitance between the negation of the sādhyā and the negation of the hetu. And when this negative concomitance has no exception anywhere we have Kevala-vyātireki, e.g., the earth differs from everything, because of the smell. It is an exclusive instance of the negative concomitance between the absence of the sādhyā and the absence of the hetu. In this case the major premise (whatever differs from the earth has no smell)—Nigamantha Mahādeśika argues, cannot be established, for the example of this concomitance anywhere else cannot be found. Such a concomitance is found only in the earth. But that is no

inference. The 'difference of everything from the earth' is centred in the earth and nowhere else and the concomitance of the sādhyā (itara vyāvartta) and the hetu (gandha vattva) is not proved before and cannot be proved anywhere, and as such the ground of inference is not established anywhere but in the supposed conclusion of the inference. Such an inference is open to the charge of circular reasoning. The instance which is helpful to establish the vyāpti becomes the conclusion which the vyāpti establishes.¹

Madhvites' Forms of Inference.

Janārdana Bhatta recognizes three forms of inference:—

(1) Kārya-anumāna—an inference of the effect from the cause.

(2) Kāraṇa-anumāna—an inference of the cause from the effect.

(3) Akārya-kāraṇa anumāna—an inference different from these, which is not governed by the causal nexus.

The inference of smoke from fire illustrates the first, the inference of the approaching rains from the rising clouds illustrates the second. The former can infer only the cause, the latter can trace the diversity of effects. Where an inference is based upon a concomitance other-wise than a causal bond, we have the third form, e.g., the sight of a fruit leads on to the inference of its taste.

Besides these, the author recognizes two other forms of inference:—

(1) Dṛṣṭam.

(2) Sāmānyata dṛṣṭam.

The inference wherein the hetu and the sādhyā

¹ Vide *Nyāya Priśuddhi*, p. 67, para 2 and p. 68, para 1.

co-exist in the same locus, and this co-existence and co-inherence are matters of direct perception, is called *dr̥ṣṭa*, e.g., the smoke-fire form of inference. The inference, wherein such concomitance is not fit to be observed, but is the ground of a possible inference is called *sāmānyata dr̥ṣṭa*, e.g., the inference of a man's vision from his knowledge of colours.¹

Vallabhites' Division of Inference.

The author of the *Prasthāna-ratnākara* accepts two forms of inference :—

(1) *Kevala-vyātireki*—is that form of inference wherein the *hetu* and the *sādhya* do nowhere co-exist except in the particular locus and this concomitance must be negative, e.g., the earth differs from others, because of being earth.

(2) *Anvaya-vyātireki*.

Upamāna.

Advaita Vedāntists recognize *upamāna* as a source of knowledge. *Upamāna* gives us the knowledge of similarity. The functional activity of the consciousness of similarity gives us the effective knowledge of similarity. This knowledge cannot be perceptual, as the terms of comparison are not presented to the senses. Nor is it remembrance, for the consciousness of similarity is felt directly, it has no reference to the past experience. It is not, again, an inference, for the likeness is cognized, but not inferred.

The author of the *Prasthāna-ratnākara* (a Vallabhite) thinks otherwise. *Upamāna* is not a different source of knowledge. The knowledge of similarity is directly perceived when the mark of similarity and the

¹ Vide *Pramāṇapaddhati*, *Anumāna prakaraṇa*.

object are presented. It requires a reference to memory and to an identical quality or the mark.¹

Arthāpatti.

Advaita Vedāntin recognizes Arthāpatti as a source of knowledge. It is an implication of cause from effect. It is a hypothesis of the cause. When a well-ascertained fact cannot be explained without the presumption of another thing as causing it, the presumption is arthāpatti. Rāmānujist identifies arthāpatti with an inference through a negative mark, vyāptireki linga, Madhva with kāraṇa-anumāna. Vallabhite also recognizes it as vyāptireki-anumāna.²

Anupalabdhi.

Advaita Vedānta recognizes non-apprehension as a source of the knowledge of abhāva. Abhāva is negation and this is cognized, according to Advaita Vedāntists, by a separate source. But the Vaiṣṇava teachers as shown above maintain that abhāva is perceived along with its locus, as viśeṣana.

Abhāva is relative to an object and to a locus. Its knowledge, therefore, requires the knowledge of the locus as well as the absence of the object. Perception is not competent to give us this knowledge. It can give us the knowledge of the locus in which the knowledge of the abhāva may be implicit. But to make the knowledge explicit we require a separate mode of knowledge, i.e., anupalabdhi. One point more. Abhāva must belong

¹ Vide *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 148, para 2, lines 1-3.

Ibid., p. 149.

² *Pramitiṭve'pi tena vina'nupapannasya tadābhāva vyapakṣbhūtābhāva pratiyogitvāt vyatirekavyāptisattvena tajjñānasyārthāpatti karanasyānumānānatirekāt.*

to the same order of reality of existence as the locus, it must be capable of being observed.

Āgama.

Besides the sources of knowledge indicated and explained above, Vedāntists of all schools accept āgama as another source of knowledge ; in fact, it is the source, which more than any other is truly entitled to acquaint us with the knowledge of Brahman. On this point there is no divergence of opinion among the Vedāntic teachers. Brahman has the epithet ' Oupaniṣadhic ', i.e. the reality which is cognizable through the Upaniṣads, which only can vouchsafe unto us the truths of revelation.

Śaṅkara has had it in his commentary that the Vedās are the only sources from which we can learn Brahman in its true nature.¹

Rāmānuja has characterized Brahman as what can be established by the śāstra (the Vedās)—Sāstraika-pramāṇakatvat brahmaṇaḥ.² None of the ordinary sources of knowledge are fit to give the knowledge of Brahman. The senses have not the fitness to perceive Brahman. The inner sense can only reveal the inner states and cannot perceive anything outer without the senses. Nor can inference help here, for Brahman is transcendent and non-relational, and as such a valid inference regarding its existence upon an adequate basis (hetu) is not possible. Valadeva has it ' Brahman is not inferrable, but knowable through the śāstras '—otherwise the epithet ' Oupaniṣada ' becomes meaningless. Meditation gives immediate consciousness, Vedānta, mediate consciousness.

¹ Vide *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, i. 1. 3.

² Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 131.

Ātmaniātmindriyatvena pratyakṣādīpramāṇā viśayatayā brahmaṇaḥśāstraika-pramāṇakatvāt.

These quotations establish beyond doubt that Vedānta has a meaning and influence not only as a ratiocinative discipline, but also as a discipline which has systematized the truths of revelation. And in this Vedāntism differs from the other systems of Indian philosophy, from the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya also, though both of them accept authority as a source of knowledge. Sāṃkhya claims that which comes down from the spiritually fit carries with it a force of proof far out-weighting the convincing force of knowledge of other sources. Such a source is valuable and cannot be ignored.

Vedānta calls such authorities śiṣtas. It accepts them when they happen to fall in with the affirmation of the śruti. It denies them when they differ. And in denying them in favour of the śruti they accentuate upon some characteristics which the śruti or the Vedās alone can possess. These are :—

(1) Infallibility.¹—Whatever may come from the śiṣtas may be fallible, for the śiṣtas have the possibility of making mistakes and since their intuitions differ, we must have an appeal to a source whose veracity and infallibility cannot be least doubted. And it is no doubt beyond cavil to accept the higher authority of the śrutis, embodying, as they do, the revelations of God. The Vedāntin accepts the śruti as a source of knowledge only because its affirmations cannot be contradicted.

(2) Impersonality.—The Mīmāṃsakas differ from the Naiyāyikas in accepting the impress of impersonality of the Vedic revelations.

The Vedas, the group of śabda and artha—sounds and their meanings, according to the Naiyāyikas are

¹ Vide *Sāṃkhya Bhāṣya*, ch. ii. 1. 1.

Vipratipattou ca smṛtīnāmavaśyakaritatvye'nyataraparigrahe'nyataraparitvāge ca śrutyanusārinyah smṛtayah pramāṇamanapekṣyā itarāḥ.

created and therefore, subject to Īśvara's will. The words and their denotative and connotative capacities are fixed in creation. The Vedas are among the creative products of Īśvara. Hence the authority is personal in the sense that its meaning and expression are subject to a personal being and its will.

The Mimāṃsakas differ. They maintain that the Vedas are the expression of the infinite knowledge of Īśvara and are a part of his being, so that nothing in them can be changed according to his will; on the other hand, in every cycle of creation the Vedas must have necessarily the same expression, as they are eternally the same in Īśvara. Creation or dissolution can have no effect upon the relation of the words, and their meaning. The denotative and the connotative potency of words are fixed eternally.

The Vedas thus bear the mark of impersonality. And this makes them a sure source of truth and knowledge, and as authority their value ranges high, freed as they are from the inaccuracies and defects of personal authorities.

(3) From this we can conclude the objectivity of the Vedic truths, dependent as they are not upon any personal source. Intuition is the direct method of perceiving transcendent truths. It may be charged with subjectivism, but the Vedic revelations are free from this charge, and in this they can claim a superiority to intuition. When an intuition falls in with a Vedic revelation, the Vedāntic teachers give them their whole-hearted acceptance.

(4) Objectivity gives unto Vedic truths a character of necessity, and since they are not originated from subjective experience, either intuitive or sensuous, these truths are in the eternal scheme of the universe.

CHAPTER VII

REALIZATION AND DISCIPLINE

The *Summum bonum*—The static and dynamic intuition, the mysticism in Vedānta—Liberation in Śaṅkara is the denial of the psychological soul and the realization of the metaphysical identity—Liberation in theistic teachers is the attainment of Unitive-consciousness—The possibility of Jīvanmukti—Vaiṣṇavas deny Jīvanmukti, accept Videhamukti—The Brahman sāmyāpatti—Jīva Gosvāmī on liberation—Liberation of the wise and the liberation of the devotee—Vallabha on Akṣara Brahman and Puruṣottama—Madhva and the author of the Nyāyāmṛta on Jīvanmukti and Videhamukti—Grace, the *sine quā non* of liberation—Nimvārka accepts Videhamukti—Has the liberated soul a body?—Five forms of love consciousness—quietus, service-consciousness—friendship—parental tenderness—inamorato sweetness—Samanjāsā—Sādhārāṇī and Sāmarthā—The aggressive and passive types of love consciousness—Ghṛtasneha and Madhusneha—Vallabha's Puṣṭimārga—the Vedāntic discipline—Śaṅkara's account—Vṛtti—Falavāpya and Vṛttivāpya—The lower forms of worship—Rāmānuja's scheme—Three stages in realization—Ethics before Theology—The definition and connotation of Bhakti—Bhakti-consciousness as distinguished from Yogic-consciousness—Śaraṇāpatti—Grace—The varied expression of the devotional consciousness—Seven qualifications for devotion—Madhva mainly follows Rāmānuja—Madhva on Bhakti and grace—Analysis of Bhakti in the Bengal School—Bhakti in its causal and effectual form—The gradual development of love-consciousness—The account of the Nimvārka School—The account of the Vallabha School—the difference of Puṣṭi and Maryādā—The four forms of Puṣṭi.

Vedānta in all its forms is an attitude of thought that seeks to transcend the sense of division and separateness, so much natural to a partial and imperfect vision of consciousness and reality. In all its phases

it seeks theoretically to embrace truth in its widest generality and practically to assimilate it in life. It seeks earnestly to ward off the false individuality, the creation of avidyā, and to attain the fuller vision of life and consciousness. In this it is intuitionism, for the soul of Vedāntism lies in the face-to-face vision of truth and the consequent felicitous calmness with the delight of conviction and the joy of rest and attainment.

Thus far the aspects of Vedāntism agree. But the *Summum bonum*, though generally accepted to be knowledge and bliss, differs to suit the cast of the different phases of being—static and dynamic. In Śaṅkara liberation in identity-consciousness has been the end. And this liberation is the loss of individual-consciousness and the breaking of the bondage of nescience, the false, though an eternal sense of an I. In other words it is to get over the duality and relativity of empiric consciousness and to realize the transcendent expanse, identity and fullness of being as consciousness. It is also the highest beatitude of bliss, for bliss is identical with a continuity and fullness of existence. The end of Śaṅkara Advaitism has been this freedom in expansive bliss, the psychological ideality of self is to be lost or immersed in the metaphysical reality of transcendence. The psychological ideality creates an ideality of not-self in the relative empiric consciousness. This relativity is sought to be absolved in the super-conscious plane, where the ideality of self and not-self does not and cannot obtain. The Vedāntin has even in experience found the transcendent identity in consciousness as witness (a state within the bounds of normal and native consciousness) which is not affected by the division in the lower consciousness of relativity.

Vedāntism has a mystic touch, for it aspires to get over reason and its claim and opens up the path of direct insight and realization. Reason or logic occupies a subordinate place herein, for the psychological opening and revelation are always accepted as the real pathway to the conception of reality. The aid of reason is sought to systematize such revelations. Thought has diverse and often contradictory ways, and Vedāntism affirms that wriggling in logic of thought does not persent truth before view, and life sometimes denies thought-activity and transcends it in intuition to get at the first-hand knowledge of reality. Vedāntism, as a system, has laid more stress upon the psychological revelations, and logic has followed psychology to explain and integrate all the experiences of conscious life. Though the mystic experiences differ, their explanation and systematization differ too, yet none can deny that in Vedāntism mysticism has the greater demand than logical systematization. But the trouble is that these mystic intuitions do not offer the same presentations; the appearances widely differ and different schools are anxious to claim some as real and true visions and disclaim others as psychical aberrations. In this way intuition and logic co-operate to establish truth on a humanly convincing basis. Truth in Vedāntism should satisfy the claims of logic in the absence of self-contradiction (*ātmavirodha śūnya*), of metaphysics in the impossibility or inconceivability of a denial (of Being) (*avādhita viṣayatva*), and of psychology in the direct experience. And when these three converge to the same thing, we have, humanly speaking, the truth.

Rāmānuja and the theistic teachers do not uphold the distinction between the psychological ideality of self

and the transcendent reality. The ideal to them is the real, and the relativity is metaphysical and not psychological. The metaphysical relativity of consciousness is a truth which holds in every sphere of conscious life, immanent or transcendent. In our search for a consummation, consciousness cannot be free from this character, though it now transcends the sense-limitation and sense-operation and the mediate vision of objects and attains the immediate and the transcendent vision of the infinite. This immediate realization of the infinite as the innerscient (*antaryāmin*) and still more as the transcendent Bliss-self is the highest beatitude. The dawn of spiritual consciousness is heralded with the synthetic appreciation of the harmony of divine life through man, society, humanity and the cosmic order, but it does not attain full fruition unless it transcends the bounds of nature and begins to feel the pulse of the self-expression to self. This self-expression to self is the transcendent expression of the infinite, and the finite-self cannot have rest and satisfaction unless it has its vision and realization. Not only this. It must feel itself as no longer an individual on nature's plane divided from the infinite life. It must have a total conversion and transformation of its own self and recognition of its being as a being-for-the-infinite, a complete inversion of its own self as subordinate to and completely dependent on and mainly existing for the infinite. Liberation in both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja connotes transcendence; but while in Śaṅkara transcendence is identity and the denial of immanent relativity due to nescience, in Rāmānuja transcendence is supra-natural unity and symphony in divine life and finally is to get beyond the influence of *māyā* and come under the influence of the *svarūpa śakti*. The two

systems insist upon this opening of mystic consciousness and intuition; and the chief attraction lies in this intuitive realization, be it of the identity or unitive-consciousness. Anyway the sense of division is disparaged. In the theistic interpretation the emphasis is laid upon the delight of variety in divine transcendence.

The term Liberation or emancipation fits in with more Śaṅkara's conception, than Rāmānuja's, for in it a bondage is cut off, the false notion is displaced by the right one. Be it noted that liberation and bondage are relative terms, and they can be applied to jivas, but, not to self or ātman, which is eternally free; the bondage is only apparent.

In Rāmānuja emancipation connotes liberation from the association of prakṛti, which, for the moment, creates an individuality, confuses the truth of reality with the falsity of appearance. The individuality is to be broken by the knowledge of the true ego, and a clear discriminating conscious of the false and the true, the inert and the conscious in the man. And in so far liberation implies this breaking of nature's bond, we can speak of the emancipated soul as getting into the infinite expanse and the transcendental realm. But it is in no sense the parting with a finite personality. In the finitude of the soul it feels and enjoys the infinite pulse. And this becomes possible through śakti, the divine influence. And we have already pointed out that in theistic systems much stress is laid upon the divine influence and its mysterious working. We have a sort of occasionalism in Rāmānuja.

Liberation in theistic sense is not the denial of the relativity of consciousness, for in it is fully realized the import of the metaphysical relativity, which does not exclude difference, but includes and absorbs it in the

transcendental apperception of unity. In such a state of transcendence of consciousness and being, our knowledge is more expansive, delight deeper, life more easy and free. But it is a freedom of acceptance of the divine life, a spontaneity of spirit, not external and opposed to the infinite life and response, but a life moving in unison and harmony with it. It is a freedom and a necessity both, freedom in the sense of a release from the divided vision and obstruction, necessity in the sense of utter dependence upon the infinite. This dependence or resignation is a pathway to greater security of being and therefore, a greater promise of freedom in the fellowship with the infinite. The theistic Vedāntism in denying to finite beings an independence has secured for them not a complete absorption, but a fellowship in love. The painful consciousness of a divided life is now absent, the joy of service has taken its place. The passiveness of resignation and the complete surrender of the entire being have the immediate effect of calling forth a graceful response from infinite love, which purifies and protects us from sins of flesh and ultimately paves the way for finally bringing the resigned under its protection. Love vouchsafes a new life, opens a new vision, affords a new delight. It is this expansive life, the blessed one feels, the unalloyed delight it enjoys, the unsought for care of a loving consciousness it reposes on. Knowledge here is expansive, delight, too deep for expression. It is the death of the lower man, the natural man, and the regeneration and birth of the true self, which finds in surrender and resignation the promise of the spiritual self and the highest freedom, which, again, is the greatest necessity. The realization here is the consciousness of the infinite expression and the reception in the being of its finite

self the divine influence. This gift and its reception afford the highest bliss awakening in us the reflex movement of love and service to check the receptive attitude and to afford the joy of active service and loving consciousness. This process has a continuity in the life of transcendence in knowledge, love and bliss. The psychological variations in realization have been indicated briefly in the chapter of Appearance.

Śaṁkara Vedāntism accepts two forms of liberation—liberation with or without the physical being. Vedāntism is, indeed, a source of great consolation to humanity in that it promises to it the direct consciousness of freedom and its expansive delight even here in this mortal frame. Videhamukti is emancipation simultaneously with the casting off of the physical being, for the commenced karma 'prārabdha' has been exhausted and no new karmic obligation to cause the continuity of individual consciousness has been incurred. And nothing remains to keep up the combination with its energizing vital and mental consciousness any longer. The veil of ignorance is put off for ever, and the liberated soul passes into the calm.¹

Curiously enough, however, Śaṁkara's and Rāmānuja's systems differ in epistemological setting, they agree in conceiving liberation as an expansive being with unceasing delight, though such an existence may or may not transcend relativistic consciousness. Śaṁkara denies relativistic consciousness, Rāmānuja accepts its assimilation in an unitive consciousness, in transcendent being. These nice distinctions apart, both of them accept an infinite dimension of knowledge and being in liberation. None denies this. Rāmānuja, though he

¹ Vide *Jivana Mukti Viveka*.

Yeyam Videhmuktirjñānotpattisamakālinajñeya.

holds atomic magnitude of finite souls, accepts an extensive dimension for these souls in liberation otherwise he cannot support his thesis of Brahman-likeness of jīva in emancipation. Rāmānuja accepts the possibility of an expansiveness to the dynamic expression of consciousness and this expressiveness has its full exercise and expression when the limitation of avidyā is destroyed.

We have already pointed out (in Chapter V) that Śaṅkara's Vedāntism recognizes such a beatitude in the evolution of jīva-consciousness and the attainment of Īśvara's being and knowledge. When the consciousness in jīva through discrimination and dissociation comes to feel its being as the object as well as the locus of avidyā, it has its jīvahood replaced by Īśvarahood. And the limitation of being and consciousness is replaced by an expansion of being and knowledge. No doubt, according to Śaṅkara, this possibility for jīva in the course of evolution is still a possibility in avidyā. So up to a certain point the forms of thought agree in the delight of expansive being, in the clarity of unobscured and unobstructed vision in emancipation. Rāmānuja thinks this to be the reality of mukti (mukhya mukti), Śaṅkara regards it to be the shade of it (gouṇa).

Jīvana mukti: Jīvana mukta passes into the calm, still the sense of manifoldness comes upon him implying a break in the continuity of his transcendent consciousness. The divided consciousness, again, appears, but can no longer assert. The spiritual consciousness divided unto itself has died out, though the form may still persist. The liberated soul has to run his earthly existence to exhaust his prārabdha or commenced karma; his is, therefore, a personal existence more in form than in reality. The direct vision and realization

immediately kill the sense of truth in the empiric order, the realism of normal consciousness, so that when the actual transcendent-consciousness has a break, the relativity of immanent consciousness can have no hold in truth, though its illusory form for the moment has an appearance. The practical reason with its affirmation of Vyavahārik sattvā has died out, imagination has lost its creativeness, theoretic reason, its capacity of judgment-construction. The consciousness is now free from the functioning of māyā, creative or veiling. The world is now a thin shadow, the appearance of reality is substituted by the appearance of illusion. Truly it has been said, 'Knowledge is non-different from its object, the object of knowledge is knowledge. Hence the knower is free from the pulse of desire or aversion.' Nothing is acceptable, nothing reprehensible, for nothing exists, besides an undivided bliss and consciousness. Ignorance is destroyed immediately and completely, it does not lose its hold by degrees.

Emancipation in life with the continuity of the combination of the sheaths has not been accepted by an authority quoted by Sarvajñātmuni. Emancipation is the destruction of avidyā, and with it is implied the disintegration of the mental, the vital, the bliss, the physical and the intellectual sheaths, the total eclipse of the I, the self-conscious seli. Nothing can remain after identity-consciousness. Knowledge is simultaneous with the casting off of the physical, the vital and the mental combination.¹ The sruti's affirmation of jīvan mukti² according to the author, is at best praise, for it seeks to enhance the

¹ Vide *Samkṣepa Sārīraka*, 4. 38, 39.

Dehadvayasyājñānavilasitatvāttattvajñānena ca svodayamālreṇājñānasya nāśitatvānnirāśrayasya kāryasyāvasthānāsambhavāt sadyo muktirevā dhruvetyarthaḥ.

² *Tasyatāvadeva ciraṃ yāvanna vimokṣye.*

importance of vidyā, knowledge and enlightenment, and not to affirm the actuality of liberation in life.

Prakāśtman, Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda and other teachers accept Jīvan mukti. Avidyā, no longer, exists with its two-fold function of obscuration and distention. The former is entirely lost, and therefore, the clear vision of a transcendent consciousness stands no chance of obscuration. Avidyā no longer persists, but its after-effects still continue.¹ Prakāśtmān has it that a jīvan mukta directly feels the identity. He occasionally feels it not, when the empirical sense recovers as the effect of long-acquired adaptation.² The possibility of jīvan mukti is a matter of technical dispute and nice theoretical analysis among the Vedāntists. But there can be no denying that as the effect of intellectual culture and Vedāntic discipline the adept soon has an opening in transcendental wisdom and delight ; though such an opening cannot long continue. Such visitations are rare, but they do not fail to impress upon us the reality of transcendent bliss, and the unreality of divided life and its promises.

There is no difference in the conception of freedom, be it liberation complete or liberation in life. Had there been any possibility of enjoying the concrete joys of life in a state of liberation in life, there would have been a chance of difference in the conception of freedom. But no such possibility exists, for the jīvana mukta is not sensitive to the pleasures or pains of the flesh. Vaśiṣṭha draws an effective distinction between jīvana mukta and videha mukta. Both, according to him,

¹ Vide *Laghu Candrikā*.

Jīvanmuktou samskāradirūpena mohasattvāt.

² *Kadācit asaṃprajñātātmaikadarśanam.*

Kadācit āravdha karmopasthāpita doṣa nimitta dvaitadarśanam bhavati (Vivaraṇa).

are free from earthly desires and are not affected by mental-being which is completely destroyed in the videha mukta, destroyed in reality as well as in form, but partially destroyed in the jīvan mukta, destroyed in reality (i.e. in its practical effect) but not in form. In jīvan mukta, the mind exists, but its theoretic and pragmatic constructions are lost upon consciousness. In jīvana mukti the seeker attains the freedom of knowledge. His is no freedom of will, or choice, for willing is energizing on nature's plane and he transcends nature and her operation. It is freedom of complete isolation and indifference, for he, no longer, is an active agent, he has no virtue nor vice, no good nor evil; rights, duties and values are categories that have no meaning for him. He is an onlooker of life and its claims. He feels them not. His is a life determined by the latent tendencies, and it is nature that works out in him, he no longer works. But no definite law can be laid down how a jīvana mukta should behave himself. Theoretically he is open to no influences. Forsakes or forsakes he not the active life, passes or passes he not into the life of renunciation (vidvāt sannyāsa) after knowledge, his is a consciousness of complete detachment. He loves and loves not. He kills and kills not. To him there is no necessity of loving or killing. These are ascribed to him to indicate the non-attachment of the soul attaining liberation.

To this conclusion we are forced by deduction. But life is greater than logic, and the attitude of indifference that should characterize a jīvana mukta does not manifest itself in every case. Jīvana mukta has two types, an active and a passive; the passive type is mostly indifferent to the demands of life and hidden in the mood of transcendence. It has a wise passiveness. It

is lost for the world and centred in the bliss of awakening. The active type has an expansive vision. The transcendent insight has the direct effect of widening the scope of practical sympathy. It has a force of expansion. Theirs is the life of service in the light of identity-consciousness. They live for others, for in them they find the identity of being. In loving others, they love themselves. They have the form of differentiating consciousness which inspires activity but the clear knowledge of identity completely changes its nature and character. In this way they work and work freely and spontaneously without any sense of restraint until the occasion arises when they, in the height of transcendent consciousness, forsake the flesh and the sense of acquired personality. The wheel of birth and death due to a divided consciousness is eternally stopped for them, for they do not incur new karmic debts. They seem to move and act, but act they do not, for they transcend will and its operation in nature's plane and understand the demand of will to be a demand of a false individuality not belonging to his being as a transcendent consciousness.¹

Rāmānuja has not lent his support to jīvana mukti. He has refuted it. Liberation in the sense of the destruction of all difference is not possible in the physical existence (atoḥ sakalabheda nivṛttirūpa muktirjivato na sambhavati), liberation, to him, is the final attainment of an unbreaking fellowship with the infinite and a likeness with Brahman in being and knowledge.² It is the opening of the transcendental truth and vision with the forsaking of the physical body after the karma on

¹ The more of it in my *System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*.

² Vide *Srībhāṣya*, *Br. Sūtra* 4. 4. 4.

Sāmyasādharmyavyapadeśo brahmaprakārabhūtasyaiva pratyagātmanah svarūpaṃ tatsamanaiti. . . brahmasamānaśuddhiṃ pratiṣṭhāpayati.

this plane has been exhausted. Mukti is, in other words, videha. A vision of the divine glory and the sense of our true inwardness of being may occasionally come to us in temporary transcendence of knowledge and love, but this is no liberation, the term has been used in its actual implication of complete freedom. Such occasional glimpses may strengthen our patience and perseverance in the continuity of intellectual and moral discipline and may also signify certain advance in spiritual life and realization, but with all these, they are no indication of liberation complete. Rāmānuja, therefore, understands liberation in the sense of actually passing into actual fellowship with the Infinite with the forsaking of the vital and physical sheaths.

The authors of the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* and the *Nyāyasiddhāṇjana* define liberation as *Brahma-sāmyāpatti*, the Brahman-likeness.¹ This *sāmyāpatti* connotes not the quiet absorption but an assimilation in Brahman, implying the newly budding consciousness of a free and unrestricted fellowship with the divine life, its self-expression in bliss and knowledge.

Jīva Gosvāmī has conceived two kinds of liberation, the liberation of the wise and the liberation of the devotee to suit his conception of Brahman and Bhagavān. Jīva Gosvāmī retains the conception of indeterminate-consciousness and in the course of spiritual realization, a state is conceived when the seeker feels the identity-consciousness, a state when the truth of difference is not yet in vision. It is awareness, a homogeneous consciousness and bliss. It is intel-

¹ Vide *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, p. 78.

Muktasya brahmasāmyāpattiḥ.

Vide *Nyāya Siddhāṇjana*, p. 78, para 2.

Paramaṁ sāmyamupaiti mama sādharmaṃyāgatāḥ ityādivalācca brahmaiva bhavāṇītyādīnāmapī sāmya eva tātparyamiti.

lectual intuition, the end of an effort of transcending avidyā and its operation. Such an identity-consciousness is still to them not the *summum bonum* inasmuch as it is a negative ideal, the denial of the manifold, and an indefinite bliss of an indeterminate homogeneity of consciousness. It is a stage reached immediately after the vanishing of avidyā and immediately before the definite heterization in bliss and consciousness. In the possibilities of spiritual life, such a realization is deemed an actuality unto those who have not still an access into determinate spiritual consciousness. The Kaivalya (the aloneness of existence) of the wise is thus a realization of the sameness in the truth of being, a sameness, which is only apparent and precursor of concreteness in transcendent experience. The transcendent identity is thus, to Jīva Gosvāmī, a fact and a realization, but it is only a fact because of the non-apprehension of the concreteness of spiritual life. The concreteness of relation is there, though for the moment the simple apprehension is all that is before us. This simple apprehension is the datum of further construction in relational synthesis of a heterization and a synthesis that can be accessible to a loving consciousness, which unfolds determinateness, concreteness and unity in spiritual realization. This concreteness of spiritual life and bliss can be felt when the stage of simple apprehension has been passed over, and the seeker gradually recovers from the overpowering sense of the first awakening in the expansion of consciousness and attains the concrete hold in spiritual life and assimilates it in the conceptual thinking and intuition. The conceptual life with its fullness of relation and unity is now in concrete intuition, and the spiritual life is now full of meaning and appreciation.

Jīva Gosvāmī conceives intellectual intuition of two kinds, which can be conveniently distinguished as knowledge-consciousness and love-consciousness. But the identity-consciousness is not exactly the absolute Identity of the Śāṅkarites, for to them it is the finality, and the concreteness has no place in it. Jīva Gosvāmī asserts that this concreteness is not the creation of avidyā. Concreteness is the absolute. It is real, though it is not manifest immediately in spiritual consciousness. So long as the attitude is predominantly intellectual, the difference-cognition is not in vision, for in consciousness in its generic aspect a difference cannot obtain a hold.¹ And this generic aspect is presented in the first illumination. The difference is the demand of love-consciousness, and it soon begins to unfold the higher and deeper satisfaction of a free gift and a free reception, which enhance the delight of realization and bring out the impulses and expressions of love-consciousness in all its varieties and details. In love-life the intellectual appreciation of unity and difference is put in the back ground, and new construction in beauty, sweetness and delight with touches on the finest emotions of all possible combinations and varieties gain the hold upon consciousness. Whatever may be the nature of love-realization, it can never transcend the perception of a unity and a difference, although love can add its own hues and colors to the expressions in this life of unity. Jīva Gosvāmī, therefore, accepts three gradual stages of the identity-consciousness, the synthetic-consciousness, and the loving-

¹ Vide *Śatsandarva*, pp. 680, 681, (Calcutta Edition.)

Tataḥ ca brahmaiva sannīti tatsāmānyatattadātmāpatyaivābhedanirdeśaḥ.

Evamevaṃ hi jīvo'pi lādātmyaṃ paramātmanā.

Prāpto'pi nāso bhavati svātantryādiviśeṣaṇāditi.

consciousness. Between the last two there can be no difference in cognition, though there may be a possible difference in the character of realization. The former has the predominating calmness of intellectual appreciation, the latter has the predominating sweetness of bliss-realization. Though either state has almost the same character, still the joy it affords has a difference and a peculiarity inasmuch as the former opens the intellectual vision, the latter, the bliss vision. But the difference is, to the Vedāntists, one of degree and intensity, but it is no difference of tattva or truth. The psychological difference of revelation cannot lead on to logical difference of concepts. Logically the concept of unity and difference works throughout, but psychology it admits of infinite shades in realization. To Jīva Gosvāmī these are experiences in love-consciousness and bliss attitudes.

Vallabha also¹ has conceived two forms of transcendent consciousness of Akṣara Brahman and Puruṣottama. The former is the identity-consciousness, the latter is the supra-person. The former dominates in knowledge-consciousness, the latter, in bliss-consciousness. The synthetic vision is the end of the quest, though on the way the identity is apprehended just after the bounds are crossed.

Jīva Gosvāmī acquiesces in the distinction of Jīvana Mukti and Videha Mukti, so far as the life of knowledge is concerned.² But this distinction he does not extend to love-consciousness, where the only form of mukti is

¹ Vide *Aṇubhāṣya*, Br. Sū., 4. 3. 17.

Jñānamārgiyanāmākṣara prāptistēṣāṃ edekaparyāvāsāyitvāt, bhaktānameva puruṣottamaṇāparyāvāsāyitvāt.

² Vide *Ṣaṭsandarva*, *Prīti-sandarva*, p. 678, 1. 3, 3.

Jīvala evāvidyākalpīlamāyākāryasambandhamithyātva jñāpaka jīvasvarūpasākṣātkāreṇa tādātmyāpannabrahmasākṣātkāro jīvanmuktiviśeṣa iti.

Videha Mukti. This, after all, is a nice distinction of terms. Even the Vaiṣṇava philosophers conceive the possibility of actual fellowship, however momentary it may be, in love-ecstasy, and occasional visitations from the loving God. Such visitations inside and outside our being are an actuality, but it is not liberation, for the continuity in such fellowship is broken. The occasional visitations are love-fits indicative of the actual revelation in consciousness of truth and beauty, but this is not characterized as liberation. But such love ecstasies are high realizations in spiritual life and do not leave the seeker blank. They have their permanent effects in the transfiguration of the functions of mental consciousness. Nothing is supposed now worth attaining and worth doing, except love and its service. The whole mental being undergoes a change, the asserting individuality with its divided consciousness and restless impulses yields to a submissive personality with its undivided consciousness and felicitous ease.¹

Madhva accepts Videha Mukti.² Liberation and continuity in physical being are not compatible. The author of the Nyāyāmṛta seems to have lent his support to Jivana Mukti (though, no doubt, he has done his best to refute the conception of the Śaṅkarites) in his own way. When the adept has the direct vision of the truth—a vision, cognition merely, but not the grace necessary to complete liberation, due to the short-coming—the absence of devotion which can only open the infinite

¹ Vide *Prīṭisandarva*, p. 691.

*Akiñcanasya dāntasya śāntasya samacetasaḥ.
Mayā santuṣṭamanaṣaḥ sarbāḥ sukhamayā diśaḥ.*

² Vide *Brahmasūtra*, ch. 4. 4, p. 155.

*Citīmātreṇḍriyāścaivapṛavistāviṣṇumavyayam
Tadaṃgānugṛhītaiścasvāṃgaireva pṛavartanam.*

possibilities of bliss¹ and its actual realization, he continues still in flesh to exhaust his 'commenced' karma. A similar conclusion we have in the Madhva Siddhānta Sāra. The author conceives two stages in the life of the seeker, (1) a stage of knowledge, direct and immediate, and (2) a stage of devotion after knowledge leading on to the final union with Viṣṇu and emancipation from the false individuality created by avidyā and fed by prakṛti.² This complete resignation and the sense of utter helplessness of the devotee pave the way to grace, which becomes the immediate cause of the final (videha) emancipation.³ Both the authors of the Nyāyāmṛta and the Madhva Siddhānta Sāra apparently conceive a stage of cognition direct which is not enough for the final emancipation, and unless devotion and the consequent grace come in, the adept has to run a physical existence and has not the bliss of inseparable union. Jivana Mukti is the stage of knowledge (Nyāyāmṛta). Devotion comes after knowledge.

Emancipation complete is wholly a matter of God's choice. The elect is liberated. Knowledge cannot bring in this election. Devotion excites surrender. And this giving up is followed by a sympathetic response, an absorbing embrace, and a complete deliverance from the prakṛta fold. Knowledge opens the gate, devotion and surrender deliver the seeker to grace which finally seals the bond of everlasting union.

Nimvārkācārya conceives Videha Mukti to be the

¹ Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 639.

Asmākaṃ tu aparokṣa jñāninopi svayogyaparamānaṃdahetu parama kṣāṣṭhāpannabhaktyabhāve tatsādhyasya mocaksyeṣvaraprasādasyābhāvena prāvṛdha karmaṇā saṃsārānuṣṭhyā jīvanmuktiḥ.

² Vide *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra*, sūtras, 529, 530.

³ Vide *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra*.

Jijñāsothha jñānajātātprasādādeva mucyataiti . . . yasya prasādāt paramārtirūpadasāmsārānmucyatenā pareṇeti.

only form of liberation. When the physical being is cast off with the exhaustion of karma, the soul is liberated. Nimvārka does not explicitly admit liberation in life, though he has an implicit reference to it when he says 'the wise, after having the full fruition of deeds, meritorious or unmeritorious, gets Brahman.'¹ The word (Vidvāna) is significant here. It establishes the actuality of immediate realization of the truth in life. Vallabha also accepts this conclusion.² Puruṣottamācārya³ says that 'even in this physical being a direct realization is the fruition of intense meditation; and the culmination reaches when the devotee attains unbreaking fellowship, when he leaves the mortal frame and acquires the spiritual vesture, the bliss-body, which fits him for direct service. Be it liberation or not, such a direct consciousness in life cannot be doubted, though it may be not an unbroken continuity, so long as the body lasts. But emancipation is, no doubt, complete, when the elect forsakes the flesh and passes into eternal fellowship and service in love.

Here, an interesting question suggests itself; has the liberated soul a body? As liberation is complete transcendence of nature's operation, the liberated soul can have no physical covering. But Rāmānuja thinks that it can at its own will assume a form, though itself is formless. It can draw its constituent matter from Śuddha Sattva and visualize itself. It is visualization, but not materialization. If it is a form, it is immaterial but none the less real. It is also an expression of spiritual being and consciousness. Rāmānuja does not put a limit to spontaneous expression in spiritual life (4. 4. 12).

¹ Vide *Brahmasūtras*, *Vedānta Pārijāt Samvāda*, ch. iv, 1. 19.

² Vide his commentary on 4. 1, *Sūtras* 7, 8, 9, 12.

³ Vide his *Vṛtti* on the *Anubhāṣya*.

It is a life of free expansion and expression, beyond the calculation of human reason and intellect. Such emancipated souls have the same satisfaction and privilege with Īśvara, excepting this that these souls can have no participation with the creative, regulative activity of the cosmos. Such a participation would establish a plurality of Gods: an unwarrantable hypothesis. Nimvārka has the same conclusion with Rāmānuja.¹ Madhva holds the same view.² Vallabha is positive about the spiritual form or body of liberated soul. So is Jīva Gosvāmī.

Vaṭṭa Keśava and Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya in the *Kramadīpikā* and its commentary have conceived two forms of realization, identity-consciousness and bliss-consciousness. The former is the vision of Brahman in its highest unity and integral synthesis (Parabrahma is Advaita) the latter is the vision of Īśvara, the supra-person with the manifest difference of its śakti. The former presents the Absolute in its integrity before view, the differences wherein are assimilated but not annulled, the latter, in its differentiated activity and being. A seer can have the vision of Brahman, in its identity-consciousness and expansive bliss or he can enjoy fellowship with Īśvara in love. Both these forms of awakening in supra-consciousness have been accepted, though the authors themselves have preferred the former to the latter. The former is predominant in intellectual consciousness, the latter, in bliss-consciousness. The one feels the calmness of expansive bliss and existence, the other enjoys fellowship and service in love.³

¹ Vide his commentary, 4. 4, *Sūtras* 11, 12, 16, 17.

² Vide *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra*, p. 161, *Sūtra* 592.

Vide *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, 44. 13.

³ Vide *Kramadīpikā* (Benares Edition), *Prathama Patul*, *Śloka*s 16, 17, 20 and its commentary.

Besides Jīvana Mukti and Videha Mukti the Vedāntic literature is replete with four other kinds of mukti. These, according to Saṁkara and his followers, are not emancipation, though they mark definite stages in the course of evolution, bringing out the higher possibilities that a soul can realize in nature's plane. Śaṁkara has this goal for the soul yearning for a superior and finer conscious opening, but this is still in māyā, and in fact the finer manifestation of its purer nature.

Īśvara with Śuddha Sattva is the highest existence in consciousness, power and bliss, though this existence is not transcendent. A seeker, possibly in the course of evolution, can get over the functioning of rajas and tamas and get to the pulse of sāttvic vibration of māyā. Such a pulse opens out to him the kingdom of Īśvara and this becomes his permanent habitat, for he has successfully got over the coarse existence in lower planes. This is technically called the attainment of the same abode with Īśvara (sālokya). But even when the adept inhabits the same plane of existence with Īśvara, he may be at a distance from the living centre of consciousness and power. A step higher in realization is, therefore, to get to Īśvara, to be with him, to be his constant associate. This technically is called sāmīpya. A still higher opening leads to the consciousness of similarity or identity of form or beauty (sārūpya) and eventually of power (sārṣṭi). Ultimately the sense of difference may be absolved, and the fit may have a penetration into the very being of Īśvara (sājuja), but this is no transcendent identity.¹ This is the identity-conscious-

¹ Vide Śatsandarva, Prītisandarva, p. 691.

Saivāntimā muktiṣca pañcadhā, sālokyasārṣṭisārūpyasāmīpyasājujabheda. Tatra sālokyeṇ samānalokatvaṁ . . . sārṣṭistatraiva samānaiśvaryaṁ api bhavati. Sārūpyeṇ tatraiva samānarūpatāpi prāpyata iti. Sāmīpyeṇ

ness with Īśvara. These forms of realization are accepted by the Vedāntists of all shades of thinking; but the theistic Vedāntists suppose them to be openings in transcendent consciousness, above the plane of māyā and its functioning. They belong to the nitya-bibhūti of Īśvara, and not to *līlā-bibhūti*. The direct consciousness of a free and expansive life in bliss is immediately experienced. Though the finite consciousness as finite cannot command such a vision, still such an expansion in consciousness and delight is thought possible through the intervention of śakti, svarūpa-śakti, which, because of its complete surrender, infuses its own power and enlarges the vision of finite consciousness. Such an intervention is thought absolutely necessary before the finite consciousness can have the lift and transcendence. Such an infusion or ingress of the expansive life current breaks the bonds of attachment which fastens jīva to prakṛti. It removes the hold of prakṛti and the bondage of a distorted and egoistic consciousness.

The Madhva Siddhānta Sāra has accepted all the above four forms and accentuated the emotional experiences of loving and service-consciousness.¹ Vallabha and the Bengal School do not differ here. Consciousness in liberation is chiefly the love and beauty-consciousness. The expression of the unitive consciousness in the delight of fellowship and the joy of service is more manifest and the bliss-consciousness dominates here over knowledge-consciousness. And this fellowship in bliss-consciousness presents the being of Brahman in delight in excelsis, freed as it is from any other consciousness of Brahman besides beauty,

samīpagamanādhikāritvam. Sāyujyaṁ keśāñcittu bhagavacchrīvigraha eva praveśo bhavatīti.

¹ Vide *Sūtras* 592-95.

sweetness and love. A description of this love-consciousness has been given in the chapter on Appearance. A repetition is not necessary.

Love-consciousness, again, reveals itself in five forms. The simplest manifestation is quietism—the consciousness of calm, tranquil equanimity. This is the intellectual passiveness, experienced just after the transcendence.¹ Such a state the adept feels when he crosses *māyā*. When the consciousness which was for the moment overpowered by the depth and immensity of the infinite life recovers itself and has the clear knowledge of its relation to the infinite life, love begins to color this relation with its characteristic hue, and the consciousness of service (*dāsyā*), friendship (*sakhya*), parental tenderness (*vātsalya*), and in amorato sweetness (*madhura kānta*) follow in quick succession.² The service-consciousness has the quietism of the first stage with a touch of loving-consciousness of the devotee and the joy of service. The sense of difference between the subject and the object of love is great, though love works to resolve it to a minimum, yet it in this plane love cannot manifest its full nature, beyond service, and the joy it affords is the consciousness of this service.

A stage higher, love-consciousness dissolves the sense of difference, and soon reveals the equality of loving and loved-consciousness. The tie that binds

¹ Vide *Bhaktirasāmṛta Sindhu*, p. 563.

Vihāya viṣayonmukhyaṁ nijañānasthitiriyataḥ. Ātmanaḥ kathhyate so'tra svabhāvaḥśama ityasau. Prāyaḥ śamaḥpradhānānāṁ mamatāgandhavarjilā.

² Vide *Bhaktirasāmṛta Sindhu*, p. 570.

*Svasmāt bhavanti ye nyūnāste' nugarāhyā harer matāḥ.
Ye śyustulyā mukundasya te sakhāyaḥ satāṁ matāḥ . . .
Guravo ye harerasya te puṇyā itī.
Mithoharermrigākṣyāśca sambhogasyādikāraṇaṁ.
Madhurāparaparyyayā priyatādyoditā ratīḥ.*

is the tie of eternal friendship. A stage still higher love-consciousness has a complete inversion; though the subject and the object remain the same in love-consciousness, still the loving-consciousness has now the mastery over the loved object, which has now totally become the object of love-ministration. It is no longer service, but it is ministration of the elder to its younger charge. And the loving-consciousness is maternal consciousness with its anxieties and delights. The anxiety is greater than delight, though this anxiety is in itself delightful. Next and last of all love reveals an attitude which combines the peculiar consciousness of the preceding three stages with its own differential characteristic of inamorato sweetness and beauty. It is essentially the consciousness of undivided unity in which the instinct of service, the sense and joy of equality and the anxious solicitude of maternal devotion are all present with their own characteristic unique touch.

Here, again, loving-consciousness reveals different attitudes. In the lowest form it manifests consciousness in which self-gratification is the motive in loving, though the gratification is possible in association with the beloved. Such a loving-consciousness has a yearning for constant fellowship, for the delight it affords to self.¹ If this motive is flagging, the loving-consciousness has also a fall in intensity. Love here is ego-centric. This, technically, is called 'the common', the 'sādhāraṇī'.

Further, loving-consciousness inamorato can manifest an attitude in which the delight is divided between the loving and the loved. Sometimes, the divided sense

¹ Vide *Ujjvalanīlmaṇi*, p. 681, *Śloka* 30 (Berhampore Edition).
Nātisāndrā hareḥ prāyaḥ sākṣāddarśanasambhavā
Sambhogecchā nidāne'yaṁ ratih sādhāraṇī matā.

predominates when the loving-consciousness enjoys the delight-self and sometimes, the sense of partnership is lost in the consciousness of unity which yields no joy to self. This is called technically, the 'sāmanjāsā'.¹

Next to this, love-consciousness reveals its highest attitude from which the thought and motive of a divided loving-consciousness and its own delight are completely absent, the delight of the beloved is the only end in view. If the loving-consciousness has a delight, it is the delight which the beloved enjoys—it has, in this state, no separatist consciousness. The delight of the beloved is the only delight which it shares, if it actually ever does so in unbroken fellowship with the beloved. Complete is the selflessness, full is the realization of unity in the intensity of loving-consciousness. The being, for the moment, is undivided, and the blessedness, the revelation affords, is no longer distributed; the loving-consciousness has the delight of the loved, the loved, of the loving. Love has its highest possibility in such a unitive consciousness. Such a state is called 'samarthā' 'the complete' or 'the perfect', i.e., revealing the complete self of love and its true import.¹

In the chapter on Appearance a distinction has been drawn between the aggressive and the submissive types of loving-consciousness. The former has been preferred to the latter as the type that fully draws or brings out love in its complete being and fullest delight. The submissive type has a tendency to be in tune with the life and expression of the object, and as such it becomes a quiet passivity.

The aggressive type, on the other hand, calls forth love-reflexes by constant assertion and consequent

¹ Vide *Ujjvalanīlmani*, p. 683, *Śloka* 33.

opposition. Such a dialectic opposition brings out the love-consciousness in its full immensity and deep diversity, and never allows the zeal and warmth to flag and diminish. The former technically is called *Ghṛta-sneha*, the latter, *Madhu-sneha*.¹

Vallabha has pinned his faith and ideal also to love inamorato. It is called *Puṣṭi* in his phraseology.² In love excelsis the devotee has the immediate vision with all the experiences, of change in love-consciousness.³ So much for the ideal in realization.⁴

Next we consider the different forms of Vedāntic discipline.

In Śaṅkara's system the ethical discipline is not the direct cause of realization, though it is an accessory to intellectual penetration and discrimination. Śaṅkara's system is chiefly intellectual and the philosophical discrimination of the real from the unreal is the immediate cause of realization. With an intellectual discipline in Vedāntism, the seeker transcends the impulsive and emotional consciousness and has a soaring in intuitive effort. Here again, the intellectual discipline may have two forms, the one is a dialectic consciousness, the other, a psychological opening. The Sāṃkhya Mārga (as the former is called) is exclusively an intellectual insight, reared up by a logical discipline, unaccompanied by any form of mystic opening. It is prominently the philosophic method. It requires an open and a free mind to follow the course of rational thinking and when

¹ Vide *Ujjvalanīlmaṇi*, p. 686, *Śloka* 37.

² Vide *Ujjvalanīlmaṇi*, pp. 710, 714, 715.

Ātyantīkāḍaramayaḥ sneho ghṛtanūṭīryate.

Madīyatvātiśayabhūk priye sneho bhavenmadhu.

Mattatośmadharaḥ sneho madhusāmyānmadhūcyate.

³ Vide *Premeyaratnāṇava*, p. 32.

⁴ Vide chapter on Appearance.

this logical understanding is satisfied, the discriminative reflection begins. As the result there of the mental-consciousness soon parts with its concrete modification, for backed up by a logical sense, it no longer attends to the sense-datum. It now is engrossed in meditation upon ātman, and an indeterminate modification of mental being, a continuous and undivided transformation into the form of ātman is soon established. Such a modification is called vṛtti in Vedāntic terminology. The process of inversion is started. This is the first stage. Before it can take a firm hold upon mental-consciousness, it must destroy the contrary modification of antaḥkaraṇam in the form of the manifold, the saṃsāra. In this stage the mental consciousness has the capacity to get over the habitual accommodation and to go out in search after reality. It soon realizes in the intensity of meditative penetration the delight of self-opening and becomes more engrossed in it. It gains a firm ground in us and soon the absolute consciousness in its integrity reveals itself. This in the third and the last stage which is immediately preceded by the negation of the manifold existence including the vṛtti itself. The first stage marks out the origin and the continuity of vṛtti, the second, its final disappearance, the third is the stage of illumination and knowledge.

Between the second stage, the denial of the manifold and the ātmic-revelation in the third, there is no sequence in time. They are simultaneous. Ātman, strictly speaking, cannot be known, for it is never an object to a subject. It transcends the ordinary operation of thinking. Even if it be not known, its existence and knowledge can be indicated by the last stage of mental transformation. It is known by implication as identical with the denial of illusion. And we have this denial in

the concrete in the last state of *vṛtti* (mental functioning) (i.e. the second stage indicated above) which destroys the conceptual structure and the empirical intuitions of the sense and with it is itself lost or destroyed. The meditative penetration has the effect of opening intuitive consciousness and with it the conceptual thinking and the sense apprehension in immanent consciousness completely disappear. *Avidyā* with its phantoms is totally denied. A training in Vedāntism has not the desirable effect of destroying nescience, unless it is followed by direct knowledge. The immediate assertion of truth requires a direct denial in knowledge. The consciousness of division is put off, and the *jīva* attains the freedom or emancipation. Freedom or emancipation is not of *ātman*, which is eternally free. Nothing can restrict its freedom, for nothing, besides it, exists. We cannot speak of freedom or bondage of *ātman*, for they are relative concepts. The one implies the other; these concepts can be extended to *jīva*, the psychological self, but not to *ātman*, the transcendent identity. Here again, the psychological or the empirical self completely vanishes, and psychological ideality consists in limitation or reflection. So with the limitation (put upon by *avidyā*) removed, the transcendent self is what alone is left. Liberation is to cast off this sense of limitation, and to get into expansive consciousness.

A distinction is drawn between the perception of *ātman* and the perception of concrete facts. In the latter case the mind-stuff goes out and takes the determinate forms of the object. The object technically is called *Falavyāpya*. In the former case, the mind-consciousness does not take any form, for Brahman has none. Brahman is *Vṛttivyāpya*. In other words, the mental functioning in concrete perception is determinate.

It reveals the object by removing the particular mode of ignorance. The mental functioning in indeterminate perception is indefinite, it cannot take any form and remains an abstract function; though it removes the primal and indeterminate ignorance, yet it is itself lost. Brahman is the locus of ignorance, and with the disappearance of ignorance, the locus remains, just as it is for ever.

Such a realization presupposes an adaptation and a fitness chiefly intellectual. This is generally indicated by the three-fold method of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. Śravaṇa introduces the subject with a course of instruction, manana establishes the logical cogency and nididhyāsana, the sustained reflection, strikes deep the truth of identity in our heart. Śravaṇa displaces the crudest form of ignorance, viz. Brahman does not exist. Manana refutes the opposite philosophic conclusion. Nididhyāsana is the continuous meditative effort to realize the truth of identity. The discipline is chiefly reflective criticism and psychological analysis.

Nididhyāsana has two forms according as the duality of the witness and the mental modification, the peculiar psychoses set up by the constant thought of the axiom of identity, exists or not.

Besides this logical reflection and criticism, Vedāntism has also in it the method of psychological opening and revelation. The discipline is to open the super-consciousness, and then to dissociate the witness-consciousness from the psychic revelations. The Yogic penetration has the immediate effect of enlarging and widening the range of mental vision, for it brings out the hidden potentialities of the instinct of service, love, aesthetic delight and knowledge. These actualities of super-conscious experience are the sure sign and

indication of the gradual assimilation of Īśvara's being and experience, and the more the adept is fixed into this opening, the more he is conscious of Īśvara's nature and existence, the less he is conscious of his own self, and its hold and relations. The supposed reality of a previous moment is no longer real and has not the same value. With self-opening the order of relations and the value-conception have a complete change. This opening is wrought gradually and has different stages. These are indicated in the Vedāntic literature as :—

- (1) Pratika-worship,
- (2) Sampat-worship,
- (3) Ahaṁgraha-worship.

In each of them the objective in meditative consciousness is Brahman, with this difference that in the first two forms of worship, the objective consciousness predominates and in the last the subjective. In Vedāntism the objective consciousness has always a reference to an external object. In pratika and sampat-worship, the attention is directed to Brahman, a symbolic locus. Pratika-worship is more conscious of the locus, or the significate than of the object to be meditated upon. This is just the initial stage of conscious spiritual opening. Sampat-worship is conscious more of the object to be meditated upon (i.e. Brahman) than of the symbol, which is left in the background of consciousness. The mind has now the capacity of meditating upon abstract qualities or things and can easily transcend the help of a concrete symbol of the immediately preceding state. This, sometimes, is called Sambarga Vidyā. But in both these forms we have a reference to Brahman as the object, the jīva-consciousness as the subject. This distinction is soon got over in the ahaṁgraha-upāsanā wherein a complete psycho-

logical inversion in the thought and meditation of the self as Brahman is clearly manifest. The object is merged in the subject or the magnified subjective consciousness. The subject becomes itself the object. In other words such an opening removes the duality of the sense or the intellect and in its place institutes the cosmic will and consciousness. The jīva-consciousness, its limitation and restricted life are replaced by the Īśvara-consciousness and its expansive and free life. The dominated consciousness is now the dominating-consciousness. Māyā no longer controls.

But the Vedāntic transcendence is not yet reached. Though the opening has revealed an expansive life, still such a life is in touch with the energizing māyā. The transcendence is reached when the locus consciousness realizes its difference from the energizing māyā. The more we get to the locus, the more the creative and individuating principle disappears. An indifferent witnessing state soon brings in the consummation.

We should not forget, for a moment, that the direct and immediate cause of emancipation is knowledge; ignorance causes bondage, knowledge gives liberation, for knowledge is opposed to and destructive of ignorance. Whatever may be the preliminary discipline, transcendence and emancipation are simultaneous with knowledge destroying ignorance. The chastening of emotions, the purification of will, the right regulation of conduct, in short, the ethical discipline, have a place in the life of knowledge, but cannot give us knowledge direct.

They prepare us for the final intellectual penetration and insight, but they cannot effect immediate vision and transcendence. Vācaspati holds that they indirectly help our knowledge by creating a desire to know and by

purification of the mental and intellectual sheaths. Karma, or merely properly regulated life in the light of śāstric injunctions, generally known as dharma, is inherently incapable of removing ignorance; for it is a life in ignorance; a divided life cannot, by a pulse of will or by a move of emotion, deny its own individuality. A course of evolution in accordance with an ideal of perfection is possible, but it is not emancipation. The ethical life with a devotional attitude has been provided with a progressive evolution, the ideal life and consciousness which has the possibility of even realizing a nature like Īśvara's, but still such an ideal, because of its still emphasizing the dynamic evolution of consciousness and being is still an evolution in nature's plane. It may be the ethical or the karmic end, but because of its being separated for ever from the truth it cannot be the goal of the search. Truth is everlasting. Everything is illusory and unreal. Will and its affirmations have a value, but not the permanence; but that which is not abiding cannot demand intrinsic value, sooner or later its truer nature reveals itself to be a hollow show, however attractive it might have appeared a moment before. Truth is reality. And the eternal reality is the fact of consciousness. The real is, therefore, the good. In Sāṃkhya Vedāntism, therefore, the ethical life gradually transforms itself from active usefulness and regulation of conduct to search after truth, for it soon discovers that truth is our being.

The dynamic conception of being in Vaiṣṇavism necessitates a different discipline for realization. The intellectual opening and conviction have the immediate effect of transfiguration and transformation of the vṛttis, the love and action impulses are withdrawn from their natural hold and directed to embrace and serve the

divine love and grace. The intellectual illumination of the divine life expressing itself through the inmost being of ours and the external nature at once remove the separatist consciousness and drive away the conflict and discord of apparent divisions between man, society and nature and in its place institute a harmony of divine life, a harmony which we can feel and enjoy in the highest synthetic vision.

It should be at once clear that the Vaiṣṇavas, unlike the Śaṅkara Vedāntists, retain an element of difference, a difference, not to indicate a division in the integrity of the Infinite (for even according to them, there is no difference but a distinction),¹ but to allow the beatitude in love and service, the mutual giving and receiving, the love currents and responses. Such a conception of receiving and embracing and the delight of giving and taking have no place in Śaṅkara. And this becomes possible in the dynamic view of Infinite life, and this difference is no difference at all, for the expression and the expressed represent the same being in its concreteness and definiteness. This run of thought must be borne in mind to understand what follows hereafter.

Rāmānuja's Scheme.

A difference in basic conception of life and reality naturally demands divergence of discipline. In Śaṅkara nescience is the root of the appearance and knowledge is the direct cause of its destruction. With the complete denial the end is achieved. In Rāmānuja denial has no place, for nothing is or can be denied. The jīva continues for ever, but if its being cannot be denied, it can be saved from the influence of avidyā and its travail

¹ *Vide* ch. ii.

of divided existence. It can transcend this earthly life and can pass into the *nitya-bibhūti* of *Īśvara* and be eternally saved.

To this end, an intellectual conviction of the pure self-conscious nature of *jīva* (different from the outer physical and vital sheaths) is a preliminary, a conviction that is necessary to transcend the attractions and possibilities of mundane or any higher plane of existence in the realm of *prakṛti*. The possibilities of an evolution in the *prākṛta*-self is fraught with danger of a fall as soon as the effects of meritorious deeds cease. Meritorious deeds have an expansive effect, but as soon as the effect ceases (for it is not permanent), the expansiveness is again, replaced by a contraction and closing. In nature these processes are subject to extraneous influences, and the force of *karma* has a transitory effect. As such evolution in nature's plane is not infrequently followed by involution. Moreover, such an evolution is the effect of *karma* and a life in *prakṛti*. It may be finer in life current and expression, but it has no hold upon conscious life. An expression in self-consciousness in dissociation from *prakṛti* is all that gives security in transcendent existence.

Such a revelation cannot be wrought by *karma*, especially when *karma* is directed to the satisfaction of craving and impulses. Such craving is nature's working in man and hardly can we get over nature by following nature's craving and its satisfaction.

The immediate demand is, therefore, not the absolute eradication of desires, but complete transformation of them. Such transfiguration is possible when the impulses and cravings are chastened under the noble and the central impulse of service. Such a consciousness

has the effect of chastening the impulses and directing them to God-head. Karma, thus understood, has a place in the life of devotion and, as such, becomes a means thereof. Such karma has been diverse: worship, penance, charity, performance of sacrifices. These have the effect of destroying our sins and chastening the mental-consciousness.¹ Karma can, mediately through self-knowledge, or immediately in itself, bring in bhakti. Self-knowledge, of course, implies the philosophic intuition of inseparable unity of jīva and Īśvara. It is not only the jīva-consciousness, but jīva-consciousness in synthetic unity with Īśvara-consciousness, as transcending prakṛti and the empirical self.² The author of the Nyāya Siddhāṇjanam—Vedānta Deśika—opines that bhakti is the immediate cause of God-consciousness. To attain bhakti self-knowledge (jīva-consciousness) is necessary. Such a self-consciousness, again, has two means, knowledge and karma. Knowledge, the differential consciousness of the self as distinct from the bodies, is rare and difficult. The fit can, if they like, leave karma aside. Naturally these two courses have been open to the philosophic and the unphilosophic consciousness. The philosophic mind can have an intellectual discipline and a consequent opening of self-consciousness, the unphilosophic mind cannot enter into the intricacies and subtleties of thought but can feel the pulse of devotion when the mind has been chastened by a course of practical discipline. And it requires no demonstration that bhakti reveals the self in its purity

¹ Vide *Srībhāṣya*, pp. 11, 12 (Narasimhācārya's Edition).

² Vide *Yalīndramatadīpikā*, p. 62, and *Nyāyasiddhāṇjanam*, p. 70, para 2.

Atredaṇ tattvaṃ bhaktiyogaḥ paramātmaprāptiyupāyabhūtaḥ tadaśaktasya tadbhaktiyogasidhyarthamātmāvalokanamapekṣitaṃ, tasya ca jñānāyoga-karmayogau dvau prthagupāyau tatra jñānāyogaḥ svātmāvalokane'ntaraṅgaḥ.

and simplicity unto itself, so that the practical devotee, though he may have no training in intellectual culture, has the clear cognizance of his truer nature with the attainment of bhakti.¹

What then is *bhakti*? *Bhakti* is conceived at once as a discipline and an end.² As a discipline it is a method of God-realization, a method which, far above anything else, can open in us God-consciousness. As an end it is the peculiar satisfaction and bliss, which never fails such realization. It is the realization and its immediate effect is overflow of bliss and delight.

Rāmānuja identifies bhakti with the knowledge, that does not waver. It comes in as the effect of continuous and never-breaking meditation. When the mind has a course of training in Vedāntism and reflection there-upon, the mind takes to meditation, and in the depth of meditation, the self has the illumination. Bhakti connotes such meditation and spiritual illumination. As such it is knowledge.

Though bhakti has been characterized by the Rāmānujists as knowledge, still it is not the analytic penetration of yogic consciousness, which is in the main discriminating, nor the transcendent static consciousness of the advaitins. It has in it a synthetic vision and a sympathetic response, opening as it does the inward being of ours in constant tune with Infinite life and expression.

With this revelation bhakti at once perceives an anxious solicitude in the Infinite to carry us up and the solicitude soon manifests itself in the form of grace.

¹ Vide *Nyāya Siddhāntjanam*, p. 69, ll. 4, 5, 6, 7.

² Vide *Nyāya Siddhāntjanam*, p. 71.

*Sādhanaṁ bhagavatprāptou sa eveti sthīrā matiḥ
Sādhya-bhaktistathā saiva prapattiriti gīyate.*

When a certain advance has been secured in the newly budding bhakti-consciousness, a feeling and an apprehension of a loving-impulse becomes explicit, and the strain of a conscious effort in self-control and self-regulation is replaced by the comfort of a loving embrace and soothing delight. The struggling creature has now the flood of the Infinite love poured into his anxious soul which soon discovers that unless and until the wave of grace clarifies his vision and removes the limitation of his finite consciousness, he has no chance of participation in Infinite glory and constantly enjoying the bliss of fellowship with the Infinite. Such an opening and a reception require an absolute passiveness which the seeker gets in the consciousness of complete surrender. Śaraṇāpatti (resignation) is that particular form of consciousness which has the immediate effect of ignoring all relations of life, all securities and stages in the worldly environment and making God the only stay in life and death. It centres our whole mental being in God.¹ God-consciousness becomes the dominating mental attitude. The more complete is the resignation, the more does the devotee open himself unto grace, the more he receives the grace, the more becomes his attitude fixed. It is no circle. In the life of devotion, a certain preparation chiefly moral, an intense thirst (tṛṣṇā), an uneasy feeling and a constant yearning (vyākulatā) and a consequent resignation which a consciousness of our utter worthlessness brings in are the initial demands. Love creates these states to purify us, to chasten us, to bring us solely under love's control and protection. The love-consciousness cannot establish itself fully, if life-pulses have other attractions and other securities.

¹ Vide *Vedānta Saṃgraha*.

Unless the conscious impulses are wholly given up in love, love cannot fully manifest its being. The love (bhakti) consciousness, therefore, in the beginning prepares the soul to fit it for receiving mercy. This mercy is love's best expression, and with it the struggling effort of a free self-directed discipline ceases, and the adept has the greatest delight in completely giving himself up to grace. And with this he has his highest achievement, nothing more remains to be done, but to receive and enjoy the Infinite-mercy in knowledge and love and to serve it in will. After the great revelation, service-consciousness dominates, for service in loving-consciousness keeps up the mutual relationship in giving and taking which characterizes the life of love. The choice of love and service, be it free or induced by śāstric injunctions, is soon replaced by a spontaneity in service and love, for after the ignorance and the individuality created by it have vanished, the whole personality becomes infused in love. Whatever now is manifested in love-consciousness is no longer a discipline, peculiar to devotion, but a transcendent revelation of love's being and self. And in such transcendent being, there is the only self of the Infinite; the question of freedom or determination of our being does not arise at all, though to retain the supremacy of the Infinite the teachers of Vaiṣṇavism attribute complete determination and subjection to finite wills.

The acceptance of the reality of finite selves and the denial of the least independence to them are certainly philosophical issues deserving of consideration. The independent being of finite selves makes them real and not phantoms and the complete subordination of their wills keeps up the harmony of the totality. The supremacy of God's will and the subordination of the

finite wills establish a fellowship in the unity of the Absolute. The life of finite selves is in tune with the Infinite life and the finite selves in subordination to the Infinite instead of feeling a limitation enjoy the fuller and more expansive being. For this subordination to the Infinite is really in a sense a subordination to its own more complete and actualized self. Subordination is not a happy word here. Fellowship suits better. A life in the spirit is essentially a free life. Determinism cannot prevail there, though the totality moves in unison with the spirit and delight of freedom. This, no doubt, is the consummation reached in the fellowship of spirits. But such a consummation is possible to such spirits as have got over the privileges and opportunities of the life in nature and have entered into the rhythm of spiritual life.

The devotion-consciousness has varied attitudes and expressions. These attitudes have effects in internal or external expressions. Meditation (*dhyāna*), constant remembrance (*smṛti*), and resignation (*ātma-nivedana*) illustrate the first, obeisance (*namaskāra*), singing in praise and ejaculation (*stuti*), uttering mentally or in high pitch of voice God's name (*kīrttana*), and worship (*arccanā*) illustrate the second. The devotional consciousness in the first case affects the inner mind, in the second, mind as well as the senses and the organs of activity. In short, it affects the whole mental being, the sense-organs, the organs of sensibility and activity.

The devotional consciousness soon passes this stage of expressions and calls for mercy and its transcendent fineness. And the God-vision is immediate. In the immanent consciousness devotion cannot have its finest expression, for the consciousness is still associated with *māyā* or *prakṛti*, and in its immanent being

devotion cannot have the God-vision, though devotion has varied expressions exhibiting its functioning even in immanent knowledge. Devotion has a superior force, for it can hold in momentary abeyance the working of normal consciousness, though it cannot exhibit itself in its finest and truest being.

The devotional consciousness even in its truest forms supposes ethical and dietetic regulation. These have no immediate bearing upon knowledge, though they have a place in the composite discipline leading to final realization. The performance of sacrifices (Vedic), the control of inner and outer senses, the regulation of breath, the practices of concentration have their own importance, either in purification, or in promoting physical and mental vigour, for the higher adaptation and opening. The sacrifices have a reference to God-consciousness and as such secure a place in devotion.

Rāmānuja enumerates seven aids to devotional consciousness. The first is viveka, purity of food (a food of pure stuff given by pure men and previously untasted by any body). This dietetic purity promotes the purity of being in sattva śuddhi; sattva śuddhi, again promotes clear and determinate knowledge (dhrubā smṛti). The second is vimoha, i.e. freedom from desire. The immediate effect is detachment and tranquillity. The third is abhyāsa, i.e. frequent repetition. The fourth is kriyā, i.e. performance of sacrifice. The fifth is kalyāna. It is truth, simplicity, charity, benevolence and non-maliciousness. The sixth is anabasād, constant vigilance and absence of despondency. The seventh is the avoidance of the other extreme, the overflow of joy.

Rāmānuja draws a distinction between duties and bad or good deeds. Duties are the enjoined deeds which

await performance in different stages of life. Deeds, not enjoined by the *śāstras*, are bad or good. They are positive obstructions to knowledge and as such to be replaced by duties. The performances, by removing the deeds opposed to knowledge, are aids to knowledge, aids only because karma is necessary to knowledge and has a direct bearing upon it.

In Rāmānuja the whole conscious life is one life and naturally the ethical discipline has a reference to metaphysical consciousness of God and cannot do without it. In fact, the ethical and the devotional consciousness is the same consciousness, there is no duality of practical and pure reason. The practical reason or the karmic discipline is an element in the synthetic devotional consciousness, and the distinction which keeps karma separate from *jñāna* vanishes.¹

Madhva does not materially differ from Rāmānuja. He has almost the same discipline for realization. A course of moral training putting the senses, inner and outer, under control, the complete abstention from gratification of desires, here or hereafter (fastening us to an egoistic consciousness), a course of intellectual instruction in Vedāntism and critical reflection thereupon with its evident intellectual illumination—the discrimination of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*—are auxiliaries to a life of faith and devotion. Madhva does not falter from the essential position as to the fulfilment of duty and knowledge in love and faith. Such a preparation, a clear moral consciousness with an intellectual satisfaction, is the demand of faith-consciousness, before it can take firm root in the seeker.² The moral discipline chastens

¹ Vide *Śrībhāṣya—Introduction* and *Vedānta Saṁgraha*.

² Vide *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra, Sūtra* 529.

the soul, the intellectual conviction with meditative effort sows the seed of faith and devotion, which draw out grace and make the soul recipient of it in the humility of complete surrender.¹ Śaraṇāpatti, according to the author of *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra*, is an attitude of loving-consciousness, which has completely given itself up with a firm conviction of a merciful protection and care.² And bhakti is itself an unceasing attraction, which keeps the adept open to the influence of grace. Madhva in his *Aṇubhāṣya* reckons three forms of grace :—

- (1) Grace consequent on karma ;
- (2) Grace consequent on śravaṇa (discourse and instruction) ;
- (3) Grace consequent on knowledge (Jñāna Samāpatti).³

The entire process of discipline is one process, though bhakti in its pure essence comes long after, but on its emergence, liberation or union cannot be delayed for a moment. The full fruition of bhakti is bliss, and in this form it is ever present in the liberated soul. Such consciousness cannot unfold itself, unless it is preceded by moral and intellectual discipline which, again, is bhakti in its lower being and expression. The former is the resultant, the latter, the discipline. But both of them are expressions of grace, lower and higher.

Faith-consciousness has different types :—

¹ Vide *Aṇubhāṣya* and *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra*, pp. 120, 121, *Jñānaprakaraṇa*.

² Vide *Madhva Siddhānta Sāra*, p. 121.

*Sarvottamatva vijñānapūrvam tatra manaḥ sadā,
Sarvādhikāpremajuktaṁ sarvasyāttra samarpaṇam.*

³ *Karmaṇātvadhamāḥ proktaḥ prasādaḥ śravaṇādibhiḥ, madhyamojñāna sampattiyāprasādistūttamomataḥ.*

(1) Intellectual type dominating in knowledge (Jñānapradhāna).

(2) Emotional type dominating in affection (Snehaprodhāna).

(3) A mixed type in which both the elements are equally (Jñāna-sneha samājukta) present.

The teachers of the Bengal School have no material difference from Rāmānuja and Madhva. They have carried the analysis of synthetic consciousness of bhakti to its causal and effectual form. The former is discipline, the latter is its true being. Faith-consciousness is essentially actualized spiritual consciousness, but so long as its full being and essence are not revealed owing to the operation of avidyā, it can have a partial expression through the ordinary functioning of consciousness. It works unseen as the inward stirring to a spiritual consciousness. In the period of initial formation, we fail to catch the occasional glimpses and to distinguish the spiritual from the ordinary functioning of consciousness, but faith-consciousness does not fail to assert itself soon in evolving an intuitive-vision and actualizing the potential spiritual being in man, who now realizes the dual character of his being—a being dominated by avidyā, and evolved in māyā and a being in transcendent glory of spirit. Faith-consciousness works this out before it can reveal its own being in supra-conscious planes. The newly actualized and differentiated conscious spiritual self has now the privilege, the fruit of surrender and humility, of fully apprehending the true being of faith-consciousness, which soon appears as love-consciousness. Love seals the bound of union for ever.

Love-consciousness has forms of expression. Before it can present the love-self in transcendent objective

consciousness, it presents it in subjective (though transcendent) consciousness. In the former the pulse of a new life is felt within, and the revelation is in the inner self, and with the intensity and fullness of love-consciousness the presence of love-self is felt within and without. It is no longer a stirring and a reception from within, it is a presentation within and without. Love removes the veil completely, and the seeker has the delight of union within and without. The sense of separateness is completely lost. Love fills our being. It stirs from within and receives from without.

Love consciousness has stages of development. In the crudest form, it originates in sanctions (chiefly śāstric). The consciousness is here dominated by the fear of authority and the consequent sense of duty. Though it has this initial start, it cannot remain long in that form, for love soon outgrows its infancy and attains maturity in its fuller expression as the very being of self. The sense of 'oughtness' dies out. Love has an ease of expression, spontaneity of fellowship and delight of service. The force of 'constraint' is replaced by the delight of freedom. Not only this. The natural attachment and attraction, the soul of love, not revealed in the lower stages of expression, are now in their full vent. Love is here knowledge, delight and keen attachment.

Love originated in ought-consciousness has a course and a development. It gives us in its fulfilment that attitude which presents to us God as majesty and power. Love as spontaneous attachment presents to us the divine beauty and sweetness. The cause of spontaneous love is either the direct touch of mercy or the direct intervention of śakti. Here again, the consciousness may dominate in cognitive aspect, the synthetic

relational-attitude may be apparent in love-consciousness. It, again, may dominate in delight. Herein, the relation-consciousness is overpowered by the free spontaneity of love-bliss. The delight of fellowship, the joy of service, the unique expression of bliss-consciousness in *excelsis* are in their highest intensity, and in this overpowering feeling-attitude, the relational-consciousness is naturally at a sufferance. In these attitudes, again, love is both the means and the end, and as means and end it has characters differentiating love-attitude as intellectual-consciousness and love-attitude as delight-consciousness.

Rūpa Gosvāmī has traced the successive stages in the growth and evolution of love-consciousness. Devotion is the first requirement. It leads on to fellowship with teachers, followed by instruction and practical discipline. This has the immediate effect of removing obstacles positive to faith-consciousness. With the removal of obstacles belief gains a firm ground and fixity, belief originates taste and likeness, which create attachment. Attachment begets bhāva. Bhāva is an effective mood of consciousness. Bhāva in its depth is prema. Bhāva gives us an inner revelation, prema both inner and outer, subjective and objective revelation.¹

Faith-consciousness has certain effect :—

(1) It destroys the kleśas. The kleśas are sin, their seed is avidyā. Sin is again, either 'commenced' or 'uncommenced'. The 'commenced' begins to yield fruit. The 'uncommenced' is the potential karmic effects, which, in fullness of time, becomes the 'commenced'.

¹ Vide *Bhaktirasāmṛta Sindhu*.

(2) It bestows all kinds of happiness upon the devotee and makes him the centre of universal attraction.

(3) It minimizes the blessing and beatitude of emancipation i.e. the delight it affords is greater in its effectiveness than the delight of liberation.

(4) It can be realized with great difficulty and hardship. It is the direct gift of God and cannot be attained without His Grace. A course of self discipline hardly brings it within our reach.

(5) It is in itself the source of positive gratification, it being itself bliss.

(6) It attracts the divine mercy.¹

Teachers of Nimvārka School trace the successive stages of discipline which begin with the regulation of karmic-consciousness and end in the fruition of faith-consciousness. Nimvārka has emphasized the importance of karma, knowledge and faith. Karma has no direct bearing upon liberation. It helps the origination of knowledge and devotion by chastening the mental-consciousness. Karma with an ephemeral purpose in view has the effect of breaking mental calmness and is not, therefore, conducive to knowledge. Vedāntism in all forms denounces the life of purposive activity in the physical plane of existence, as karma creates the possibility of future birth. Vedāntism is the denial of life in ignorance and karma originates from the false individuality. But life on nature's plane is essentially a constant demand on our karmic obligations, and these demands we are to meet without any hope of gain or reward and to bear a mental detachment, so much

¹ Vide *Bhaktirasāmṛta Sindhu*, p. 13 (Berhampur Edition).

*Kleśaghñī śubhadā mokṣaśaṅkṣatāṅkṣatā sudurlabdhā
Sāndrānandaviśeṣātma Śrīkṛṣṇākarsinī ca sā.*

necessary for higher opening in intellectual and spiritual life. This break between spiritual being and practical energizing on the biological and physical plane is characteristic of Vedāntic thought: will, as energizing on natures' plane, is to be controlled before one can aspire to the dawn of philosophic insight and spiritual vision. But the moral energizing in duty-consciousness in natures' plane with a strict ethical discipline is what is insisted upon as preliminary to faith and knowledge.¹

Faith comes next. It is the finer conscious stirring to God-consciousness. It manifests itself in constant remembrance and resignation. Faith gives knowledge direct. It opens the vision and brings out the true nature of reality. Devotion and resignation give surrender, surrender calls forth grace. Grace brings redemption.² Grace, though it is never-ceasing and expansive, cannot be universally effective, for it awaits some fitness and preparation before it can be received.³

Faith-consciousness has an inferior and a superior being. The former is the discipline, the latter, its being. Before faith in its essence can emerge, the discipline, by a purification of the mental consciousness, gives direct knowledge of the self, the 'tvam' of the Vedānta. It subsequently reveals its love-being. Love directs all intellectual and conscious functioning to God.

¹ Vide *Vedāntaratna Manjuṣā*, p. 94 and also Vedānta. *Pārijāt Saurabha*, Br. Sū. Bhāṣya, iii, iv, 27, 33

Kaṭṭṭvādyaabhimānaśūnyaśūnyamukṣubhiranusthītāṇaṃ teṣāṃ manahśuddhi paramparayā jñānabhakti janakatvena mokṣa sādhanatvam.

² Vide *Vedāntaratna Manjuṣā*, chap. 3, pp. 96, 97.

Atha bhaktiyogonāma vārṣika gangāpravāhavadanavacchinna . . . bhagvatśmarana santatirupānubhūti viśeṣaḥ . . . prapattiyogo nāma śāstrokti jñānādi sarva sādhanāṣu svasyā'sāmarthyākalaṅkṛta . . . bhagavati atmabhāvanikṣepanarūpaḥ.

³ Vide *Manjuṣā*, chap. 1, p. 18, para ii (Chowkhamba Series).

God-consciousness is now the only consciousness that prevails.¹ Faith secures the immediate calm in mental consciousness necessary to sustained meditation. It can without the least effort put the mental consciousness in a meditative strain. It moves our whole being to God, it fixes the mental being thereto and gives knowledge direct and constant (*dhruvāsmṛti*).²

Teachers of the Suddha-advaita School make a division of bhakti as puṣṭi and marjyādā. Puṣṭi is spontaneous effort and expression of love-consciousness, marjyādā is conscious effort and expression. The latter is always directed with an ulterior motive of freedom from bondage. The former has no such conscious end in view. It is the self of love and delight. This puṣṭi is in the gift of God. None can acquire or attain it by self-effort, though a certain preparation is a preliminary to its reception.³

This puṣṭi has four forms :—

- (1) Pravāha-puṣṭi,
- (2) Marjyādā-puṣṭi,
- (3) Puṣṭi-puṣṭi,
- (4) Suddhā-puṣṭi.

The first is the beginning of attraction to God, the second is the aversion to earthly pursuits and the concentration to meditative and kindred effort. The third and fourth indicate love in its purity which exhibits itself in spontaneous devotion and service.⁴ The seeker

¹ Vide *Vedāntaratna Manjuṣā*, p. 126, para 2, ll. 1-4, p. 127, para 2, ll. 1-4.

² Vide *Parapakṣagirivajra*, p. 581, ll. 7, 8. (Brindaban Editon).

Dhyānam ca vijātiyapratyayaśānyatve sati dhyeyākāraika smṛtirūpaṁ tadeva paripākāpannam dhruvāsmṛtiparābhakti śavdābhidheyaṁ—sattva-suddhou dhruvāsmṛtiḥ.

³ Vide *Prameya Ratnāṇava*, p. 29, para 2, ll. 1-4.

⁴ Vide *Prameya Ratnāṇava*, p. 17, para 3.

exhibits a taste and an attraction in the initial stage, before he can have the consummation. This taste presupposes a psychical culture and an opening. This culture in the terminology of the Vaiṣṇavas is bhakti. Bhakti creates the intense desire of hearing discourses, reflection and meditation. Constant application leaves permanent impression and creates a subjectivity. This is called bhāva. This subjectivity in its intensive strain causes revelation in inner-consciousness. This revelation, though temporary and occasional, deepens the taste and intensifies the attraction. It also changes its character. It is now immediate. This taste is now the indicator of the true inwardness of our being and keeps the new life fresh and vibrative. Bhāva is deepened and passes on to prema, which reveals God in and out. In the intensity of prema, maddening attraction is visible in the adept to any and every object, everything is seen in divine glory. Such an attraction is vyāsan. Love condensed is vyāsan.

Puṣṭi confers the uncommon privilege of direct fellowship marjyādā, a fit body for service and sājujya. Some think puṣṭi-puṣṭi gives the first, puṣṭi-pravāha, the second and puṣṭi-marjyādā, the third.¹

The doctrine of grace needs an illuminating exposition. Vaiṣṇavism counts upon grace as the immediate cause of liberation from the divided life consequent on association of the soul with nature. Grace sheds forth kindly light and loving attraction which carries the struggling soul up to the fullness of life and light. But before the soul can feel the touch of grace and receive it, it is to be absolutely purified and resigned. Karma

¹ Vide Introduction to the *Sevā-falan*, and the *Suddha-Advaita-Mārtānda*.

gives this purity of being, resignation and humility. In lowliness and humility the spirit receives grace. The Vedāntists accept the ever-presence and ever-expansiveness of grace, still they maintain that grace is vouchsafed unto the spiritually fit. The importance of karma and self-discipline has been emphasized in this affirmation. Mercy bestows its genial protection and upward stirring to every struggling consciousness, but the virtuous and the meritorious alone are fit to receive them. The unrighteous cannot receive them by the grossness of their nature. Even in cases when the flow of divine mercy has an unprecedented swiftness, the heart must have been pure, the spirit lowly, and the intellect in tune with the synthetic vision. Grace or mercy is consequent upon clarity of vision and lowliness of spirit. When the synthetic vision is in complete sight, the heart moves in the rhythm of the synthetic life and gradually begins to receive the loving touch and the protecting care of Mercy. Such a conception of mercy is not opposed to the self-effort and self-discipline. 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.'

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